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ABSTRACT
A Method of Pricing European Style Equity Options
by: David Harris
The study of option pricing has a very short history, when compared with other
elements of economics. Since the publication of a method to price European style
equity options by Fischer Black and Myron Scholes in 1973 a vast amount of
research on option pricing has occurred. Ultimately, the pricing of equity options
depends upon the match of the model and reality. A new method to price option
contracts is proposed. It is argued that the distributional assumptions of standard
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LIST OF SYMBOLS
Significant abuse of notation occurs in this dissertation. There are two practical
reasons for this. The first is that the dissertation has over two hundred equations
and inequalities. They cover diverse range of fields that are normally conceptual-
ized as distinct from one another.
This presents two problems. The first is the exhaustion of the English and
Greek alphabet. The second is that in many fields letters have specific meanings.
Should decision rules be denoted as δ, or should dividends be denoted δ. Should
prices be denoted as p or should probabilities?
Symbols a defined locally and in the context of their usage. This avoids mov-
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Since 1952 economics and finance have been driven by mean-variance finance, either
directly due to the model being taught and used in application, regulation and law,
or by driving alternative methods due to observed anomalies that would imply the
various models of mean-variance finance fail to explain significant phenomena. An
article, and subsequent articles following it, by Benoit Mandelbrot in 1963 should
have brought an end to the discussion by empirical falsification, but did not.[60]
Mandelbrot’s article was built around the premise that returns on investment
followed a Cauchy distribution. As the Cauchy distribution has no mean, and
as a consequence no variance, mean-variance finance should have stopped there;
subject of course to further study of the distributions involved. Unfortunately a
number of things prevented this.
The first difficulty was the choice of hypothesis testing method. Certain hy-
pothesis testing methods, given the sheer quantity of data, are problematic in this
setting. The second is closely related, which is the tradition of testing log returns
rather than actual returns. This method comes from a time period when com-
putational limitations made this practical. The logarithmic transformation of the
data alters the mathematical properties present in ways that most would find un-
expected. The third reason was the perception that no first principles reason for
Mandelbrot to be correct existed, but there appeared to be a first principles reason
for mean-variance finance to be correct. Indeed, two Nobel Prizes were awarded
3
despite known empirical difficulties. Fourth, the models were perceived to have
assumptions that were too simple to model the world. This led researcher to at-
tack the symptoms rather than the core elements. Fifth, the models made simple
predictions using very well understood technologies. Ordinary least squares dom-
inated the methodology, or variants on it, and as this is computationally simple
and quick a natural resistance to the use of other technologies formed. Sixth, the
methods of mean-variance finance allowed economists to drop utility from prob-
lems. Utility and more generally preferences can allow Keynes “animal spirits,”
to run amok in economic models. Despite Pareto’s indifference curve, the utility
function is a pointless added difficulty if it can be avoided.
Of course, the needs of empiricism can force science to face unpleasant choices.
There is always a struggle between Occam’s Razor and accuracy. Models lacking a
variance, and more importantly, a covariance matrix leave economists back in the
pre-’50’s world with a requirement that everything be begun again from scratch.
That is not trivial. Box and Draper point out,
that all models are wrong; the practical question is how wrong do they
have to be to not be useful.
The answer to the question provided here is mean-variance finance carries no
information about the world when understood in a Bayesian framework and re-
sults in a non-measurable set when a non-Bayesian mechanism is used. It will be
shown that mean-variance finance results in a mathematical contradiction when
understood in a Bayesian framework and a near complete loss of information when
a non-Bayesian mechanism is used. Hence, not only is the Black-Scholes Option
Pricing Model not usable as a model, it must be replaced. The beginning of the
process of replacing option pricing models is contained in this work. This work does
not provide the correct method to price options. It provides a method that can
be used to price European style equity options. Definite empirical improvements
are available and will be discussed.
The intuition that economics must go backward to go forward is correct, but
that is not a bad thing at all. Luminiferous æther was unknowingly a step back-
ward, or at least sideways, but physics has since not only survived but thrived. The
Higgs Boson, light that becomes a solid through quantum entanglement, landing
4
on the moon and magnetic resonance spectroscopy show a vibrant field. Economics
hasn’t changed a lot since Samuelson. Tomorrow is a vibrant new day, one without
a mean or a variance. Incredible natural variation is now open for economists to
capture in wonderful models. Even though economics is less esoteric then physics,
its problems are no less important.
1.1 Reworking The Math
If it is assumed that the empirical difficulties with mean-variance finance imply
something is wrong in the underlying models, then it is tempting to look again at
the math. If one goes back to the original articles and asks what would happen
if different choices were made, then new models can be constructed. The question
then regards what math to use.
The math used in this dissertation is somewhat of a reworking of the path
taken by mean-variance finance. As such, it is important to understand the meth-
ods and goals of mean-variance finance, at least in generalizations. At the same
time, other topics that have previously been secondary issues in economics and fi-
nance suddenly move to the forefront. In particular, liquidity costs assure the laws
of probability hold for option markets where market makers permit private parties
to underwrite the short position in option contracts.[76] This is a rather surprising
observation. Although it is possible to assume the laws of probability into exis-
tence, the presence of an at-risk, profit-maximizing, market maker guarantees they
hold.
Either a monopolist market maker or a regulated competitive market maker
nearly assures an equilibrium even in the presence of risk loving actors.
Liquidity costs are not the only required but generally ignored element of option
pricing. Bankruptcy is necessary for option pricing to exist in equity markets.
Without the possibility of bankruptcy, such as through legalizing intergenerational
slavery and indentured servitude to pay debts, there is no left boundary for the
statistical distribution and as such no expected profit.1 Unexpectedly, the presence
of bankruptcy may be necessary for economic growth as will be shown later in the
section on the data.
1See section 5.9 for discussion.
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Merger risk is not required for an equilibrium price to exist within the op-
tion markets themselves, but the absence does raise questions on the relationship
between physical capital and financial capital.
The final issue is the existence of dividends. Historically dividends have been
a nuisance. Even though standard finance theory says a firm’s price is equal to
the discounted value of future dividend flows, in equilibrium; they have uncertain
timing, uncertain payment amounts and are subject to suspension. Regardless,
dividends affect option prices even for firms that do not pay dividends.
The other difference in this dissertation is using Bayesian rather than Pearson-
Neyman or Fisherian methods. This is due to the methodological issues in estima-
tion created by limiting support to the positive real numbers due to bankruptcy.
Although this is a seemingly small change, that is formally accounting for survivor
effects, it turns out to create economically substantive biases in estimation.
Since the 1950’s a synthesis of Fisherian and Pearson-Neyman methods has hap-
pened and for purposes of this dissertation will be called Frequentist or Frequency
based methods. The two schools differ in important ways, but the differences do
not impact the logic or discussion here. The greatest difference between the two
schools regards the distinction between statistical significance and hypothesis test-
ing and the use of the likelihood function versus the minimum variance unbiased
estimator. With one brief potential exception, the differences do not impact the
content here.
In Frequency based methods the function to estimate statistics and perform
inferences is critical. There is an absence of estimation tools and testing tools for
the mixture type problem present here. The closest is to use the extant literature
which assumes the support for returns on the entire real line. Bankruptcy makes
this impossible.
Unfortunately, the minimum variance unbiased estimator extant in the liter-
ature over-estimates returns by two percent per year and underestimates risk by
plus or minus four percent per year, due to the impact of bankruptcy on the
distribution.[83] This absence of a pre-existing tool in the Frequency-based liter-
ature is not an issue for Bayesian methods. In any Bayesian problem, the data
is passed through Bayes rule even for the strangest of all distributions. Inference
is performed on the posterior distribution or as a ratio of likelihood functions.
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In doing so, Bayesian estimates lack the systematic bias present in the currently
available Frequentist methods.
1.2 The Background for Mean-Variance Finance
Historically, there have been a variety of approaches to pricing equity option con-
tracts. This dissertation takes a new and novel approach using relatively primitive
maths. The primary method currently in use in economics is based upon Itô cal-
culus as pioneered by Louis Bachelier in 1900.[9] His work was expanded upon
by Fischer Black and Myron Scholes in their article The Pricing of Options and
Corporate Liabilities.[16] A primer in such methods is provided by Neftci.[69]
The goal of such pricing models is to determine what price, in equilibrium,
would hold for option contracts. The model was originally derived as an extension
of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and the general methodology is the
continuous time expansion of that model, which is a static model. Mean-variance
finance was pioneered by Harry Markowitz and A.D. Roy. This work was later ex-
panded by Black, Sharpe, Linter, Treynor and Mossin. [15, 57, 62, 65, 89, 104, 105]
An alternate model was developed by Ross as Arbitrage Pricing Theory(APT).[82]
The APT differs in that it considers the factors that drive pricing.
The models have a variety of assumptions that are key to understanding them.
For the continuous time models, the requirement is that the time series converges.
For arbitrage pricing theory to hold an expectation and variance must exist, further
through the use of principal components analysis or factor analysis additional
restrictions are placed upon the error terms. For the CAPM the requirement is
that an expectation, variance and covariance exist. Itô pricing models can be
derived either from the CAPM framework or the no arbitrage framework.
At the core of each of these models is that the distribution of returns has
both a mean and a variance. Indeed, many models go a step further and simply
assume that a normal distribution is present. This is extremely reasonable given
the nature of many economic models. Further, even if this isn’t true, provided the
underlying distribution has a mean and a variance, then the sampling distribution
of the means will converge to normality due to the central limit theorem.
The central limit theorem is so named, not because of some limit at the center
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of the distribution, nor due to the presence of the mean at the center, but rather
due to its central importance to the field of statistics.[46] While it is central to
statistics, its importance to economics is even greater. The normal distribution and
the expectations operator are everywhere in the modeling of economic processes.
What very few people, other than statisticians, are aware of is that there is an
important restriction in the classical central limit theorem regarding the existence
of a mean and a variance. The classical central limit theorem applies to any arbi-
trary probability distribution with a fixed mean and variance. This requirement, if
not met, causes the classical central limit theorem to be inapplicable to real world
problems.
The first appearance of this restriction in the normal law of errors, as it was
originally called, was in a note by Poisson. Poisson, in reviewing the theorem,
noted that the distribution f(x) = [π(1 + x2)]−1 was a counter example to the
theorem, as the distribution has neither a mean nor a variance. Still, Poisson
wrote,
But we shall not take this particular case into consideration; it will
suffice to have remarked upon the reason for its singularity and note
that we will without doubt not encounter it in practice.[96]
Independently, Bienaymé wrote an article showing that least squares regres-
sion provided the best possible mechanism to fit a line to data, in contrast to a
method provided by Cauchy.[96] He had discovered that the method of ordinary
least squares gave the best linear unbiased estimator. This triggered a series of
articles in which Cauchy developed a distribution, the Cauchy distribution, which








While nothing stops people from using ordinary least squares as an algorithm,
or for that matter finding a sample mean or sample variance, the algorithm has no
predictive value and inferences obtained are meaningless. Indeed, Sen notes that
such a method would be perfectly inefficient when compared with valid solutions
when the Cauchy distribution is present.[87]
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The first appearance of the normal distribution in economics and finance ap-
pears to be a presentation by Jules Regnault in 1853.[9] He discovered empirically
what Bachelier would argue theoretically in 1900. In the interim, Edgeworth, fol-
lowing work by Laplace, Jevons and Quetelet, would argue for applying the law
of errors to investments in general and Bank of England notes in particular. He
takes it further, seeking to unite utility theory and probability theory.[32]
Edgeworth would not be the first to attempt to do this. The first is by Bernoulli
in his solution to the St. Petersburgh paradox.[112] To leap into mean-variance
finance one must first pass through the works of Clark[24], Böhm-Bawerk[110, 111],
Veblen[109, 108], Fisher[35]. Keynes[49], Pareto and Hicks.[44]
Böhm-Bawerk, Clark, Fisher and Pareto pull together the interest rate as the
marginal cost of patience. A careful read of Veblen’s work on the leisure class
could be read as the first work on behavioral finance. Keynes work creates an idea
not possible in the classical school, inefficiency and emotion in markets. Their
work stands in contrast to the combined work of Pareto and Hicks. Hicks’ work
is central to the classical school of thought regarding capital. It is this work that
starts Markowitz down his path breaking idea of having economists measure both
risk and return.[62]
While Veblen and Keynes would continue to influence future economists, the
latter more than the former; it is Markowitz who would set in motion Hick’s
unattained goal of “an economics of risk.” Although Roy simultaneously discovered
the same thing, it is Markowitz’s work that is remembered.[84]
Hicks appears to make two conflicting comments in his book Value and Capital.[44]
On the one hand, he clearly argues that people include risk in their plans and prices,
implying economists should measure risk. However it is also clear from his writing
that the tools to measure risk do not exist.
Hicks goes on to state that economists can ignore risk because it is included in
the plans and expectations of the actors. By watching actual returns we implicitly
get the risk variable, hence we need not measure it.
It is improbable that Markowitz could have guessed the impact of his initial
writing. The transformation is greater than formulating a trade-off scheme between
risk and return, it is a way of thinking about and including statistical measures
in economic thought and economic processes. A casual read of this initial work
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shows a field of economics in a comparatively primitive state. Indeed, without
Markowitz, this and subsequent work is impossible. Although earlier writers, such
as Regnault, Edgeworth, Hicks and von Neumann bring uncertainty and risk into
the discussion, Markowitz and Roy are the first to propose a mechanism of exchange
between return and risk.
It is from this starting point, and that of Bachelier and Samuelson, that Black
and Scholes derive the model now considered the cornerstone of most modern
models.
1.2.1 Partial Examples
The first problem to understand with the mean-variance models is that they are
perfectly valid mathematical models given the stated assumptions. They are not
valid scientific models because it is implicit in each of these models, given they are
strictly true, that the marginal investor seeks to lose money with every transaction.
This is far from obvious and so an understanding of the goals and methods of
construction of the models are necessary. John H Cochrane’s Asset Pricing is an
excellent book to use to understand these models.[25]
To understand the problem with mean-variance finance it is first critical to un-
derstand what the models are trying to do and how they are arrived at. Markowitz’s
original paper was designed to provide a tool for asset allocation among compet-
ing assets by individual actors. In treating prices as given, the question becomes
what allocation of risky assets should be selected? The models share a variety of
elements as they ultimately are inspired or even directly derived from Markowitz
and Roy’s original papers.[62, 84]
In some form, there is an expected return. How that expectation is arrived at
is unclear in the Markowitz paper, but because there are no costs in the primary
models, it is necessary that in equilibrium allocations will be driven by the expected
returns and that these returns are known in some manner to everyone.
It is rather important to note that equilibrium in these models is not defined
as market clearing. The quantity supplied isn’t even restricted to the number of
existing shares, as it is possible to short sell and in effect create an infinite number
of shares. Likewise, the quantity demanded can grow without bounds as infinite
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borrowing is possible. Implicitly the market clears, but there is no explicit math
to support this.
Equilibrium in the CAPM, for example, would be that each asset is efficiently
priced. The simplest way to explain this would be to posit that pricing errors are
driven to zero from competition. If an error is present then the model cannot be
in equilibrium as this would constitute an unrealized profit. This is close to an
absence of arbitrage condition.
In addition, the models posit the existence of finite variance for all assets and
indeed presuppose a positive definite covariance matrix for multi-asset models and
a fixed variance for single asset models such as the Black-Scholes option pricing
model.
Most models also include a risk-free asset. A risk-free asset is an asset that
pays out the same amount in all states of nature. A risky asset’s payout is state
dependent. Most standard models include this. The existence or absence of a
risk-free asset is without consequence to this dissertation as it has no effect on the
work involved.
Most models assume the actors involved are in perfect competition with sym-
metric costless information and an absence of moral hazard. There is an extensive
body of literature on the lifting of these implicit restrictions.
Finally, there is an implicit assumption that individuals are utility maximizing
and seeking a profit from investing or that firms that are investing are profit
maximizers, both subject to a chosen level of risk. Alternatively, they assume the
dual problem that individuals are risk minimizers for a given chosen level of return.
1.2.2 Example–Individual Asset Allocation With Risky
Assets
Assuming no risk free asset, a possible solution to the asset allocation problem for
a single individual following the Markowitz model is as follows:
Assume an arbitrary but finite number of risky assets exist. Further assume
that a vector, to be denoted µ, exists and that this is the solution to the equilibrium
required return by the market in perfect competition. Further pre-suppose that
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the covariance matrix, to be denoted Σ, exists of the returns on investment for
the universe of traded assets. For each individual actor a utility function exists.
This utility function is implicitly maximized, given the risks and market prices, by
choosing some total portfolio return, a scalar denoted µp. From these assumptions,







µ′s = µp (1.3)
1′s = 1 (1.4)
Placing the problem in the form of a Lagrangian equation it becomes:
L = 1
2
s′Σs+ λ(µp − µ′s) + γ(1′s− 1) (1.5)
1.2.3 First Order Conditions for an Optimum
Solving first order conditions to determine an optimum:
Ls = s′∗Σ− λµ′ − γ1′ ≡ 0 (1.6)
Lλ = µp − µ′s∗ ≡ 0 (1.7)
Lγ = 1− 1′s∗ ≡ 0 (1.8)
Second order conditions are omitted as it is well known that the solution has a
unique minimum, the second order conditions play no subsequent role in this sec-
tion, they play no role in the disproof of mean-variance finance, and they consume
space. For proof see any standard reference or the underlying proofs cited in the
bibliography.
1.2.4 Moving Toward a Solution
Using the equations resulting from the first order conditions we note that we al-
ready have solved the optimal allocations given the shadow cost of changing the
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expectation and the shadow cost of removing the restriction that allocations must
sum to unity.
Beginning with equation 1.6 we note that post multiplying by Σ−1 results in
the solution:
s′∗ = λµ′Σ−1 + γ1′Σ−1 (1.9)
It becomes a matter of solving for three equations with three unknowns. Trans-
forms of the first order conditions result in a definite solution of all unknowns.
The addition of the assumption that a market portfolio exists, that is all assets are
owned, and so statements about the market in general and the behavior or assets
in particular are possible. The addition of a risk-free asset or a zero-covariance
portfolio allow a complete solution of the market equilibrium beyond a solution for
a single actor.
The solution for the Black CAPM is:
µi − µz = βi(µm − µz), (1.10)
where µz is the expected return on a portfolio of assets with the property that
the collection of assets have the relationship of having zero covariance between the
chosen portfolio and the market portfolio.
1.2.5 Example–A Continuous Time Single Asset Model
The key to understanding Black-Scholes is in understanding the logic by which
the solution is set up. Indeed, it has a long and relatively tedious solution that is
in itself not very enlightening. Fundamentally, however, only a few core concepts
are needed. The first is that there is to be created some contract expiring under
known conditions whose value is derived from the price of an underlying security
and the statistical properties of that security. The price will vary with the passage
of time and is modelled as a differential equation of bounded variation.
For purposes of this dissertation, the fundamental equation that sets a solution
in motion is:
dXt = µ(Xt, t)Xtdt+ σXtdZt (1.11)
where dZt is a diffusion process, Xt is a price, µ is a function that drives price
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The key element here is that σ is a fixed constant. A perfectly hedged portfolio
is then constructed of a European style call(or put) and some asset. This hedge
removes all risk; so the logic goes that in expectation, the hedged party will receive
the risk free rate. The key to understanding how this happens is through Itô’s
Lemma. Itô’s lemma permits a solution such that at the limit, the stochastic
portion converges in value to the deterministic portion driven by time.
The resulting formula becomes the difference between two cumulative normal
distributions, one scaled by the price of the underlying, the other scaled by the
present value of the strike price. The critical assumption is that of a convergent
process and a fixed variance.
1.2.6 Example–Arbitrage Pricing Theory
Arbitrage pricing theory takes a completely different tack on the pricing of equity
securities. It varies in key areas from Black-Scholes and the CAPM, but if its
factors are complete, then all variability of return would come from the variability
accounted for by the model’s factors.
The fundamental idea is that each security has factors that determine its return.
Further, if you demeaned those factors and placed the mean drift into a variable,
then return could be predicted by knowing the factors, the drift and the effect of
errors. In particular, one could construct the following equation:
r̃i = µi +
K∑
k=1
bikFk + εi, (1.14)
where r̃i is the return on some asset i, µi is the mean return on asset i, ε ∼ N (0, σ2i ),
where Fk is a factor with mean zero, and bik is the factor loading for that return.
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Ross then takes a novel approach, he asks explicitly what would the returns
become in equilibrium if the investor had no money invested, that is they short sold
an amount equal to the long side of the portfolio and if no arbitrage opportunities
existed.
To do this three things must be present. First, there must be no money invested,
that is to say:
I∑
i=1
si = 0. (1.15)
Second, the portfolio must have a large enough number of securities to drive id-
iosyncratic risk to zero at the limit. Third, factor analysis is used to construct
orthogonal sub-portfolios so that:
P∑
p=1
spbpk = 0, (1.16)
where p is a sub-portfolio, sp is the allocation of some factor loading, and bpk is
the loading of that factor on that sub-portfolio. This is added together so that the
portfolio has no systematic risk.
The absence of arbitrage and the absence of risk with no investment implies
that the return on investment, in expectation, is zero.
Of interest is that the expected return is zero, that no systematic or idiosyn-
cratic risk exists, and in particular the long run effect of errors do not matter at
the limit.
1.2.7 Commonalities
The models share a handful of things. Finite variance exists, in equilibrium prices
converge so that they behave as if expected returns were known ex ante, equilibrium
is with reference to pricing efficiency and no actual shares exist just allocations
of money, implicitly consumption needs have no consequence to the equilibrium,
errors are normally distributed and implicitly there is no free lunch.
Generally accepted in economic modelling is that errors will be normally dis-
tributed. Indeed this will become the crux of the problem. An assumption of
normality is generally a low risk assumption in many problems. Many distribu-
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tions can be approximated with the normal distribution without a large loss of
precision. Many models can be reformulated so that the difference is irrelevant.
Many statistical tests are going to use an assumption of normality. This is emi-
nently reasonable and also incorrect.
1.3 Post Markowitz and Roy
1.3.1 Static/Discrete Models Post Markowitz and Roy
Markowitz’s stated motive in authoring his initial paper was to correct a statement
by Hicks.[62] The most probable statement in Hicks is a sequence of comments in
Value and Capital about risk and return. Hicks states that people consider risk
when choosing a return, but also states that economists can ignore risk as we
can neither see the risks as seen by the actors nor determine what information is
available to the actors. However, since risk should be incorporated into return, we
can simply look at returns.
What makes this change profound is not merely that we now try to measure
risk, what makes this profound is that under this formulation there is a trade-
off rule between risk and return. Tobin then extends this to include cash as an
asset; this change starts the development of the risk-free rate as a concept in the
models.[103]
The challenge at this time is one of calculation; and indeed, the idea of a Cauchy
distribution being present in the data may have been better received in the modern
world of super-computing. Given the limited resources available at the time the
next step was by Sharpe who reduced the calculation burden substantially.[88] This
led to independent work by Sharpe, Mossin, Lintner and Black.[15, 57, 65, 89]
These static models would launch the linkage between the continuous time mod-
els and option pricing creating the transformative article by Black and Scholes.[16]
1.3.2 Continuous Time Models Up To Black-Scholes
As mentioned earlier, Bachelier developed the ground work for Brownian motion
in his dissertation in 1900. Unfortunately it would moulder on shelves for decades,
while its content would have to be reinvented by Einstein and Kolmogorov.[9] It
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would sit until revived by Savage, who sent postcards to economists around the
world recommending they read Bachelier’s dissertation.[9]
In parallel, mathematics and statistics solved many of the key subsequent
challenges that would be necessary to arrive at the Black-Scholes option pric-
ing model. From an economist’s perspective, the next major innovations were
Itô’s development of the stochastic integral and Donsker’s work to show that con-
tinuous time and discrete time models were equivalent mappings through scale
invariance.[30, 45]
Although the major innovation of Bachelier was to arrive at the Brownian
process with its symmetric normal distribution, this was a problem for economists
as it permitted negative prices through normal shocks. The next innovation was
to propose a log-normal distribution to evade the issue. It’s only downside is that
bankruptcy becomes impossible as the shock could never reach a zero price. In the
intervening period work by Samuelson and by Osborne, a physicist, prepared the
way for Fischer Black and Myron Scholes critical paper.[74, 85]
1.3.3 Empirical Criticism
Yilmaz provides a good discussion of the literature of criticisms of Black-Scholes
and replicates them with data as well.[116] According to Yilmaz “empirical evi-
dence shows that the classical Black-Scholes model does not describe the statistical
properties of the financial time series very well.” Yilmaz notes excess kurtosis,
skewness, volatility clustering, the volatility smile and market completeness.
While Yilmaz provides extensive references for these, Yilmaz constructs them
from data as well. This criticism goes back to Mandelbrot’s criticism of the mean-
variance finance in 1963.[60] While it is a truism that all models are wrong, some
are more so than others. If a Cauchy distribution is present in the data, then mean
based measures will be uncorrelated with nature at the limit.[87]
The thesis of this dissertation is that in the absence of boundary conditions,
the distribution of returns must converge to a Cauchy distribution as time goes
to infinity. If one assumes, rather than proves as is later done, that a Cauchy
distribution is present then a new light is shone on the model contradictions.
While the Cauchy distribution has no measure of its kurtosis, when measured
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using an assumption of normality, the Cauchy distribution has a high kurtosis. To
provide an illustration, given a data set to be modelled by a Cauchy distribution
and a normal distribution by setting their modes and their probable errors equal,
you would find the Cauchy distribution is expected to be 310 quadrillion times more
dense than the normal distribution for data with a mode of zero and a probable
error of one when measured at six times the probable error.
The measured skew likely has several components. Since the standard devia-
tion, skew and kurtosis are arrived at using normality based measures and that
there are no defined moments for the Cauchy distribution, caution should be used
when discussing such observations. If the models are true, then there should be no
excess kurtosis or skew, except in the case the log-normal model is used. In that
case, there should be no excess kurtosis or skew in log-return space.
Ignoring for a moment the problem of the measurement, assuming a Cauchy
distribution is present; likely sources of skew are:
 The real world has a budget constraint
 The real world has taxation
 The skew when measured using an algorithm that requires support on the
entire real line would be calculated as skewed if the data is truncated for the
limitation of liability, even if the data is in fact symmetric otherwise.
Volatility clustering would be a symptom of the presence of a Cauchy distri-
bution. Volatility clustering would result as the measure of variance over a local
interval will be a random variate itself. There may also be cyclical processes at
work in real data.
The volatility smile is the observation that prices paid by people in a real
market imply that volatility changes non-linearly rather than linearly with time.
The graphic visualization of this process is called the smile. This is a contradiction
to monotone volatility with time. It is likely liquidity costs drive this, but this may
also be a symptom of the absence of a fixed variance.
Finally, market completeness implies that there are the possibility of risks with
no off-setting market mechanism to absorb these risks. It is difficult to understand
the impact of this as an empirically testable assumption. The presence of political
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risks, for example, may have no offset. How would one have priced the probability
the Soviet Union would collapse? Is there a measurable process to test for revo-
lution? What about disruptive technology? These risks may influence prices, ex
ante, and event studies may capture this, but that would really be the incorpo-
ration of data as people suddenly believed it could be a real possibility. For long
term options, the model cannot anticipate this.
The Bank of International Settlements in its 2012 semi-annual report on deriva-
tive contracts reports outstanding notional amounts of $647,762 billion in over the
counter contracts. They are valued at $27,285 billion using Itô calculus based
methods and if a Cauchy distribution is present then they are valued at an un-
known amount. Proper pricing is a critical issue.[71]
1.4 Market Makers
Traditional option pricing models ignore the market makers’ role in pricing option
contracts. Dealing with the problem of the existence of a market maker adds a
terrible complexity to the math that is not ordinarily dealt with at all. There are
no frictions in the core mean-variance finance models as they disrupt the math.
Yet the market maker is a key point for option pricing.
Market makers are financial intermediaries. They serve a variety of functions.
They provide liquidity to the marketplace. They underwrite and create new securi-
ties where none previously existed. They provide notarial services by guaranteeing
that assets and liabilities are properly assigned. They extend credit.
The unusual aspect is that they provide these services to generally anonymous
counterparties. A person needing a sudden $1,000.00 can immediately sell a like
amount of securities without the need to find a buyer. The market maker acts as
buyer where no market for the security currently exists. The market maker carries
the asset until a buyer comes along at some future time. In essence, the market
maker has loaned the market $1,000.00 for an unspecified period of time with an
uncertain pay off. This is done for a fee and in some cases for the right to create
derivative securities.
In this respect, market makers are banks. Traditional deposit banks operate
by taking capital and loaning it to the market place. The proceeds of those loans
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are deposited creating deposits. The job of banks is to manufacture deposits. In
essence, their capital is used to create money. Likewise, health insurers create a
demand for health.
Without a health insurer only those with sufficient resources could pay for
health care. The demand would be relatively small and the number of doctors,
nurses and pharmacists would be very small. By pooling the risk and making the
cost affordable, health insurers create a demand for health care professionals and
health itself. Health insurance creates health.
Traditional broker-dealers place their capital at risk and in doing so create a
demand for capital. By pooling risks and transferring risks to those most capable
of bearing those risks, more capital is demanded.
At the heart of all financial intermediation is the providing of liquidity at the
time of greatest need rather than when it would be otherwise available. Interme-
diaries make themselves fragile so that their customers can be flexible.
1.4.1 Diamond and Dybvig
The proposed model could be thought of in the framework of a Diamond and
Dybvig model, but from the perspective of the bank.[28, 29, 36] To understand
the Diamond and Dybvig model, one must begin with utility. The simplest way to
conceptualize the model is to presume that an actor is planning consumption for
the next two periods. For the next period what is not invested today is consumed
tomorrow and what is invested is consumed in the following period. The added
modeling element is the possibility of a liquidity shock.
In a Diamond and Dybvig model the refrigerator could break, the furnace could
fail or the car could crash. This would require consuming future period investments
early. The source of the unplanned illiquidity is unimportant for the model; what
is important is that future liquidity needs are uncertain as to timing.
In a Diamond and Dybvig model there are three possible scenarios; they are
autarky, a bond market and a banking system. The important finding of the
model is that the banking system is Pareto optimal. Banks pool resources and
allow a statistical transfer of resources from reserves set aside for “rainy days.”
If there were no uncertainty as to the true rate of emergency then exact reserve
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requirements could be constructed and optimal investment would happen in the
system. The surprising result is that bond markets cannot obtain optimal risk
sharing.
Empirical evidence for this understanding of broker-dealers in the various forms
of active trading markets comes from a variety of sources in what are primarily
before and after studies. Anand and Weaver report improved bid-ask spreads.[6]
They estimated cost savings to participants in 1999 of 221 million dollars.
Tse and Zabotina went a bit further in studying the creation of a designated
market maker for a specific issue. The results provide some insight into the market
microstructure that is altered by the presence of a market maker. In particular
Tse and Zabotina found that:
. . . introducing a designated market maker in the trading pit enhances
competition, reduces transaction costs, and improves both liquidity and
market quality. The market maker enhances the speed and efficiency
of incorporating information into prices.[106]
This is also generally true of Mayhew, however Mayhew reports blocks of time
in high volume issues where this statement isnt true.[64] However it is unclear
the role of the market makers in those high volume markets. It may be that the
volumes can be high because a market maker exists to catch the proverbial “falling
knife.” In that case, the market maker may be acting as an insurer of last resort
permitting behavior not possible without it.
In the Diamond and Dybvig model, banks can exist in one of two states. The
first state, which could be called the stable state, behaves as if all deposit with-
drawals are idiosyncratic. The other state is the bank run. In the bank run,
depositors view withdrawals by other depositors and may view them as unusually
heavy. The perception is that there are too many withdrawals happening for it to
be due to chance alone. Someone is perceived to be acting on private information
and making appropriate withdrawals. Other actors, viewing this, then respond
because such banks can only pay out until reserves have been paid out and then
no further withdrawal is possible.
Goldstein and Kavajecz found that in periods of stress limit orders did in
fact vanish and a reliance on market makers took over on the New York Stock
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Exchange.[40] OHara reports the same phenomenon on the foreign exchange markets.[72]
This makes use of the Diamond and Dybvig model somewhat restricted in that it is
unclear how empirical support for this phenomenon impacts the model as elements
of this resemble a bank run rather than a stable state, but not enough to directly
apply the model.
There are a number of possible solutions to the problem of the bank run.
Deposit insurance, lender of last resort policies, and banking suspensions are all
strategies to manage the bank run by authorities. There are two possible types of
runs facing market makers in this dissertation.
The first, and the most important seen from the perspective of moves in a game,
is when an unusually large demand for shares or cash are made by a participant or
many simultaneous participants. The second would be the mass exercise of option
contracts destabilizing the off-setting positions. Enron was an example of this.
In the first case, for a single block order, there are a number of strategies avail-
able to the market maker. The market maker could fill the order from inventory,
mark the order up or down, and gradually replace the inventory in the market.
The second is to take the order off the market and quietly fill it from market orders
as time passes. These orders exceed the planned reserves set aside to maintain an
orderly market and could upset market prices. As such, these items are normally
taken off the tape and only reported later at a weighted average price when the
information can no longer impact prices.[72]
The second case is more serious. The game assumes away counterparty bankruptcy
risk by sufficient collateral, but a rational bank will expand its book of business
past that point. The primary role of the market maker is to be a guarantor
for the liabilities of the contracts written through its customer base. In the real
world, customers die, declare bankruptcy and face statistical runs. Any such risk
is priced, in equilibrium, by a marked up rate when the market maker accepts the
writer’s contract. What is a bit more challenging to model are systemic runs on
the system. In that case, many writers who were facing independent risks now face
correlated systematic risks and fail. The bankruptcy cost rolls onto the market
maker’s balance sheet as defaults mount.
The challenge of replicating this, for the purpose of this game, is in forming a
well-defined predictive function for bankruptcy. To do this, it is necessary to view
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market makers as part of a macroeconomic game.
There are several potential problems with doing this here. The first is that
the government controls the definition of solvency and can and does change it.
Further, the government can transfer risks or losses to market makers and so the
government can itself be a source of insolvency.
A second potential problem with simple prediction is the presence of a coordi-
nation problem. In the real world a variety of contract types exist. Some contracts
are structured as fixed nominal contracts, others attempt to behave as variable
real contracts. Some contracts can be terminated immediately, some contracts
are short in duration and some are long in duration. Some contracts require pre-
payment, such as insurance contracts, others require intermittent payments while
others require payment upon completion of the contract. In addition, financial
institutions are often the nexus for contracts. An insurance company underwriting
pensions and using mortgages to fund the pension payments joins together two
separate types of obligations, but obligations with very different types of risk.
With a pension there are a variety of risks, including the risk the beneficiary
could live too long or that the reinvestment rate is less than the required amount
to meet the pension obligations. For the mortgage there is a risk of late payment
or of non-payment. Further, there is the risk of interest rates falling resulting
in early prepayment. If the new rate is low enough, then the pension obligations
cannot be met. Some risks are correlated directly, such as interest rates, but others
indirectly. Although the risk of a single annuitant living too long would have a
trivial effect, many annuitants living too long would change the macroeconomic
conditions. They would demand different types of services, they would remain in
homes longer and so forth.
In the case of market makers in this game, there is a risk that market mak-
ers could be over-exposed to some type of event and not realize that there is an
underlying correlation between a risk and a position.
In addition, the failure of a market maker would depend upon the bankruptcy
law involved in the unwinding of contracts. If person A owns a call and person B
underwrites the call, but the market maker does not exist, then neither contract
could potentially exist.
Further, if you consider an economy with a GDP understood as Yt+1 = γYT +
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ε, ε ∼ N(0, σ2Y ), γ > 1, then Bayesian estimates of γ will follow a Cauchy distribution.[114]
If the number of fixed contracts, not subject to cancellation, are large as a per-
centage of anticipated income after basic consumption is met, then a shock to
income would result in systematic bankruptcies. The path of those contracts is
not fixed, though it should be possible to game out various scenarios. As such, it is
unclear whether a simple function would suffice for market makers. A combination
of models for various scenarios could be created by using Bayesian networks, but
because systemic crisis are relatively rare the networks would depend heavily upon
the prior distributions as little data would exist for any one path.
If you extend the argument of Evgeny Slutsky that auto-regressive processes
with additive errors can appear as sinusoidal processes entirely due to the summa-
tion of random shocks, then booms and busts can be thought of as statistical runs
that compound on themselves.[93] Since people cannot see their own errors, or of
course they would not make them, banks cannot see the errors they make when
they join in the errors of market participants. As there is not a unique channel nor
a unique bankruptcy process for market maker failure in the system, attempting
to game this is prohibitive for the purpose of this dissertation.
Further, each contract can itself contribute to the risk of a statistical run in the
forward period. Separate research on this phenomena is required to price market
maker failure and participant failure risk.
1.4.2 Options as a Risk Management Tool
Financial intermediaries who provide services in both the spot market and the
option market increase both their own liquidity and the liquidity of either mar-
ketplace. To understand why, consider a market maker who only provides spot
market services.
If an order to buy securities is placed in the market, the market maker sells
securities either from inventory or borrows them, often from a customer’s account.
To defease the risk of loss from being in the position of a short seller, the market
maker has to find a seller from which to buy securities. If the market maker also
underwrote positions in the derivatives market then the position would also be
offset if there were customers who wanted to buy a put and another that wanted
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to sell a call.
The derivatives market permits the market maker to consider two strategies
unavailable to a dealer operating only in the spot market. First, the market maker
could hold the short equity position and buy a long call from a customer. To do
this, the customer has to be short the call, underwriting the market risk of the
position. However, in doing so, the market maker’s position has been transformed
into a long put. This would be called a synthetic long put. No actual put contract
is in place.
If the next order were a request for a long put, the market maker would create
a contract for an actual long put and sell it to the customer. The risk would be
offset by the synthetic long put. If on the other hand the next order were to sell
shares, the market maker would be in the position of holding a long call. The can
continue in a variety of ways until the aggregation of positions close out. As this
opens up two other markets, each of which can be thought to have Poisson arrival
times, the speed of order flow should increase, reducing the time risk of the maker.
The probability of there being an order to gather pricing information from goes
up as a function of time.
The second strategy available is to open and hold positions using the spot
market and the option market to construct synthetic positions. In this role, the
market maker acts more like an insurer or lender and less as a facilitator.
This creates two possible profit functions, one as a facilitator and one as a
bearer of risk. In both cases the market maker underwrites the securities and
assures proper transfers of ownership. The difference is in risks held.
While the market maker is indifferent to the gambles presented for the pur-
poses of market making, it may not be indifferent to the gambles held for portfolio
purposes. Indeed, Amihud and Mendelson show that a market maker will, under
very mild conditions, systematically lose to informed investors. As such, portfolio
positions taken as a result of market making operations could be gamed by in-
formed counterparties if those counterparties have information unavailable to the
market maker.[5]
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1.4.3 Amihud and Mendelson
The market maker controls two things, the bid-ask spread and the institution’s
portfolio composition. If we assume the market maker only assumes positions for
purposes of customer and market liquidity, then positions are incidental and are in
essence a residue of ordinary trading behavior. Doing this permits us to transition
from the more general Diamond and Dybvig style model to the narrower pricing
based model of Amihud and Mendelson.[5] and from there to the operationalization
of the markup/markdown process by Abbott.[1]
Abbott has shown that the bid-ask spread is a function of the half-life of a
position. The larger the position a market maker must take, the greater the cost
to the person entering into the market order. This satisifies the requirement from
Amihud and Mendelson that some form of continuous time discounting be used.[5]
The need for continuous time discounting comes from the observation that
inter-transaction arrival times are not identically distributed.[5] As such, there
does not exist a convenient unit of time for which a rate can be set other than
continuous time.
In addition to market orders there are limit orders. Whereas market orders
drain liquidity from the market by taking it away from the market maker, limit
orders add liquidity to the market. A limit order will break up the implied geo-
metric progression of prices from a statistical run as in the figure 1.1 In a limit
order, a market participant for a stock states a maximum amount they will pay
for some quantity of security or the minimum amount they will accept to sell some
quantity of a security. In doing so, the participant reprices the security, in essence
sets a new current price, denoted pt. If no other orders are present in the mar-
ket, the market maker may fill the order from their own inventory if they feel the
price is advantageous, or may simply hold the order in abeyance as a source of
funds should the market move in that direction. If many limit orders are present,
they provide a market maker with an estimate of both the supply and the demand
curve.
If the mark-up/mark-down function were thought of as e±λn, where λ is the
implicit cost of liquidity and n the number of shares then the market maker is
going to try and maximize profits by choosing λ. The value of λ is a component of
net price, As the cost of liquidity is a function of λ, it affects the number of shares
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Figure 1.1. Possible path of orders
transacted, but also the frequency of shares transacted.
To see this would be the case, imagine a change in λ causes an increase in the
quantity supplied and demanded by the market in a market with a fixed trading
period. Those additional quantities must be filled in the same amount of time and
must be filled sequentially as well. Two things should happen, both the average
order size and the number of orders should increase. For the cost of liquidity to
change without a change in the interest rate paid by the market maker, then many
additional actors must be filling in the demand curve with limit orders.
In that case, the market maker can reduce the capital commitment to keep
the market liquid, or could hold capital contingently as in bank letter of credit
obligations.
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1.4.3.1 Liquidity During Runs
Not approached in this game is the question of liquidity during runs. This is a
pricing issue, but it is empirical and outside the scope of the data available. To
understand non-equilibrium pricing, or rather multiple equilibrium pricing we must
go back to the Diamond and Dybvig game.
In a Diamond and Dybvig game there are three and possibly four equilibrium
states if you allow banks to sell assets into a market place. In that case, markets ride
on top of the bank equilibrium reducing the phenomenon of credit rationing.[36] In
the world with banks instead of markets the pricing reflects the low cost of liquidity
due to its provisioning by banks. However, imagine there is some possibility of a
bank run and banks cease providing market liquidity. Participants must then find
buyers for their securities and new option contracts cease to be written.
In this new environment positions are no longer ex ante efficient. Trades become
infrequent and become a function of the elasticity of supply and demand. Overall,
prices should fall to reflect the higher cost of liquidity. This will place puts in-the-
money while driving the value of calls downward. However, market makers will not
be able to recover their losses by selling into the market as volume has contracted
by the absence of their liquidity, exacerbating the fall. Further, collateral will be
of reduced value and so more bankruptcy claims will form on the market makers.
Customers with cash deposits at the market maker will need to use them to cover
liquidity driving up the internal cost of liquidity for the market maker.
Is this always the case? No, it isn’t. A stock that gradually loses market
support will cease being supplied with derivative contracts. It could eventually
make it onto the pink sheets, where no market maker exists. An order can be
placed and may be filled months later or not at all. The market maker is a pure
broker and only facilitates trading. In that case, the market maker pulls out of the
market in a manner such that its departure is not evident until it is gone.
Since this state of affairs exists with positive probability, like pure bankruptcy
it should be priced, but unlike pure bankruptcy where contracts are not fulfilled,
here the ability to exit loss positions changes. That is λt 6= λT .
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1.5 Existential Risks and Cash Flows
Firms are a very unusual human construction. Some firms, such as limited liability
companies, usually have defined lives at which time the firm dissolves. Other
firms, such as partnerships, generally dissolve when a partner dies or when the
partnership agreement is terminated. Although there are older business forms
extant such as the business trust or the joint stock company, most people think
about the corporation when they discuss the stock market.
Corporations are unusual in that they lack, generally speaking, a predetermined
date of dissolution. They can exist in perpetuity, at least in legal theory. Nonethe-
less, there are a number of specific types of risks to their continued existence.
The three most common existential risks are bankruptcy, liquidation and the
merger. Each of these categories have an extensive legal tradition and body of law
around them. Indeed they cannot be spoken of independent of the laws around
them. A proper study of finance cannot be independent of the laws and institutions
finance must operate in.
For purposes of the dissertation the terms are going to be reduced to relatively
narrow operational definitions that are somewhat at odds with the legal defini-
tions. Legal definitions provide clarity of the legal status of shareholders and other
stakeholders but do not consider the subjective outcomes of these legal statuses
on the participants.
Shareholders of a firm in bankruptcy may walk out of bankruptcy retaining
economic value. Although their shares will be vacated by the court they will be
issued new shares, with a diluted interest, as if a merger with the creditors had
happened. Previous creditors will suddenly find themselves as shareholders in what
was previously a debtor firm.
Similarly, owners of a firm in liquidation will end up with no residual resalable
claim once the final liquidating dividend is paid; that is no different in practice
from the shareholders of a bankrupt firm liquidated by the bankruptcy court.
A merged status also isn’t a clear status. With a cash merger the pre-existing
shareholders receive cash in a manner no different from a firm in liquidation. The
shares of the old firm are liquidated for an agreed upon amount of cash. In other
mergers, pre-existing shareholders receive shares in the buying firm, though this
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is no different in status than a bankrupt firm where the pre-existing shareholders
retain claims on the new entity.
Bankruptcy will be defined here as any state of existence where the future
value of an equity security is zero at some future fixed date. How it arrives at that
zero value is irrelevant with one important caveat. Some firms cease trading but
still exist. The shares cannot be legally traded on an open exchange but can be
privately sold. The value is therefore positive even if this also means the security
could not be sold in most pragmatic situations. It isn’t the absence of trading
which triggers the bankruptcy state, it is the absence of any legal claim to an
asset. It isn’t the price that has gone to zero in the allocation formula of price ×
quantity, it is the quantity that has gone to zero.
Under this definition, a firm issuing liquidating dividends that terminates its
existence prior to some fixed period has become bankrupt by that period even
though no bankruptcy filing ever happened.
This leads to two definitions.
Definition 1. An allocation at time t, for all times t, is defined as pt× qt. In this
definition pt is the price of the security and qt is the quantity of the security owned
at time t.
Definition 2. A firm is bankrupt at some future time t′ if at time t′ the quantity,
q′t, in allocation pt′ × qt′ is equal to zero. That is q′t = 0.
This discussion then logically leads to a discussion of dividends since it is pos-
sible for a firm to behave as an annuity and become self-liquidating. For that
purpose a definition is in order.
Definition 3. The dividend rate, to be denoted δt′ , is a cash flow to shareholders
at some time t′ from the owned corporation, where t′ > t, where the shares were
purchased at time t.
Definition 4. The dividend is defined as δt′ × qt′ at time t′ > t where the shares
were purchased at time t.
A merger is differentiated by a change in the form of legal property owned.
Just as bankruptcy regards the status of the quantity owned a merger is defined
in terms of a quantity and not a price.
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Definition 5. A merger is defined as a change in the legal form of a claim on
equity at some future time t′ from its form at time t, t′ > t. For a shareholder
owning a quantity of shares in a firm to be denoted i at time t, the quantity is
exchanged for a quantity of some firm to be denoted j, where i 6= j, at some time





An important missing item here regards firms sold for property, such as cash,
and shares. An example would be a firm that was merged out of existence for $50
in cash and one share of the new firm for each share of the old firm. Under the
above definition the cash would be treated as a dividend and only the new shares
as the merger.
1.5.1 Estimating Existential Risks
This reduces the types of existential risks to two types. The first is that it will
cease existing as a going concern, the second is that it will be absorbed into another
entity. The first risk eliminates future cash flows, the second risk changes their
character such as frequency or amount. The literature of both types of states has
been from the perspective of practical users, banks that want to make loans and
want to avoid bankruptcy and market participants that want to gain extra profits
from anticipating future mergers. The goal of this study is limited to pricing
options.
Pricing options is not a concern in the existing literature for either bankruptcy
or mergers. The goals in the existing literature are more pragmatic and general.
While mergers are a pragmatic risk in option pricing, the impact of mergers on
option pricing has been through how the terms and conditions of the merger impact
the contract to deliver shares. Is a contract to deliver 100 shares of ABCorp the
same as delivering 500 shares of DE Financial post merger, if that is the terms of
exchange?
The limited goal here is to find the posterior probability of bankruptcy and
merger and to limit that discussion to the impact on option contracts.
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1.5.1.1 Bankruptcy
As the goal is the development of an option pricing model, the development of
a model of how and why bankruptcy happens, its legal forms and the decisions
involved is outside the scope of this work. Rather the concern is developing an
estimate of the probability that bankruptcy, a merger and/or a dividend will occur.
The challenge of this form of estimation comes from the nature of the data itself.
Accounting data can be very challenging to work with. The variables are highly
correlated by design. For a firm in equilibrium, with some predetermined stable
credit policy, the firm may find that 30% of its sales are in the form of accounts
receivable and the rest in cash. If the sales of that firm are known then in approx-
imation at least two other variables are known. Correlations between accounting
variables in the Compustat universe run between 60% and 96% depending on the
variables involved. It is possible to have captured most of the random variation in
a firm by knowing just one variable. This lack of independent information makes
estimation methods difficult to construct.
The first important work on this is the publication of Almtan’s Z score in
1968.[3] The purpose of Altman’s Z score is to produce a score that is highly
indicative of the risk of bankruptcy or non-bankruptcy. It makes a rather clever use
of discriminant analysis. Extreme scores indicate a high probability of bankruptcy
or alternatively continuing as a going concern. Middle scores have been found not
to be correlated with outcomes.[20]
The use of Altman’s Z score has primarily been to make yes/no types of de-
cisions in practice. The difficulty is that it does not translate into a probability
statement about the risk of bankruptcy given accounting data.
Altman’s Z score is a clever tool given the issues facing analysts in 1968. Be-
ginning in the 1930’s analysts began testing ratios for their predictive power.[3]
Analysts had been extremely critical of the pre-existing rule of thumb methods
then in use. Unfortunately these ratios did not seem to discriminate between
going concerns and bankrupt firms.
Discriminant analysis is powerful in that it reduces the dimensionality of the
problem into the number of groups the researcher is concerned with minus one.
Since bankrupt versus non-bankrupt are two groups, this reduces the question
down to a single dimension and looks much like a regression model in practice.
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Altman made multiple computer runs on a sizeable portion of the combinations
variables available and published the resulting formula he felt was the best solution.
Unfortunately his publication of the criteria he used to select the best formula was
unclear.
The final scoring was:




X3=Earnings Before Interest and Taxes/Total Assets
X4=Market Value Equity/Book Value of Total Debt
X5=Sales/Total Assets
Z=Overall Index
Altman split the resulting scores into three zones. The middle zone was called
the “zone of ignorance” where misclassification happens.[3] It is this zone that
seems to trigger the difficulties.
These difficulties are not real if used as the author intended. He provides an
example:
The discriminant Z score index can be used,. . . ,as a guide in efforts
to lower the costs of investigation of loan applicants. Less time and
effort would be spent on companies whose Z score is very high, i.e.
above 3.0, while those with low Z scores would signal a very thorough
investigation.
However, as we need an option price for every security, even those securities
with middling financial statements, this type of analysis won’t be very helpful.
Hillegeist, et. al., in assessing Altman’s Z finds that price volatility is a more
accurate assessment of bankruptcy probability than other methods reviewed.[59]
At a certain level this is unsurprising. A rational market maker facing the risk
of their inventory being revalued to zero would want to maintain as minimal an
inventory as possible. This would result in a lack of smoothing and a wide bid-ask
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spread. A wide bid-ask spread will be inherently more volatile, ceteris paribus.
Nonetheless this creates a cart before the horse problem.
This issue is brought forward in Cooley’s 1975 work on Bayesian discriminant
analysis. Although having many of the issues that would follow from any Frequen-
tist method, Cooley brings up two important issues. The first is the cost function.
The cost of misclassification isn’t trivial and as the costs may not be symmetric,
the trade between Type I error and Type II error may be misplaced by the choice
of an arbitrary choice of α. The second issue runs to the “cart before the horse”
problem.[26]
The article was written just after the Lockheed and Penn Central collapses
and the market was caught surprised at their sudden failure. As many measures
depend upon the market making this decision it leaves the open the giant problem
of what criteria to use.
If people in a market judge a firm as having a high probability of bankruptcy,
how did they do this? How did the market maker realize this fact? How did the
existing shareholders and possible future shareholders judge this? This problem
is also present in Altman’s Z score via the price to book ratio. While this is a
good time saver for a bank loan officer it is problematic for someone attempting
to price securities based on forward prospects, particularly if it is not yet common
knowledge that the firm is doomed.
In a broader based criticism of the methodologies of bankruptcy, recovery and
state change prediction in general, Nwogugu goes after prediction models on deeper
methodological issues including probit/logit and neural network models along with
discriminant analysis. He points out that none of these models possess a theoretical
grounding, they ignore the political economy the firm is operating in, causal rela-
tionships, state functions and the possible unique role of government in triggering
bankruptcies such as through industry deregulation or interference.[70]
An important criticism by Nwogugu is of misspecification. There are several
types of misspecification possible. One is by assuming there is a single optimum
level all firms are judged regardless of their markets, capital structure, or manage-
ment plan. Although not mentioned by Nwogugu, another is judging firms that
lack some variable or for whom the variable behaves differently than in a different
industry. Finally, there are violations of assumptions in the logit/probit models in
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use that make them effectively misspecified models. Included in this criticism are
the hazard function models that judge it in an actuarial manner. Among the crit-
icisms not listed above is a reliance on external raters such as bond rating services
to set the rating.[70]
Nwogugu’s criticism of neural network models is less well laid out. Neural net-
works have significant limitations, in particular, the models are subject to change,
the models are difficult to verify and validate relative to the problem at hand, the
coefficients cannot be interpreted and nothing similar to a significance measure or
an interval estimate exist.[52]
Not well called out in his article is the role of the macroeconomy on firm specific
outcomes. It is not an economics article and items that would be symptoms of
macroeconomic factors are used as examples.
He also calls out the fact that the models are models of initial court filings
and not of bankruptcy. That is the various models in use don’t measure loss to
stakeholders but rather the filing of a bankruptcy petition.
Nonetheless, he does provide reasonable criticisms of the models in that they
are often used outside the context they were designed for. Many of the models
were designed with a limited purpose and then generalized by the audience for
such models. Unfortunately he does not provide any suggestions for better models.
Indeed, we need a general model of failure not merely an attempt to estimate it
using data mining.
An article which goes somewhat down the road toward thinking in terms of
process and time effects is an article by Ando on the hazard term structure of
failure.[7] By looking at the future time structure of the probability of failure Ando
provides something other than an estimate at a fixed point in time. However this
is of less interest for option pricing as the European option contract itself closes at
a fixed point in time.
A promising improvement to the methods has been produced by Sun and
Shenoy.[100] Some of the issues addressed by Nwogugu’s critique are naturally
addressed in this article through the use of Bayesian networks. A Bayesian net-
work is somewhat of a hybrid construction. It isn’t a pure computational tool
nor is it a pure network as may be the case in a neural network. Their findings
were that a näıve Bayesian network performed in a superior manner in both false
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positives and false negatives. Still, the methodology could be justifiably open to
criticism and improvement.
A Bayesian network is defined by Sun and Shenoy as,
. . . probabilistic graphical models that represent a set of random
variables for a given problem, and the probabilistic relationships be-
tween them. The structure of a Bayesian network is represented by a
directed acyclic graph, in which the nodes represent variables and the
edges express the dependencies between the variables.
A model is considered a näıve model by including an assumption of indepen-
dence among the predictors so that a simple Bayes factor solution can direct the
outcome. Correlations are addressed through the linkages, but the prior distribu-
tions are flat. Importantly, it is assumed the relationships are linear in nature, as
is the case with the other models in the literature. Their model had two layers to
deal with recovering missing data in the higher order layer. They found when using
other industry methods, which require complete data sets, two thirds of the data
was lost. This loss is captured in the Bayesian network since Bayesian methods
have a simple method of dealing with missing data.
Some of their findings were interesting. They found that turning continuous
variables into discrete variables using the extended Pearson-Tukey method substan-
tially improved performance. They also tested the bracket median method, but
believed the extended Pearson-Tukey method superior because of how it handles
tails.[100] The graph is designed to minimize the impact of redundant information
and maximize the effect of independent information.
Unlike the other methods in use, this model requires a statement of the posterior
probability of bankruptcy given whatever data is appropriate. The Sun and Shenoy
article are closest in providing a probability statement. Using what amounts to
the likelihood ratio test of the two hypothesis where the null is the firm will go
bankrupt and the alternative is that it will not, then it is classified as bankrupt
if the odds are better than one to one in favor of bankruptcy. Of course an odds
ratio is just a transformation away from being a probability statement.
The two weaknesses of this article are simply the assumption of linearity and
possibly the mechanism for choosing variables. There is still no underlying theory
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of the various economic channels that lead a firm to bankruptcy. This is in part
because bankruptcy is a complex process. Firms declare bankruptcy as a strategic
move, because they are forced by their creditors, in order to protect the jobs of
senior managers, to deflect the costs of previous poor decision making and due to
changes in the economic environment. Bankruptcy is the result of often years or
decades of choices. It is quite possible that by focusing on things such as the one
year probability of bankruptcy the wrong time scale is being looked at.
Although economics lacks a general theory of bankruptcy, outside the area of
prediction there is work on the role of financial ratios in the firm itself. Davis
and Peles studied whether firms’ ratios moved to equilibrating values or followed
a random walk.[27] An equilibrating value is understood by Davis and Peles as:
an accounting ratio may have an equilbrium value if management
targets a certain ratio so that any deviation from the target causes
management to initiate actions that will return the ratio to the target.
Also, although management may not be targeting the ratio, the inter-
action of management’s actions with external market forces may lead
to an equilibrium value.[27]
They found that when a firm experiences a shock to liquidity equilibrium forces
counterbalance the impact of a little more than a third of the impact in the fol-
lowing period for financial ratios. For performance measures the recovery period is
longer but still shows evidence of equilibrium values. Of particular interest would
be where equilibrium ratios are forced by competition away from bankruptcy min-
imizing points.
In the case where market forces push firms to risky combinations of manage-
ment decisions it may be possible to generate a substantial lead time to predict
bankruptcy. This may be a very fruitful path of investigation in the future. Cau-
tion should be taken when looking at this as a long run static equilibrium. In a
long run study of farming equilibrium rates, Shepard and Collins found that the
technology employed altered the mix very substantially over the period so that in
periods as short as a few years the values are stable, but they gradually change as
technology changes the mechanisms available to produce the output desired.[90]
The other likely fruitful path is to look at the market where bankruptcy carries
an entirely different impact, the bond market. Because of the fixed income nature
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of the bond market the ability to adapt bond structures to changing market con-
ditions is totally absent. Giesecke, et al, look at corporate bond default over a one
hundred and fifty year period.[97]
They found that stock returns, volatility and changes in GDP are strong pre-
dictors of default rates while credit spreads were not. They further found that
credit spreads are not responsive to realized default rates.[97] This latter finding is
somewhat surprising, but the finding that bond defaults are a function of gross na-
tional output are unsurprising. A sudden downward shock in total output should
trigger substantial increases in the number of defaults.
Outside these methods, an unbelievably wide variety of specific methodologies
have been attempted to varying degrees of success. Their main goal is to improve
accuracy of prediction, but do not necessarily shed a theoretical light on why
bankruptcy happens. They include generalized additive models, discrete time sur-
vival trees and forests, a variety of data envelope analysis based methods, fuzzy and
rough set methods, Frequentist methods assuming stochastic covariates, multidi-
mensional scaling, asymmetric Levy’ flights, support vector machines and principal
components analysis.[18, 12, 22, 23, 31, 38, 50, 73, 78, 79, 80, 81, 91, 98, 99, 107, 115]
1.5.1.2 Mergers
Any discussion of merger risk has to account for the critical article by Palepu on
predicting which firms are takeover targets.[75] Prior to Palepu very high levels
of predictive ability were reported in estimators and after Palepu the values came
down substantially. Palepu’s article is complex and multifacited. Some portions
apply to Bayesian methods and some are strictly important to non-Bayesian meth-
ods.
The relationship between Palepu’s article and Bayesian methods is through the
relationship of maximum a postiori methods and maximum likelihood methods.
As such, caution is required in understanding Palepu’s criticism in light of the
likelihood principle and Stein’s paradox.[55, 95]
Palepu’s posited two objections that had three impacts. The first was that state
based sampling introduced bias both into the estimator and the test statistics that
would be eliminated by random sampling. The second was that arbitrary cutoff
values, without considering the context, payoffs or cost functions made the results
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difficult to interpret. Both of these objections run deep into the Bayesian versus
non-Bayesian debate.
The first impact, that of a biased estimator, is important in that Palepu shows
that existing sampling methods would overstate the probability that a firm would
be a target of merger. This is due to the fact that state based sampling will tend to
push the mode of the likelihood function to the right. For individual firms whose
probability is near some cut-off threshold there will be a tendency to misclassify
them as targets when they are not.
This argument is important to the Bayesian method as well as it argues that
the estimates will be a result of something other than the likelihood principle,
that is the selection method. Palepu reports that the justification for state based
sampling is that it optimizes the amount of information extracted from the data
regarding the parameter.
The argument by Palepu is that the high prediction quality is an artifact of
the bias being introduced and that when the bias is removed the information
quality becomes so low as to have little predictive value. State based methods, as
reported prior to Palepu, likely violate the conditionality principle and as a result
the likelihood principle. In effect the experiment chosen is not independent of the
parameter.
The Likelihood Principle is derived from two simpler ones, the Sufficiency Princ-
ple and the Conditionality Principle. The Conditionality Principle can be stated
as:
Definition 6 (Conditionality Principle). If an experiment concerning inference
about θ is chosen from a collection of possible experiments, independently of θ,
then any experiment not chosen is irrelevant to the inference.
The argument of Palepu could be restated in Bayesian terms as follows:
1. Mergers are rare events, random sampling would collect very few examples
from the population as very few exist.
2. Increasing the proportion of observed mergers in the sample that represents
observed mergers to maximize the information about mergers implies that
the experiment was constructed in the manner that it was because the event
is rare.
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3. The method chosen then becomes dependent on the true value of the param-
eter. More common events would not use this experimental form.
4. As the Conditionality Principle does not hold, by assumption, it cannot be
shown that the likelihood principle is the sole source of inference.
That said, the likelihood principle may not be the firmest foundation upon
which to posit a Bayesian objection. There are several objections to the Likelihood
principle, two of which occur in this dissertation. The first is that the use of risk
functions for Bayesian decision theory violate the Likelihood principle, the second
is that the Cauchy distribution lacks a sufficient statistic and so for the overall
purposes of this dissertation the Likelihood Principle is irrelevant, even if true.[13]
A better objection may come from Cox’s postulates.[46] Slightly restated from
Jaynes, the relevant postulate would be:
The [decision maker] always takes into account all of the evidence
it has relevant to a question. It does not arbitrarily ignore some of the
information, basing its conclusions only on what remains.
In maximizing the amount of information on targets it has reduced the informa-
tion on non-targets. The proportion of some occurrence is relevant information.
Intentionally altering the proportions to collect more relative information about
targets reduces information about the complementary group.
The second concern is not a Bayesian concern. Bayesian inference is built
around the posterior distribution, assuming there is no objection to the data itself
then bias is not an inherent concern of Bayesian thinking. A potential objection
to Palepu is that with the large number of independent variables and the form of
the inference that Palepu runs afoul of Stein’s Paradox. Although not an issue in
Bayesian methods with a proper prior, Stein’s Paradox is an observation that the
unbiased estimator can often be stochastically dominated by a biased estimator.[95]
Although it is a concern of both Bayesian and Frequentist methods in how the
sample was formed, the high degree of prediction may in fact be created by the
introduced bias. Nonetheless, it makes testing impossible using conventional means
even if it were later found to be valid.
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The second objection is foundational to any decision theoretic perspective.
This objection is addressed here through the use of Bayesian decision theory as a
framework to solve the problem.
Indeed, if this objection were taken more seriously one would arrive at different
principle for institutional portfolio selection. Palepu’s paper isn’t just an objection
to merger estimation methods but to any arbitrary decision system that ignores
cost or utility functions.
In addition to providing methodological objections Palepu did empirical tests
of models then extent in the academic literature. In particular he tested six hy-
pothesis using ten variables. The finding was that the variables and the models
had little explanatory power.
This observation was from the false positive/false negative perspective. Palepu
describes well the intent of these models, to predict which firm is going to be a
target. The goal is to make excess returns by purchasing the firms early and selling
them when the bid runs up. This is not the goal in this dissertation.
It is irrelevant to this dissertation to determine which firms will merge, rather
it is the probability of merger that is of concern. An option contract that has an
obligation to deliver 100 shares of a firm that merges out of existence tends to be
converted into an obligation to deliver the new firm’s shares at some ratio. As
such, the identification problem which dominates the literature is irrelevant here.
Rather, the goal is to get a low noise probability estimate.
Likewise, it is irrelevant here to determine which firms are likely acquiring
firms. Such events are simply part of the ordinary management of a going concern
and do not impact the terms of the option contracts. Further, the sample used
by Pelepu was restricted both by industry and by time period so generalizations
from significant variables need to proceed with caution. Generally, his findings
were that large firms buy small firms, efficient firms buy inefficient firms, leverage
is a predictor of merger and that industry specific factors matter.[75] Thirty years
later these findings were echoed by Liu and Qiu in a larger cross-border study of
mergers.[58]
While their variables were different and they did not test leverage but did
test technology development, the overall findings were about the same with an
important caveat. Liu and Qiu were not concerned with determining which firms
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would merge but rather the before and after impact of mergers and acquisitions on
the participants. Nonetheless the variables that were significant in terms of impact
were also predictors in Palepu implying that impacted variables are also potentially
the predictors. Further tests of differences between targets and non-targets showed
differentiation along these variables for the use in regression on impact.[58]
Similar findings are echoed in Beccalli and Frantz on 777 deals involving Eu-
ropean Union acquirers in the banking industry. Although the article is restricted
to banking, it too found large firms buy small firms, efficient firms buy inefficient
ones and that leverage matters.[11] Of importance the leverage impact was dif-
ferent, implying that financial institutions are different. Financial institutions are
intensely leveraged and so simple comparisons between banks and industrial firms
are not possible.
Jensen places Palepu’s findings in the framework of the Cash Flow Theory of
Mergers, that is that managers and shareholders have conflicting incentives and so
firms seek targets to consume their excess cash flows from firms that benefit man-
agers via their compensation structure.[47] Griffin and Wiggins reframe Jensen’s
article more formally into agency theory by providing an economic model.[41]
Extensions to the Palepu article include an article by Ambrose and Meggin-
son to include data sets not available to this dissertation but concern owner-
ship structure and agency issues.[4] Billett parses out the leverage effect by us-
ing credit ratings to measure the bankruptcy risk, bringing bankruptcy into the
equation.[14] Agrawal appears to be the first to be concerned with takeover prob-
ability and extends Palepu to decompose the impact of a takeover threat on man-
agerial compensation.[2] Astebro and Winter extend Palepu and Altman to include
trinomial estimation of outcomes, bankruptcy, survival and merger.[8]
This framing of merger risk in terms of managerial conflicts with shareholders
greatly reduces the scope of variables required to observed in a study. The only real
limitation in the merger literature is the nearly universal use of probit/logit models
to estimate target risk of takeover. This contrasts sharply with the bankruptcy
literature which explores an extensive range of methods.
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1.6 Conclusion
The history of modeling used here is to determine what has been done in the
past and the consequences of making different modeling choices. An important
observation about science in general is that many elegant models about how the
world could work exist in every discipline. Empiricism disciplines the various
endeavors of science by excluding those not supported in the data. This focus
on the empirical is the fundamental distinction between the humanities and the
sciences. Statistical methods, as an extension of rhetoric, form the key difference;





THE USE OF BAYESIAN
STATISTICS
A basic review of economic literature shows that the use of Bayesian statistics
occurs in a very small percentage of research articles. Although some elements of
this dissertation use frequency based statistics in addition to Bayesian statistics
for completeness, the decision to primarily use Bayesian methods was made for
several reasons.
The first reason is that in some portions of this work, no admissable frequency
based solution exists while remaining consistent with economic theory. A decision
rule is admissable if no other statistical rule dominates it. The most well known
example of a statistical rule that is inadmmisable for the purposes of making de-
cisions is in using the method of ordinary least squares when there are three or
more independent variables.[95] The James-Stein estimator stochastically domi-
nates least squares in that case, where the method of ordinary least squares would
be applicable.
This leads to a basic question of admissability. Admissability is an impor-
tant concept in Frequentist statistics, but less so in Bayesian statistics as Wald
shows that all admissable rules are either Bayesian rules or the limit form of some
Bayesian rule. Under mild conditions, a Bayesian solution is always admissable.
The second reason is that not all hypothesis in this study are binary. As
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Frequentist hypothesis are restricted to a binary form, this makes anything other
than a binary question difficult at best.
The third reason is the ability to continually update parameter information as
more data is acquired. Had a frequency based solution been chosen, parameter
would have been estimated in a training set and tested over a validation set. In a
Bayesian framework, the testing data also serves as training data, once they enter
into the historical set. This permits an increased quality of estimation as time
passes as each point of data updates posterior beliefs.
One particular weakness of this methodology, however, is the loss of a guarantee
against false positives. Frequency based solutions have the virtue of providing a
worst case guaranteed coverage against the possibility of false positives. For a
trading desk, this could be material.
A false positive could commit significant trading resources. The issue is over
the difference of the coverage between the methods. Bayesian methods do not
automatically provide a protection level against false positives and hence against
the cost of trading on false signals. An admissable Frequentist procedure would also
permit a specification of the level of protection for a decision maker against false
signals. Simultaneously, by choosing some level of significance, α, false negatives
are minimized.
2.1 Bayesian Versus Frequency Based Models
The dissertation uses a combination of Bayesian and Frequentist thinking. The
necessary theorems are Frequentist in origin, but the better set of inference tools
for this class of problem are Bayesian. This forces careful use of both schools of
thought as they are often incompatible.
The dissertation seeks to show that the outcomes are independent of the school
of thought employed. A quote from Egon Pearson seems appropriate
Controversies in the field of mathematical statistics seem largely
to have arisen because statisticians have been unable to agree on how
theory is to provide, in terms of probability statements, the numerical
measures most helpful to those who have to draw conclusions from
observational data. We are concerned here with the ways in which
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mathematical theory may be put, as it were, into gear with the common
processes of rational thought.[77]
It is incorrect to think that Bayesian and Frequency based models are different
ways of solving the same problem. Rather they are ways of using the same data
to solve different problems. It is often true, however, that there are no numer-
ical differences in their estimates. The differences are then interpretive and not
numerical.
For most of the 250 years of Bayesian statistics, it was called the method of
inverse probability.[34] The reason is that inference was of the form, Pr(θ|y), where
θ is a parameter or vector of parameters of interest and y is the data. As such,
you were inferring causes from effects as you could see the effect in the data, but
could not see the causes. It was a statistical form of solving the inverse problems
so common in economics.
This structural form requires that the data are given as true and therefore are
fixed points and not random instantiations of a sample space. Conversely, the
parameters are random variables, or more precisely beliefs about the parameters
are random variables.
An hypothesis is considered a belief, so the idea that µ > 5 is one of many
possible beliefs about µ. Inference about that belief would be shown as Pr(µ >
5|y). Beliefs about µ change as more information arrives. So as the data set goes
from y to y′ the belief about µ > 5 goes from Pr(µ > 5|y) to Pr(µ > 5|y′). This
forces a necessarily subjective view of probability, as different viewers have access
to different information. This leads to epistemic probabilities, something quite
removed from the Neyman-Pearson concept of aleatory probabilities.
Frequentist, or frequency based statistics, are modeled on the long run proba-
bilities of some event occurring. For this methodology to be used, it implies that
the long run model can be known. Rather than look at past information and test-
ing new information given prior information, frequency based measures look at the
long run model and asks, ”what is the probability the data looks as it does given
the model is true?” That is to say Pr(y|θ).
In frequency based statistics, the parameters are fixed points and the data is
considered random. This is the very opposite of Bayesian inference. As such, an
hypothesis is true or false. It is a fixed point and cannot have probabilities of
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truth or falsehood assigned to it. The data, on the other hand, are not fixed and
so probability statements can be made about the likelihood of observing the data
given the fixed parameter.
Using Frequentist statistics, the hypothesis µ > 5 is either true or it is false.
Usually, however, if the real concern is whether or not µ > 5, then the uninteresting
and complementary hypothesis of µ ≤ 5 is tested instead. Whereas Bayesian
tests determine the probability a belief is true, frequency based statistics test the
probability the data could not happen given a null hypothesis is true.
This probability is based upon the long run frequencies given the hypothesis
and not the data alone. Whereas Bayesian statistics use only the observed data
to make decisions, frequency based measures consider the samples that could have
been observed according to the model.
These subtle differences can lead to rather sharp differences in the understand-
ing of the same events. Aleatory probabilities are closely related to physical prob-
ability in the sense of dice rolls or coin tosses. Bayesian probabilities are subjective
and so the tie to physical probability is looser. In a sense, it is one step removed
from the physical probabilities, even for dice games.
2.1.1 Illustration
As a pragmatic illustration of the difference, imagine two possible dice games under
perfect competition for customers.1 One type of dice game is run by an honest
casino and everything is fair. In the other type of dice game, con men and ex-
magicians run the same game. The players do not know which type of game they
are in. The house takes two die, places them in a cup, shakes them in the cup,
and turns the cup upside down with the dice still covered by the cup. Players then
wager against the house on whether the sum of the digits is even or odd. The
house, through a croupier, rolls the dice, but the player chooses “even” or “odd.”
Players pay a cover charge of one dollar in advance and can play all day for one
dollar per dice roll.
Even in such a simple model of probability, the contrasts can be quite stark.
1The purpose of this illustration is to distinguish statistical schools. As such, a formal eco-
nomic model is not derived. A continuation of the illustration would include equilibrium cheating
and the costs of actors in an economic model. This is ignored.
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In a simple sense, the Frequentist methodology has one giant advantage here, the
solution will always be unique. The most natural way to approach this question is
to have two hypothesis:
1. The casino does not cheat the players
2. The casino does cheat the players.
It is possible to either test the count of the wins versus losses or the percentage
of times the house wins versus the house loses. For simplicity of presentation,
it is easiest to choose the latter method of percentages. Setting πhouse as the
probability of the house winning, the most logical null hypothesis is πhouse ≤ .5,
with the alternative hypothesis being of course πhouse > .5.
The Bayesian method, however, does not automatically yield a unique answer
or set of hypothesis either. The hypothesis could be the same as the frequency
based method. It could be an infinite number of hypothesis, where each point on
the number line is hypothesized as the true value, that is πhouse = i, ∀i ∈ [0, 1]. It
could also be any mutually exclusive and exhaustive set of hypothesis that combine
intervals and points.
Likewise, the Bayesian method requires the choosing of a prior distribution for
the parameter πhouse. If a flat prior is used, the result will be numerically identical
with the frequency based method, provided of course the same hypothesis are
used. The difference would be one of interpretation. However, there is a strong
economic argument and therefore statistical argument against the uniform prior.
The economist is in possession of information from the model.
Competition should drive out cheating that could be detected by non-rigorous
methods by casual players as it is costless to change casinos.
So, in the absence of cheating by the croupier in favor of the player, the expected
value of πhouse > .5 in perfect competition. Since it is reasonable to believe the
house is monitoring for cheating by the croupiers, with maybe a slight chance being
present of cheating by croupiers for higher tips, the prior probability distribution
for the estimate of πhouse should be centered slightly to the right of 50%, possibly
narrowly distributed and possibly skewed.
In a view quite opposite the Frequentist, this skews the outcome toward the
hypothesis “the casino does cheat players,” until enough data comes in to overcome
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that, if, of course, there is no cheating.
Even if the prior were centered on 50% with a variance of 25%, this additional
information would reduce the required number of observations to reach a con-
clusion. Indeed, Jaynes shows that in similar situations, the number of required
observations may be half that required for the unbiased Frequentist estimate.[46]
As each observation bears a potential cost, cutting the required number of esti-
mates in half can be meaningful.
One other difference is what is considered random by the two schools. The
Frequentist school would not consider the dice rolls to be random variables as they
are fixed points at the time the player calls out “even” or “odd.” Rather it is what
is called out by the player that is random and hence it is the matches that are
random. They are betting they can match a fixed point.
If there are too few matches, then to some degree of confidence, the result
cannot be due to chance and so the fixed point of the null hypothesis is probably
being manipulated causally. The Bayesian method, on the other hand, is going
from effects to causes and so sees the parameter of wins as uncertain and the
matching as fixed points once they occur. The Bayesian sees nothing random in
the matches and non-matches that actually happened, they are the result of the
parameter in use. What is uncertain is which type of game is being played, and
hence the true value of the parameter.
2.2 Learning Through Bayesian Thinking
Bayesian methods are used in two ways in this dissertation. The first is to test the
probability that a Cauchy distribution better supports the data when compared
to the more commonly held normal distribution. The second use is to estimate
the price of European style put option contracts with one year maturities. The
Bayesian methodology is rather simple, especially when compared to frequency
based methodology. Frequency based methodology, if thought through from be-
ginning to end, is really quite complex mathematically. In most cases it is necessary
to derive the asymptotically optimal procedure and then calculate sample statistics
to represent the data and perform inference on the data, given an hypothesis.
Bayesian methodology is broken up into determining any prior distribution
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about uncertain variables, pass the data through the likelihood function, normalize
the probabilities to one, perform inference on the parameters of interest. Of these
parts, only the determination of the prior has the possibility of being conceptually
difficult; although normalizing the data to unity may in practice be the most
challenging.
2.2.1 Subjectivity
A brief discussion of the subjectivity of statistics is in order. Much of the battle
between Frequency and Bayesian based statistics has been over subjectivity. Some
partisans have been very clear on their position on subjectivity. At the most
extreme on the Bayesian side is probably Leonard Jimmie Savage.[86] He developed
what he called personalitic statistics. His argument can be brought down to the
idea that all statistical methods are subjective in one way or another and that
because Bayesian methods do it in a disciplined way they must be the best way.
This argument is echoed strongly by Harry Markowitz.[63]
This argument is philosophically pointless. Although valid as it goes, it de-
pends strictly upon the underlying assumptions. Credible arguments in favor of
Frequentist methods are just as valid and just as dependent upon underlying as-
sumptions. This leads to two possible mechanisms to think about which tool to
use.
The first mechanism is well understood in economics, that is the argument
from preferences and/or costs. Some individuals simply prefer some methods. As
it cannot be argued in any rational sense that a person should prefer an apple to
an orange, or vice versa, it also makes no sense to argue over a preference for one
method over another. The better argument is one from costs.
As most economists are trained nearly exclusively in one methodology over
another, it would be costly to change methods even if the other were superior.
A valid argument as to which methodology to use is from first principles. That
is, “what are you trying to solve?” Solving the probability of observing a set of
parameters given the data is not the same thing as the probability of observing
the data, given a model. Further, there are times where one method is simply
more informative than the other method. There are also times where one method
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provides superior rules for decision making than the other.
Two things make Frequentist statistics objective. The first is not their relation
to nature, but rather the difficulty of a researcher to tamper with the results given
a chosen method and a chosen data set. This is not to say it is impossible to
“lie with statistics,” but rather that for a chosen method with a given sample,
the outcome of the analysis will result in a unique solution.. That is not true for
Bayesian methods. The second element of objectivity comes from their evaluation
of the data, given a model of the world. This second element looks objectively at
one model alone.
There are two indirect Bayesian answers to these issues. The first is that basic
safeguards do exist in the Bayesian methodology to prevent tampering through a
careful and maybe crafty choice of prior probability distributions and hypothesis.
The second is that Bayesian methods can look at a wide range of models, not simply
one. Still, neither of these get to the heart of the problem that the Frequentist
methodology is trying to avoid.
At the simplest level, all frequency based methods can be mapped to some
Bayesian method in the sense that all calculations will result in the same statistics,
ignoring any differences in philosophical understanding. Does this make that subset
of Bayesian methods objective? No it does not. The fact that a Bayesian method
has good frequentist properties and may indeed be numerically identical in all ways
to an unbiased objective set of measurements, does not alter the subjective nature
of the Bayesian tool.
A decision to numerically mimic a Frequentist solution is a purely subjective
choice. It would be the best choice under the narrow circumstance of true igno-
rance and it was felt that the best choice of ignorance prior happens to map to a
Frequentist solution.
The real goal of the economist should be to map real prior knowledge into
the prior distribution. This goal is difficult and has proved elusive. Nonetheless,
it can be done. Indeed, the goal of creating a prior distribution should be to
accurately map knowledge into numerical calculations, even if that information is
vague information.
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2.2.2 Decisions by Economic Actors
Bayesian analysis is a form of inductive reasoning and as such is incomplete. This is
not true for Frequentist statistics. The inferential goal of Frequentist statistics is to
falsify some null hypothesis and as such is a statistical form of modus tollens. This
gives a straight deductive answer to a question of interest, subject to some degree of
confidence. Bayesian decision theory, on the other hand, combines traditional game
theory with Bayesian analysis. It can only form a version of complete reasoning
if it can exhaust the possibilities through the game. In such a case, it becomes a
statistical version of modus ponens.
To arrive these decisions, actors observe data to form a posterior distribution.
The posterior distribution is made up of three parts, the likelihood, the prior distri-
bution and the constant of integration. Of interest to economists is the likelihood
and the prior distribution.
The general assumption in mean-variance finance is that of a normally dis-
tributed likelihood function and of this dissertation of a Cauchy distributed likeli-
hood function. Although the controversial part of this research is actually regard-
ing the likelihood, it is usually the nature of the distribution of prior beliefs that
is controversial.
2.2.3 Dealing with Prior Information
2.2.3.1 Introduction
Ideally, the distribution used to model prior knowledge would accurately describe
an actor’s prior knowledge of the parameter in question. In practice it is a noisy
representation of prior knowledge. There has been a tendency among authors to
divide prior distributions by the amount of knowledge they encode. There is no
canonical list for such terms, but they are presented here as the uninformative, the
vague, the informative and the highly informative prior distribution. An additional
type of prior is included as well, the adversarial prior. The adversarial prior, like
Fisher’s null hypothesis, is designed to favor views that are in opposition to some
hypothesis.
This new prior is a partial acknowledgment of the deep philosophical value of
the null hypothesis. This is not a complete conversion to the Frequentist perspec-
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tive as that would require placing 100% of the prior belief on one hypothesis.
The influence of Frequentist statistics in the literature is obvious. Competition
with Frequentist methods has had a disciplining effect on Bayesian methods. A
consequence of the Frequentist concern with unbiased estimators has been felt even
in economic practice. When economists have used Bayesian statistics the bias in
economics has been for the use of uninformative prior distributions, or ignorance
distributions. In many respects this is unfortunate. Ignorance priors do limit the
influence of a particular researcher’s beliefs on inference from the data, this does
throw away two sources of prior knowledge, economic theory and the knowledge
of related information.
The controversy over avoiding bias in the outcomes versus including real knowl-
edge is unavoidable. However it is important to remember that to some extent the
word choice that happened to be used in the field of statistics and probability hap-
pened, in part, for polemic reasons. If the Pearson-Neyman estimator was also the
unbiased estimator, then by word choice the others either conform to their model
or must publish biased estimators. The same thing is true with a wide range of
terms, including such terms as admissibility.
The important thing is to understand the origins of the various controversies
and to use the gains from them in science. There is no reason to take sides from
these often contentious controversies, rather the job of science is to grab pragmatic
tools from the various mathematical systems and understand the consequences of
adopting certain axioms.
Consider the relatively simple question of determining the annual bankruptcy
rate of publicly traded firms. A firm is bankrupt or it is not. The question of
estimation is in practice not trivial, even though this resembles a coin toss problem.
To see how and why this issue is important it can help to look at the problem
from a Frequentist perspective. Frequency based methods do not concern them-
selves with prior information as the data is considered random and so any sample
that is large enough and independently gathered should contain the same informa-
tion. The key to this idea is the idea of large enough. For rare events the required
sample size could be large indeed.
It isn’t inference about the estimator that is of interest but rather how the
estimator is constructed. The maximum likelihood estimator is simply the number
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of observed occurrences of bankruptcy divided by the number of trials. If two
bankruptcies are observed in 1000 observations then the proposed bankruptcy rate
is 0.2%.
Bayesian methodology does not make this question so simple. Do economists
have information about the bankruptcy rate, either from theory or from other
data?
The simple answer is “yes,” economists do have information about the annual
bankruptcy rate embedded in other data that theory says should be important. Is
it exact information? The simple answer is “no.” As in all things relating to a prior
distribution, it is unlikely that a researcher has precise prior knowledge. Indeed,
if a researcher did have this precise prior knowledge then the research would be
unnecessary.
This creates several trade-offs for the researcher. The first is model preci-
sion. Better prior distributions result in smaller credible intervals. The second is
credibility with hostile audiences. The more the prior information influences the
outcome, the less certain the result would be the same under differing assump-
tions. A third issue is the admissibility of the result. Flat prior distributions
do not always create an admissible solution. From the Bayesian perspective this
is why multi-dimensional ordinary least squares is inadmissible. The Frequentist
least squares solution maps to the same solution a Bayesian would receive with a
uniform distribution as a prior.
The uniform distribution has a distribution of:
Definition 7.
Pr(X) ∝ 1
This results in a total mass that goes to infinity as:∫ ∞
−∞
dX =∞ (2.1)
Since the prior does not integrate to one, it isn’t guaranteed the posterior
distribution will integrate to one. As the number of independent variables becomes
three or more, the posterior distribution does not exist if the prior distribution
was uniform over the parameter space for linear regression.[39, 76] Using Bayesian
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methods then requires conscious trade-offs to be made. Generally this guarantees
admissibility, but also can guarantee a dispute over the quality of the research.
2.2.3.2 The Uniformative Prior
The first set of prior distributions to consider are the set of ignorance priors. They
are so called because they have minimal impact on inference from the data. As
the likelihood for bankruptcy estmation can be modeled as a binomial process, a
rational prior distribution is the conjugate prior distribution, the beta distribution.
A conjugate prior has the nice property that the prior parameters can be inter-
preted in terms of observations. The normalized joint distribution is the posterior
probability distribution of the parameter. The effect of the prior can be interpreted
as though specific observations had been made.
For the binomial distribution there are three generally used ignorance prior
distributions. They are the Haldane, the arcsine and the uniform distributions.
Each ignorance prior distribution has different properties, even though each can
model the state of a lack of knowledge.
The maximum a posteriori estimate using a Haldane prior is computationally
the same as the Frequentist maximum likelihood estimator. The illusion would
be that this would make the Haldane prior unbiased. The Haldane prior is an
improper prior in that it does not integrate to one. Computationally, the prior
is represented as 1
p(1−p) . The distribution arose as an attempt to solve a rarely
discussed, but important problem in the sciences.
For many problems in the physical sciences the sample size is one. Often the
sample itself is destroyed. The classic example is to drop a substance into water
to see if it is soluble. This is not a task that is repeated thirty times in order to
use a z test. It has no degrees of freedom.
The Haldane prior places infinite mass at zero percent and one hundred percent.
Seeing a single observation results in all of the posterior mass being at the observed
value. The Haldane prior joint with the binomial distribution becomes an ordinary
beta distribution as the sample size increases.2
While it is equivalent to adding no observations to the posterior distribution so
that all weight in the estimate is from the data, it has a rather peculiar U shape
2When looking at improper prior distributions, it is necessary to look at their limiting forms.
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where the density is minimized at a fifty percent bankruptcy rate and maximized at
either a zero or one hundred percent bankruptcy rate. Although it has no impact
on the posterior distribution directly, as it is the equivalent to adding no additional
information, it favors very small and very large probabilities and dampens the effect
of probabilities near fifty percent.
The arcsine prior is the Jeffreys’ prior for the binomial distribution. A prior is
a Jeffreys’ prior if the results are invariant under reparameterization. For example,
if instead of a rate a present value were measured then the resulting posterior cal-
culations would not be impacted. The Jeffrey’s prior for the binomial distribution
is the square root of the Haldane prior. It differs from the Haldane prior in two
ways.
First, it is twice as dense at the fifty percent rate. Second, it is equivalent to
observing one half a bankruptcy and one half a survival. As such it is equivalent
to adding a total of one observation to the data. The expectation is fifty percent.
The third commonly used ignorance prior is the uniform distribution. First
suggested by Laplace and Bayes the distribution assigns equal probability to each
possible value of the parameter.[46] It is a proper prior since it is bounded at zero
and one in this case. While it is properly bounded, it has the peculiar property of
being equivalent to adding one bankruptcy and one survival to the data set. Using
the uniform prior is not uniformative even though it provides no information as
to the location of the parameter other than it must be within the interval [0,1].
Further, it biases the expected value of the rate toward the fifty percent point. As
the sample size becomes very large the effect is negligible, but it does go to point
out that even in complete ignorance that information is provided by the prior.
2.2.3.3 The Vague Prior Distribution
The purpose of the vague prior is to encode real but noisy information. Informa-
tion that is known from theory or other data, but not through direct research.
An example more like the bankruptcy problem would be to consider using the
triangular distribution to model prior bankruptcy beliefs.
Any reasonable set of economists would agree that the likely bankruptcy rate
is smaller rather than larger for public firms. It is improbable that the true long
term annual rate of bankruptcy is ninety-nine percent. It is more probable that
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it is low. The triangular distribution, constructed as Pr(θ) ∝ 1− θ, has the nice
property that any point to the left is more probable than any point to the right.
This is not complete ignorance and has the impact of adding two survivals and one
bankruptcy to the final data set. This does bias the rate downward, but does not
grant infinite weight to the extreme values as the Haldane prior does.
The vague prior has an impact on the final estimate and on the final inference,
but it is very weak. Another example would be to code a normal distribution with
the value expected by the researcher, but with a very wide standard deviation.
To understand why this may be of value, consider that the maximum likelihood
estimator considers all values equally likely prior to seeing the data. A fork full of
green beans could as easily have one million calories as five prior to observation.
By using the normal distribution to code an expected value some values become
so unlikely that their prior weight is nominal. By reducing the weight on the
extremes of the number line, the posterior density estimate is narrower increasing
both accuracy and the quality of inference.
2.2.3.4 Informative Prior Distributions
While vague prior distributions encode very little additional information, prior
distributions shouldn’t be vague when real world information exists about the
parameters. It is at this point, where information external to the data begins to
seep into calculations of the data that the controversies really begin. This class of
prior distributions is called the informative priors.
With an informative prior, pre-existing information impacts the estimates of
the parameters and the posterior inference about those parameters. A simple and
non-controversial example would be data from prior research. Someone reading
a study on the spread between the LIBOR and treasury securities as a predictor
of GDP from 1980-2001 could simply acquire data after 2001 and use posterior
distribution of the other data as the prior distribution. This would result in no
difference in calculation than had the researcher acquired the entire set of data.
Another non-controversial and simple example would be to manage data sets
that do not begin at the same time. A restriction in Frequentist regression is that
if there are multiple data sets with differing start dates, then regression can only
be calculated from the latest start date. This is not true for Bayesian regression.
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Consider a research project that intends to perform inference on CRSP, Compu-
Stat, Treasury and Federal Reserve data. CRSP data goes back to 1925, some
Treasury and Federal Reserve series are quite recent but economic theory would
say people react to prices. Not knowing the value of some type of data does not
mean people do not react to it, merely that the economist cannot directly see the
effect without an independent variable.
Using relationships between series allows the capture of this hidden effect as
uncertainty in the distribution. As new series become available their role in that
uncertainty can be conditioned on prior knowledge of the known relationships
up until that point. Adding each new series removes uncertainty and improves
prediction. Further, rather than perform a short regression on ten years of data,
nearly a century of data is at least partially encoded in the prior.
Finally, another non-controversial use of the informative prior is to manage
breaks in time series. For a variety of reasons economic time series have periods
of missing data, sometimes years of missing data. Frequentist regression would
require choosing one set of those broken series to estimate the parameters. Bayesian
regression would take the data up to the first break and create a posterior estimate.
That posterior distribution would become the prior distribution once the series
starts again. This process would continue until the entire data set is used.
It is here that controversy begins. Imagine a researcher who is estimating the
bankruptcy rate of public firms for the United States from 1925-2012 and who
has also just completed an estimate of the bankruptcy rate of British firms from
1800-2012. The question becomes “can the British data be used to estimate US
parameters?”
The English and the American legal traditions are similar in most US jurisdic-
tions, but there are other differences as well. The United Kingdom is geographically
small and so the competitive environment is different. Constitutional issues and
state ownership of firms differ as well at different times. How much weight should
British data provide to American data?
An advantage of Frequentist methodology is that economists can ignore this
type of question entirely; Bayesian methods should encode prior knowledge. If the
British data is highly representative then it should code into US data as a prior. If
the British experience is not representative of the American experience then little
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or nothing of the British data should be encoded through the prior. If it is not
representative at all, then a flat prior would be preferable.
An alternative is a mixture distribution. Mixing together a normal distribution
and a uniform distribution will maintain the center of location from the British data
but flatten the prior distribution so that the encoding of British data is weakened.
How much should the variance be increased? That is up to the subjective viewpoint
of the researcher and any referees.
While Bayesian methods are generally admissible, they do not provide a free
lunch alternative to Frequentist methods. They are far from a panacea.
There are other ways to get information into a prior distribution as well. A
review of stock market indices provide annualized returns. As indices have survivor
effects the returns on an index should be higher than the true return as bankruptcy
effects are excluded. The result from theory is that the annual bankruptcy rates
must be less than the returns on the indices.
Depending on the time frame long run returns run up into the high teens. It
is very safe to assume that less than twenty percent of the firms become bankrupt
each year. The question is how to represent this as a prior distribution. It is
important not to assign a zero probability to any value as it forces a zero percent
probability into the posterior distribution. Humanity has yet to run the course of
its existence and so making something impossible by assumption is dangerous.
Nonetheless, annual bankruptcy rates in excess of twenty percent are very im-
probable, with a much less than one percent chance. If a uniform distribution is
assigned over the interval zero to twenty with ninety nine percent of the mass and
a triangle distribution over the remaining range with one percent of the mass then
we have a proper but arbitrary prior distribution.
The obvious question is “how is this a good idea?” The answer is the unfor-
tunate answer that arbitrary solutions are an element of Bayesian statistics. Even
to choose a conjugate prior, where one exists, is a very arbitrary choice. The most
likely reason economists prefer Frequentist statistics is that any arbitrary choice
that is made is hidden from the user and the arbitrary choice is usually some
criteria, such as unbiasedness.
Is there anything that would be less arbitrary? No, but there may be methods
that are computationally more convenient. For example, the prior could be set
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as the normal distribution with a mean of zero and the 99.99 th percentile at the
highest ten or twenty year annualized return for a broad index.
The difference between the two is computational convenience and the appear-
ance of exactness, even though that upper bound is itself a product of chance.
Given a different way of looking at the data over a different time frame the chosen
prior would have been different.
Not all the of elements of Bayesian statistics are disquieting. As the data set
becomes large, regardless of the prior, the Bayesian solution and the Frequentist
solution will converge.[46] There is an improper argument that since they will
converge anyway, the choice of the prior does not matter. This should not be used
as an excuse to be sloppy. It is true for large sets the impact of the prior is very
small. This is even true for moderate size sets, but that is not the point.
The prior, as inconvenient as it is, should represent real information where it
exists and ignorance where it does not.
Finally, there is the highly informative prior distribution.
2.2.3.5 The Highly Informative Prior
A highly informative distribution is a distribution whose effect swamps the effect of
the data. There are several reasons to use a highly informative prior distribution.
The first is simply because the data exists. If you have historical data and you do
not use it then you are wasting information. The second can be a bit subtle.
Imagine that in some research there is a set of well researched and well under-
stood relationships with extensive data sets. A researcher believes another unre-
searched variable matters as well, but the set is small. Using a highly informative
prior for the parameters to be estimated that are already well understood has the
nice property of swamping any idiosyncratic elements unique to the specific data
set, while capturing any new information not already in the prior distribution.
The issue with highly informative prior distributions isn’t quality of data, it
is “why bother?” Adding ten data points to a million data points isn’t likely to
produce a change in parameter estimates. It is only where they are used to support
a broader question that the research makes sense.
The data from the likelihood is conditioned on these prior distributions. Al-
though Bayesian statistics does provide a method of robustness checks, that is not
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the concern here, from a game theory perspective.
The concern is in getting from a prior belief, through the data, to a predictive
distribution. Having formed prior beliefs into a distribution, the second half of
creating parameter estimates from the data is the likelihood function. This is the
contentious part of this dissertation.
2.2.3.6 The Adversarial Prior
A prior is considered antagonistic to the model to the extent it over-weights or
favors beliefs against the proposed model. This is done in a number of ways. First,
in some sections a highly informative prior is placed that would tend to discredit
the model, ex ante. For the model to overcome this prior belief system requires
substantially more evidence than a neutral observer would require. In other places,
where the variance impacts posterior density testing, the prior variance is treated
as substantially higher than would be the case in reality.
Adding additional prior variance makes the model appear less stable than it
really is, making it more difficult to overcome adversaries’ objections. Further,
increasing prior variance reduces the information content of prior empirical knowl-
edge. This adds noise where signal had previously been detected. By analogy, it
is like blurring an image.
Favoring the adversary is much like null hypothesis testing, though without the
closure created by modus tollens. Traditional Bayesian mechanisms have eschewed
null hypothesis testing and have instead looked to having no favored hypothesis.
While this has the benefit of neutrality, it may not change minds. Traditional
null hypothesis testing concedes the argument and then begins, “given that the
adversary is correct, what is the probability of observing the actual data?”
In Frequentist null hypothesis testing the concession is total. All tests are given
that the null is perfectly true. That cannot function in Bayesian thinking. It cannot
be the case that 100% is credited to one hypothesis as this guarantees the posterior
will not be impacted by the likelihood. Instead, the only real requirement is that
the prior parameters are unreasonable from the perspective of the supporters of
the proposed model.
Unreasonable is subjective. It is unlikely that a dyed-in-the-wool creationist will
suddenly read a research paper and become a supporter of evolution. It will always
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be possible to argue that the prior distributions used were not unreasonable enough.
Likewise, a strong supporter of traditional Bayesian thinking would correctly argue
that the prior distributions should reflect real prior information and should not be
diluted or altered.
There cannot be an answer to this question. At most, a scientific consensus
could form that the conclusions are trustworthy or untrustworthy. It is unlikely
anything stronger is possible to claim.
2.3 A Sidestep Into Bayes Actions
As actors are forward looking, they are concerned with a model of future events,
given parameters. In Bayesian statistics this is called the predictive distribution.
This is the distribution an actor believes will happen in the future given historical
data and any prior knowledge.






where X is the future values and θ are the parameters of interest.
Bayesian decision theory does not assume a parameter is known opening the
question as how to make decisions without fixed point solutions. Bayes action is a
tool to supplement decision by building a Bayesian game. Option prices are built
on a predictive distribution of possible future prices. In taking expectations on
a predictive distribution an implicit cost function is being accepted regarding the
parameter estimates. That cost function may or may not be explicitly known to a
decision maker.
As an example, an individual with one undergraduate semester in statistics
may decide to use ordinary least squares to estimate a relationship between two
variables. In doing so, that individual has accepted a quadratic loss function even
if they are not aware they are doing so.
The skipped step, up until now, has been how to arrive at an estimate for the
center of location, µ, and a scale parameter, σ. This reflects the risk of looking
through a rear view mirror to predict the future.
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It is quite common in American economics to use American data to estimate
future American data. In doing so economists ignore events that have happened
in other economies such as hyper-inflation. Would the American stock market
respond the same way under hyper-inflation as in other economies or would it be-
have as it did under prior more normal periods? There is a risk that the American
economy, going forward into the distant future, will have aspects of other world
economies. This implies our population estimates for µ and σ bear some risk. This
risk may not be fully acknowledged leaving unaccounted for risks in this model.
There have been two approaches here, Bayes action and minimax. Minimax is
appealing because it doesn’t need the requirement of knowing the probabilities for
any state of the world that may happen before they happen.[76] Beginning with
Savage this has tended to be discounted in favor of expected utility in Bayesian
methodologies.
Formally, the minimax concept seeks to minimize the maximum loss from an
incorrect choice of parameter estimates. It can and does happen from time to time
that an action which is considered a valid Bayes action is also a valid minimax
action.
The virtue of a minimax choice is that it is fundamentally conservative. The
game theory equivalent model would be a model where nature moved first and is
trying to purposefully deceive actors, the actors then observe their world and act
on the prior observations in nature, whereupon nature would pounce. Minimax
minimizes the maximum loss from a purposefully deceptive natural world.[76]
It would also minimize the risk from choosing a poor data set to model data
on.
Economists cannot know how marginal actors either in the past or going for-
ward are modeling parameters or parameter risk. We can know the normative
tools taught in academia, but we cannot know with certainty how they are being
implemented in the field.
A possible way for economists, regulators and institutions to sidestep the issue
is through using Bayes actions. This isn’t a preference choice but rather a result
of the concept of admissibility.
Admissibility is more of an issue for Frequentist style statistics than for Bayesian
statistics, but it is nonetheless important for Bayesian measures as well. A measure
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is admissible if no other measure can stochastically dominate it.
An admissible decision rule has the same property of dominance, but with
regard to a risk function. It is also closely related to Pareto optimality.
Following Parmigiani, if a utility function has already been specified then a loss
function can be defined as:
Definition 9. A loss function L can be defined: u(a(θ)) = −Lu(θ, a), where
(θ, a) ∈ (Θ×A)
Given a prior distribution of θ, π(θ), a Bayes action, a, is defined thus:
Definition 10. An action a∗ is a Bayes action if:









as the prior expected loss from an action.
This brings up the question of how to find a∗. The traditional mechanism in
economics is through some formal optimization process. This may be somewhat
difficult in some Bayesian problems as there is no guarantee of a unique mode or
a connected credible region in which to find an optimal solution.
Wald’s solution was to create a decision rule, δ(x) with a domain of X and a
range of A. The entire class of decision rules is D. The existence of a rule to find
a best action, however, then begs the question is there a risk created by the rule?
Could an actor choose the wrong rule?
We need a way to define risk:





This risk only considers the predicted distribution. A Frequentist solution
would then choose the rule for decision making that minimizes the maximum risk.
The challenge with this is that there is no assurance that such a rule is admissible
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for the purposes of decision making. A separate proof would have to be constructed
to show the minimax rule for the circumstance involved is also an admissible rule.
Note further that the above risk function can be expanded to include the pre-
dictive distribution as the predictive distribution is fundamentally the likelihood
function given a parameter set. Still, this is not quite an optimal rule yet.
Two further concepts are required, the Bayes risk and the Bayes decision rule.






A Bayes rule that minimizes the Bayes risk is the optimal Bayesian decision
rule.
Definition 13. A decision rule δ∗ is Bayes with respect to π if
r(π, δ∗) = inf
δ
r(π, δ)
Although this gets to a best rule, it doesn’t show the best rule is admissible
for the purpose of making decisions. To get there two things must be done, first
its necessary to define what admissibility means and second its necessary to show
that we have not left out any decision rule that could be used.
The first definition we need is that of what it means to be R-better.
Definition 14. A decision rule δ is called R-better than another decision rule δ′
if
R(θ, δ) ≤ R(θ, δ′)
and R(θ, δ) < R(θ, δ′) for some θ. It can also be said that δ dominates δ′.
The definition of admissibility follows as:
Definition 15. A decision rule δ is admissible if there is no R-better rule.
The next segment, omitted here, is to show that the class, D, is a complete
class. The concern is that no rule that could be R-better is omitted.
Although the great objection to Bayesian thinking by Frequentist theorists is
the prior distribution, the goal of Frequentist theorists is admissibility. Proofs
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to the following theorems are omitted as it is the result that is critical for this
discussion. For a discussion of Wald’s Complete Class Theorem and admissibility
in general, see chapter 13 in Jaynes’ Probability Theory.[46]
Theorem 1. Suppose that every Bayes rule with respect to a prior distribution π
has the same risk function, then all these rules are admissible.
Theorem 2. Any unique Bayes estimator is admissible.
These two theorems assure any economist, regulator or participant in the mar-
ket that they can make choices based on a proper prior distribution that reflects
true prior knowledge. Because Frequentist rules generally are the equivalent to
multiplying a likelihood by a flat improper prior, an area where the two groups
can jointly operate are in generalized Bayes rules. Generalized Bayes rules are rules
where the prior distribution is improper, that is it does not integrate to one, but
the posterior does so at the limit. An example of this is a uniform prior distribution
with a univariate normal likelihood.
This overlap is only important for future work. In this work, it matters only that
a unique Bayesian solution will, under very mild conditions, always be admissible.
As such, since a properly formed posterior distribution on µ and σ has no R-better
solution possible, the results can be trusted.
Further, even though the mechanism by which the populace arrive at an equi-
librium cannot be known, its reasonable to trust the posterior estimates in finding
the basin of attractions for prices.
2.3.1 The Effect of Prior Information
A peculiar question often haunts Bayesian and Frequentist debates, what to do with
prior information. Frequentist methods discard direct usage of prior information,
using it only in study design. Prior distributions, as mentioned above, are usually
sloppy. Still, this does not settle the debate.
The prior information discussion enters into the Bayesian/Frequentist debate
through admissibility as well. Kale shows for distributions in the exponential
family that sample statistics are not admissible when prior information exists.[48]
Although not shown for other families of distributions the intuition behind this
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finding is rather simple. Imagine prior data from a sample with one million data
points and a current sample of one hundred data points. Discarding the prior
information would result in an unbiased estimate that is also one hundred times
noisier, on average, than the joint estimator.
The economist is always in possession of prior information, if nothing else that
most things are not supported in the negative real numbers. Further, theory and
related data usually narrow the possible range of solutions. The argument would
be that no Frequentist estimator is ever admissible for an economist in almost all
circumstances. Nonetheless, except where there is real prior knowledge from data
it is quite common for this argument to be practically vacuous.
A numerical look at Frequentist and Bayesian estimators on sets with large
enough membership will tend to converge and so using one or the other may only
have theoretical significance but no practical significance. Still, it cannot be pre-
sumed there is no significance, merely that admissibility isn’t truly a sufficient
single condition to make decisions from without a context, data or an understand-
ing of the prior information.
As Bayes risk resembles Pareto optimality, it is quite likely that a Bayesian
decision theoretic equivalent to the Greenwald-Stiglitz theorem probably exists.
2.3.2 Impact on Option Pricing
It will be shown in the segment on option pricing that a profit maximizing market
maker is engaging in an admissible decision function via profit maximization. If
this were generalized, it would imply that entrepreneurs and business owners in
general minimize risk by maximizing profit. This makes sense that it minimizes
risk to maximize the premium collected for taking a risk.
2.4 The Impact of Sufficiency on Prediction
People are neither concerned with historical stock market prices, prior bankruptcies
nor the history of mergers. They are concerned with future events and in the
prediction of those events. Option contracts, as a form of insurance, depend upon
the ability to forecast future liability. Sufficiency, like admissibility, is an important
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concept in understanding statistical decision making.
The Cauchy distribution is used extensively throughout this dissertation and as
such an understanding of the relationship between the distribution and sufficient
statistics is necessary. A sufficient statistic is important in Bayesian thinking be-
cause to use any other statistic is to waste information. The Sufficiency Principle,
which follows from the Neyman Factorization Theorem, shows this relationship
best.
2.4.1 Preliminaries
Certain antecedent concepts are necessary first to discuss the Sufficiency Principle.
The first is the idea of a statistic. It can be defined as:
Definition 16. Given a vector observations, x = {x1, x2, . . . , xn−1, xn} defined on
a sample space, X, then some real valued function, t is said to be a statistic when
t = t(x).
It is important to note that the function t adds no additional information that
is not already contained in the vector x. So that:
Pr(x|θ) = Pr(x, t|θ) (2.2)
The right hand side can be expanded as:
= Pr(t|θ) Pr(x|t, θ) (2.3)
If t does not depend upon θ then it follows that
Pr(x|θ) = Pr(t|θ) Pr(x|t) (2.4)
This leads to a basic definition of a sufficient statistic for a parameter.
Definition 17. A statistic t is said to be a sufficient statistic for θ if it does not
depend upon θ.
The Sufficiency Principle can be derived from the Pearson-Neyman Factoriza-
tion theorem. A statement of that theorem is:
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Theorem 3 (Neyman Factorization Theorem). A statistic t is said to be a suffi-
cient statistic for θ given x if and only if functions f and g exist such that
Pr(x|θ) = f(t, θ)g(x)
where t = t(x)
Proof. If t is a sufficient statistic for θ given x then we can set the right side of
the equation as:
f(t, θ) = Pr(t|θ) and g(x) = Pr(x|t) (2.5)
In this direction the theorem follows naturally from the definition and the basic
rules of probability.
In the converse direction it is necessary to assume that Pr(x|θ) is a Lesbesgue
integrable probability mass function. Integrating both sides over all x in X such











Pr(t|θ) = f(t, θ)G(t) (2.8)





Choosing any x such that t = t(x) and substituting out f(t, θ), the equation


















= Pr(x|t, θ) (2.12)
So
Pr(x|t, θ) = g(x)
G(t)
(2.13)
Since the right hand side does not depend upon θ it follows the left hand side
does not as well. As such, t is a sufficient statistic for θ.
It would be helpful here, both from a Bayesian and a Frequentist perspective
to define the likelihood function.
Definition 18. The likelihood function, l, is defined as
l(θ|x) = Pr(x|θ)
This leads to thinking of a statistic in terms of its information content and
in particular, the information content of a sufficient statistic. The Sufficiency
Principle leads to this discussion with ease.
Lemma 1 (The Sufficiency Principle). A statistic t is sufficient for θ given x if
and only if
l(θ|x) ∝ l(θ|t)
whenever t = t(x) and assuming the constant of proportionality does not depend
upon θ.
Proof. If t is sufficient for θ given x then
l(θ|X) ∝ Pr(x|θ) = Pr(t|θ) Pr(x|t) ∝ Pr(t|θ) ∝ l(θ|t) (2.14)
Conversely, if
l(θ|x) ∝ l(θ|t)
whenever t = t(x) then
Pr(x|θ) ∝ Pr(x|t), (2.15)
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by substitution. Choosing a function g(x) so that
Pr(x|θ) = Pr(t|θ)g(x) (2.16)
Invoking Neyman’s Factorization Theorem it is proved.
Having shown these basic ideas, it is now possible to discuss the information
content of sufficient statistics. Theorems showing the above are true for multiple
parameters and for discrete distributions are omitted for brevity and because they
do not illustrate additional concepts of general importance to economists.
2.4.2 Sufficient Statistics and Information
A key point regarding information in both Bayesian and non-Bayesian methods
using the likelihood function is that a sufficient statistic regarding a parameter
contains all relevant information regarding the parameter. To make this clear it
needs to be noted that the posterior probability is proportionate to the likelihood
times the prior probability.
Corollary 1. If a statistic t is sufficient for θ given x then it follows that
Pr(θ|x) ∝ Pr(θ|t)
Proof. If a statistic t is sufficient for θ given x then l(θ|x) ∝ l(θ|t). If Pr(θ) is the
prior probability of θ then multiplying the likelihood by the prior and substituting
yields:
Pr(x|θ) Pr(θ) ∝ Pr(t|θ) Pr(θ) (2.17)
The result follows directly from Bayes’ Theorem.
This leads to a far more important observation, that inference from a sufficient
statistic will be the same as for an entire sample.
2.4.2.1 Inference
Normally this section would concern the likelihood ratio due to the agreement
among both Bayesians and Frequentists as to its power as a test. Instead the
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posterior odds are going to be discussed due to their relationship to decisions.
While the likelihood ratio, for simple hypothesis, gives the change in belief given
by the data alone, a decision maker would rationally include any prior information
as well as the sample. Further, the simpler construction highlights the key element
here, that of the sufficient statistic.
Theorem 4. Let Θ′ and Θ′′ be disjoint regions, possibly closed and each with a
neighborhood of points containing more than one point3, in closed region Θ which is
defined as the parameter space for inference about θ, a sample x ∈ X, a posterior
density function, fθ, that is Lesbesgue integrable and statistic t = t(x) which is






Proof. If fθ|x(θ|x) = Pr(θ|x) and fθ|t(θ|t) = Pr(θ|t) then fθ|x(θ|x) ∝ fθ|t(θ|t) by
substitution. Since they are proportional for all θ ∈ Θ it follows that a constant c
can be chosen such that fθ|x(θ|x) = cfθ|t(θ|t),∀θ ∈ Θ.














Since the constants cancel, it follows that the posterior odds ratio given the data
is the same as the posterior odds ratio given a sufficient statistic.
Note that proof for distributions with multiple unknown sufficient statistics are
omitted but the proof is trivial due to marginalization of parameters.
This leads to an important corollary, that the posterior inference from a sample
is the same as the posterior inference from a sufficient statistic for the parameter.
Corollary 2. Given the assumptions in Theorem 4,
Pr(θ ∈ Θ′|x) = Pr(θ ∈ Θ′|t)
.
3This is to delay discussion of a sharp hypothesis.
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Proof. Odds ratios can always be expressed as 1−p
p
. Since both odds are equal,
then both numerators are equal to 1− p while both denominators are equal to p.
Therefore the posterior probabilities of each simple hypothesis are equal.
2.4.2.2 Prediction
At the beginning of this discussion on sufficiency the concern with prediction was
emphasized. Mentioned earlier was the predictive distribution, in particular the
probability of observing Xn+1 = xn+1. If t is a sufficient statistic for θ then it
follows that predictions based on t will be no different than predictions based on
the sample.
Theorem 5. If t is a sufficient statistic for θ then the posterior beliefs about the
probability of observing Xn+1 = xn+1 are the same either using the data to generate
the prediction or the sufficient statistic.
Proof. Substituting the posterior distribution into the definition of the predictive
distribution the prediction for xn+1 is:
Pr(xn+1 = Xn+1) =
∫
θ∈Θ
Pr(xn+1 = Xn+1|θ) Pr(θ|x)dθ (2.19)
From the corollary it follows that the predictions regarding future data are the
same.
Out of sample prediction is key to option pricing. Frequentist and Bayesian
methods exist to project estimates out of sample. In the best circumstance, where
the natural system is well behaved, the method of ordinary least squares is used.
The circumstances where this happens are sufficiently common that it is often the
first method projective method taught in statistics.
The attraction to the method of ordinary least squares, where all the classi-
cal assumptions are met, is that the parameter estimates are sufficient statistics,
the method is admissible, it is the minimum variance unbiased estimator and it
coincides with the maximum likelihood estimator. Indeed, in the absence of prior
information there is a reasonable argument against Bayesian methods in favor of
Frequentist methods since Frequentist methods have pre-constructed tests that
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warn of violations of assumptions. Although robustness checks through sensitivity
analysis exist in Bayesian methods, they are costly in that they do not exist as
pre-built tools.
Violations of assumptions have led to a plethora of robust tools, but as the
assumptions depart from the best case assumptions the value of ordinary least
squares as a tool declines. At the extremes of the well behaved and the poorly
behaved system are two statistical distributions, the normal distribution and the
Cauchy distribution.
Cauchy was able to show that the Cauchy distribution leads to the failure of the
method of ordinary least squares to estimate parameters. The Cauchy distribution
lacks the nice properties of the normal.
2.5 The Cauchy Distribution and Its Transfor-
mations
The Cauchy distribution is problematic for a variety of reasons. It lacks a mean
and hence has no variance. There is no sufficient statistic for the location or scale
parameters. Most statistical tools are undefined with the Cauchy distribution and
hence are inadmissible.
As a consequence of this absence of sufficiency, the maximum likelihood estima-
tor does not produce a sufficient statistic. As the maximum a posteriori estimator
is nothing more than the maximum likelihood estimator conditioned on prior in-
formation, it also does not produce a sufficient statistic. The prior information
can be thought of as the posterior of data and an ignorance prior and as such the
maximum a posteriori estimator is the maximum likelihood estimator of the joint
estimate of prior and current information.
This does not mean the maximum likelihood estimator is a poor estimator
for the parameter, merely that there is still information held in the sample x
that remains unused. The maximum likelihood estimator and its Bayesian cousin
waste information. This leads to two remaining projective methodologies, that
of the minimum variance unbiased estimator of the parameters and the Bayesian
method of marginalization to construct a predictive distribution.
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It should be noted that the maximum likelihood estimator can be conditioned
on the scale parameter, as an ancillary statistic to construct intervals and to per-
form inference. In that case, they are jointly minimally sufficient.[33] Nonetheless,
a projection outside the data is not sufficient and wastes information.
Where the Cauchy distribution is present, it is usually operated on with trans-
formations. As such, the properties of using various transformations need dis-
cussed.
2.5.1 The Symmetric Case
The symmetric case is the true Cauchy distribution. In certain respects its prop-
erties are superior to the truncated case in that the population median and the
mode are the same. In the population the median and the location parameter are
located at the same point. The twenty-fifth and seventy-fifth percentiles mark the
points of inflection, the half maximum point and the distance between them is
twice the scale parameter. This property makes the order statistics well defined
and very useful.
Order statistics are always sufficient statistics. Given these nice properties,
order statistics are not only sufficient, but they minimize a linear cost function
and hence are admissible, at least assuming the true cost function is linear.
Since real world data is not symmetric this would seem to be incidental, but
that is not the case. Of the Frequentist methods, Theil’s method of regression,
combined with Rothenberg’s estimator for the median slope can usually be treated
as a symmetric case.[83, 101] Noting that the median minimizes the absolute loss
function,
L(θ, a) = |θ − a| (2.20)
it should also be noted that it is an acceptable solution to the all-or-nothing loss
function which is minimized by the mode,
L(θ, a) =
0 if |θ − a| ≤ ε1 if |θ − a| > ε, (2.21)
when ε is sufficiently wide so that the distance between the median and the mode
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is small enough then the median approximation satisfies both loss functions.
As Rothenberg’s estimator is the minimum variance unbiased estimator of the
median and as Theil’s method provides an unbiased estimator of the median slope
of the set of all possible slopes, Theil’s method provides all of the nice proper-
ties desired in a Frequentist estimate of the population parameter. Further, any
intervals are well defined in Theil.[101]
2.5.2 The Truncated Case
The truncated case happens when returns are defined as future value divided by
present value. The mode and the median no longer match, the interquartile range
is no longer located at the points of inflection. The median no longer is located
at the position of the location parameter. In the data set used here, the difference
is approximately two percent per annum. To understand the difference, had the
growth rate of India over the twentieth century been two percent greater per capita
income would be seven time higher by the end of the century and India’s per capita
income would be around the same scale of Spain or Portugal today.
Though it is a biased estimator, median based inference is still valid. Although
the order statistics are shifted from where they would be in the symmetric case,
this is basically a different distribution. It follows that order based measures are
valid for inference, though not necessarily for finding the basin of attraction.
Since the median is no longer located at µ it can be argued that the median
estimator is inadmissible, leaving only Bayesian methods. This may not be true.
As with articles designed for small samples using quantiles, there may be a way to
recover µ and σ from the truncated case making clever use of quantiles.[21]
2.5.3 Logarithmic Transformation
The logarithmic transformation has two cases. The first case is captured purely by
taking the log of the data, the second by running regression on the log of the data.
In the first case, where no regression is run, the data will follow the hyperbolic
secant distribution:[56]
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Regressing on a log-log transformation of the Cauchy distribution results, gen-
erally, in a normal distribution as the set becomes very large. As long as the pa-
rameter estimate avoids the explosive root problem, the transformation will yield
a well behaved equation. More generally, although leptokurtic, the Hyperbolic Se-
cant distribution has finite variance and transformations that can be seen as sums
drawn from the hyperbolic secant distribution are well behaved.[10] When care-
fully constructed the distributions have finite variance the classical central limit
theorem holds and so estimators of β should converge to normality.
Further, as many macroeconomic models are built in logarithmic space, this has
all the nice properties attributed to the normal distribution without the problems
of the Cauchy distribution. It does not solve the problem more commonly seen by
financial economists where the concern is in terms of prices and quantities. The
logarithmic transformation is distorting in that case as the mean of the logs maps
to the median of the underlying distribution, which in the case of the truncated
Cauchy distribution has all of the distortion problems listed above.
2.5.4 Bayesian Methods in General
The likelihood function for the truncated and the symmetric case is proportionate
over the mutually supported space. The difference is the constant of integration.




σ2 + (x− µ)2
, (2.22)
while the form of the truncated distribution is:
2





σ2 + (x− µ)2
(2.23)
For both Frequentists and Bayesians the interquartile range no longer is an unbi-
ased estimator for the shape parameter, but the two points where the values are
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at half the maximum value of the likelihood function still have a distance of twice
the shape parameter. This fact may be useful to Frequentist estimation.
Except in some very specific applications where the constant of integration
impacts the solution, as may happen in some circumstances with Bayes factors,
the constant of integration can be dropped.
Since the Bayesian predictive distribution uses all of the data, by construction,
both the questions of admissibility and sufficiency are sidestepped entirely.
2.5.5 Frequentist Methods
Although the problem of estimators could be evaded entirely using only Bayesian
estimators, this fails to resolve three important problems. Indeed, despite all
other discussions, these three issues form a key element of the Bayesian and the
Frequentist debate and cannot be ignored.
The first goes to the core of the problem of the concept of admissibility. Subject
to very mild conditions, Bayesian solutions are admissible. This isn’t a plus.
It is a plus for a Frequentist measure, but it isn’t a plus for a Bayesian measure.
To understand why consider a series of experiments by a Creationist designed to
test variety of components of evolution. Assume they are well designed from the
viewpoint of biologist both methodologically and in their scope.
Also assume that the null hypothesis is that evolution has no effect, that is,
“H0 : µ = 0,” for each effect. Assume each t-test rejects Creationism and that
the Bayes factors for each test reject Creationism. Also assume that while the
Creationist distribution is non-degenerate it is highly prejudiced.
Although neutral tests reject Creationism, it is still possible for the Creationist
to reject evolution as the posterior density may still properly include the “no effect”
hypothesis. That is a fully admissible solution.
The Frequentist methodology would correctly exclude Creationism as the Bayesian
method would for people with only mild biases toward Creationism. In the pres-
ence of the Creationist’s prior beliefs the Frequentist methods would automatically
fail to be admissible, assuming all tests used distributions in the exponential family.
Admissibility came out of the Frequentist school as a criterion for statistics. It
is valuable and should not be ignored, but it is quite a limited concept. Indeed
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it hides the problem of the prior, as it fails to discriminate between Bayesian
solutions.
Consider two possible proper vague prior distributions for some experiment. It
is unclear which prior best encodes the information. It is not correct to conclude
that since either solution is admissible then it follows that it does not matter which
solution is chosen. That defeats common sense and indeed defeats the underlying
postulates in the various axiomatic systems of Bayesian thinking.
Admissibility does not permit the rascal to escape the hard work behind the
problem by seeking refuge in Bayesian methods. If anything, it makes the it more
difficult rather than less as it is a non-criterion for Bayesian methodology.
Bayesian methods are not unbiased methods. Even if the method is inadmissi-
ble, most Frequentist methods are unbiased. Inadmissibility, the negative criterion,
should exclude only once the reason for inadmissibility has been determined.
The second reason is computational feasibility. Although most Bayesian so-
lutions are mathematically simple, they may not be computationally simple. Al-
though modern computational methods have ameliorated this issue, they have not
elminated them.
The third issue gets to the heart of a divisive issue, the sharp or point null
hypothesis. The correct solution to solving a problem of the form Pr(x|θ) is to use
a Frequentist methodology. Theil’s regression, with slight modification to optimize
estimates of the median, has many of the desired nice properties of an estimator
in most circumstances. It cannot consider prior knowledge, but otherwise has nice
statistical properties and is usually computationally feasible. It can also answer
the null hypothesis Pr(x|β = 0). The Bayesian method is painfully challenged by
that question.
2.5.6 Conclusion
Three statistical concepts are of importance to this work. They follow from the
nature of the problem and the data set in use.
In this work, there exists very substantial prior information from a massive
data set, there are no sufficient statistics for the Cauchy distribution and the issue
of admissibility is evaded through Bayesian marginalization of the posterior over
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the parameter space to project onto the future sample space.
Although it cannot, logically, be concluded that the Bayesian method dom-
inates the Frequentist to the point it should be excluded, it does simplify the
solution of the problem. To solve the problem from the Frequentist perspective
one would solve a very large optimization problem with multiple nuisance parame-
ters. This is challenging with well behaved distributions. Combined with the other
elements this favors Bayesian methods over Frequentist methods.
As such, the bias of the document is toward Bayesian methods and away from
Frequentist methods. Although this bias is present, for a different problem in





The debate over heavy or thin tailed distributions has been going on since Mandel-
brot first noted that the distribution of returns did not match economic theory.[60]
Although the argument is being made that under very mild assumptions, the dis-
tribution of returns in both the Bayesian and Frequentist paradigms must converge
to a Cauchy distribution, this should not be construed as arguing that returns fol-
low a Cauchy distribution. Rather, in the blackboard economics generally used in
finance and economics, returns must converge to a Cauchy distribution. Adding
in very simple economic constraints can have a large impact on the distribution
observed in nature and also confirm that the Cauchy distribution is in fact a rea-
sonable likelihood function when compared with the normal distribution.
3.1 Model Assumptions
This dissertation has a number of relatively simple assumptions that should be
non-controversial. In particular, the model assumes that the Böhm-Bawerk and
marginalist pardigms, generally accepted for over a hundred years, are valid. The
model adopts the mean-variance assumption that future wealth equals current
wealth times a reward plus a random shock. This research further generalizes
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this and argues that the static model is the same as an auto-regressive of degree
one process, without a loss of generality. It assumes that both the Bayesian and
the Frequentist models of probability and statistics, when viewed separately, are
completely valid understandings of their fields. Finally, it assumes that scien-
tific models have at least two properties; that is that models are mathematically
coherent and that measurable inference can be performed on a model.
This last assumption is little more than a reworking of Cox’s postulates for a
narrow purpose.[46]
3.1.1 Difference Equations
Key to understanding the various models is the structure of the equations used
to make them. Implicitly or explicitly, the models use difference or differential
equations. Stochastic economic models can be divided into three groups: static
models, discrete time models and continuous time models. The relationship be-
tween discrete and continuous time models is through scale invariance.[30] The
relationship between static models and discrete time models in economics comes
from the proposition that, subject to a model’s assumptions, economic models are
statements of general economic principles that hold across time.
For example, if a model contains x1 = f(x0) and xt = f(xt−1), then by in-
duction it can be shown that xt+1 = f(xt),∀t ∈ N, So static models of the form
w̃ = Rw̄+ε, where w̃ is an uncertain future wealth, R is a parameter, and ε is a ran-
dom variable, could be re-written, without a loss of generality, as wt+1 = Rwt+εt+1.
The equation w̃ = Rw̄+ε, it should be noted, is the basis of an ill-posed problem
as used by economists. Gauss reminds us that it is only in the limiting form of
a well posed mathematical process that any real discussion of the properties of
w̃ = Rw̄ + εt+1 can begin.[46] If w̃ and wt+1 were not treated as being equivalent
constructions, then indeed it would have a most peculiar case.
While it is quite possible to imagine single gambles which have no economic
consequence in the future, this is not what is generally discuss in economics. That
said, this does not preclude the existence of multiple limiting models. This proof is
one such model, but it is believed that it fully encompasses the range of behaviors
possible in a mean-variance finance proof.
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Assumption 1. The equation
w̃ = Rw̄ + ε
can be expressed as
wt+1 = Rwt + εt+1,
without loss of generality. In the above equation, ε is drawn from a distribution
with finite variance and is centered on zero. As well, εt ⊥ εt+1,∀t.
3.1.2 Böhm-Bawerk Theory
The author has run into a rather unexpected argument in the course of this paper
that while purely technical and not reasonable within the context of economics
is nonetheless a key element for the existence of heavy tailed distributions. The
argument is that finance theories do not explicitly require that the marginal actor
is trying to make a profit from investing. Technically, this is true. The assumption
is usually implicit.
Regardless, in the late 19th and early 20th century significant work was done on
capital and interest rates; this work underpins all modern thinking. In particular,
the work of Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk on the agio, or premium, theory of interest
rates and the writing of James Bates Clark on marginalism come together in the
writings of Irving Fisher and later in J.R. Hicks.[24][35][44][110][111]
Of importance to this paper is the idea of an investor requiring an anticipated
premium for deferring consumption. This implies that for Frequentist models, that
R > 1 and the center of location of R for Bayesian models is greater than one.
Showing this is true is rather simple. Ignoring issues of uncertainty for a mo-
ment, a utility maximizer will prefer a positive return if the alternative is a zero
return on nominal money. Under uncertainty some funds may be maintained in
money if there is some minimum level of consumption required in following time
period or under strong risk aversion.
Alternatively, one could ask the counter-factual question, “what if the reward
for investing was anticipated to be a loss in every period, ignoring shocks?” The
capital stock in a finite resource environment would go to zero. This would imply
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no spears, no seeds, no machinery. This implies extinction so systemic losses are
excluded for the parameter R. If humans lived in the state R = 1 then while capital
could form it couldn’t be partitioned to allow for different prices for different risks.
As such, R > 1 is the only available option.
Assumption 2. The anticipated return for investing by the marginal actor must
be positive.
3.1.3 How Bayesian and Frequestist Paradigms Affect the
Equation
In both models only the vector wt is observable. The error term, ε and the reward
for investing, R, are unobservable and of course wt+1 is yet to be observed. What
differs between the Bayesian and the Frequentist paradigms, is what is a random
variable and what is a fixed point.
In the Frequentist model R is a fixed point. It has a degenerate distribution.
The vector wt+1 and ε are random variates. Although R does not have a distri-
bution with density, there is a distribution of R̂−R. Indeed, these differences are
thought of as errors as the true value is a fixed point.
In the Bayesian model R and ε are random variates and the vector wt is fixed.
The future value, wt+t has not been observed and so remains a random variate
until seen.
Frequentist Assumption 1. In the equation, wt+1 = Rwt + εt+1, R > 1
Bayesian Assumption 1. In the equation, wt+1 = Rwt + εt+1, the center of
location of R, µR, is greater than one.
3.1.4 Scientific Modelling
A definition of what constitutes a scientific model is necessary here. It seems
to require at least two parts. The first part is mathematical coherence. This
only requires that the models follow the standard rules of mathematics unless
some axiom or postulate is added to create differences. Any standard regularity
conditions assumed by economists may be included implicitly. Fundamentally, the
connections must be logical and consistent with the rules of mathematics.
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The second portion is that the variables and/or parameters of interest are
measurable and inference on those parameters is possible. If some aspect of the
model could not be measured, then it fails the second criteria.
3.1.5 Boundary Conditions
Neither the models of mean-variance finance, nor other economic models with
stochastic difference and differential equations tend to include boundary condi-
tions. It is possible that prices could be infinitely negative where a normal distri-
bution is used and there is no upper bound in resources. The consequences of this
are not necessarily trivial.
There are two potentially large consequences of boundary conditions being
absent.
The first is that frequency based statistics tend to explicitly or implicitly de-
pend upon rank statistics in order to perform significance testing when a Cauchy
distribution is present. If the Cauchy distribution is truncated on the left at zero,
but the center of location and scale parameters are unknown, then the rank mea-
sures are shifted an unknown amount. Many estimators depend upon the median
being the center of location. With truncation, the median and the mode no longer
match. The mode, as the basin of attraction, is now the center of location.
The second has to due with thin tails and market failure. If one posits that
a future budget constraint exists, then there exists a positive probability that the
constraint will be to the left of the market clearing price causing a market to fail.
This both skews the distribution and thins the tails from the tails expected by
a Cauchy distribution. Not accounting for bankruptcy on the left and potential
market failure on the right results in a truncated, skewed distribution without
finite variance and possibly without known analytic properties.
3.2 Returns
One of the large challenges in financial economics has been explaining and modeling
the presence of heavy tails in the distribution of returns. While many difficult
models have been proposed, they are based on the fit to the data and not on
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beliefs about how humans must behave in an economic system. A difficulty in
finding a solution is that the Bayesian solution and the frequency based solution
are not the same at all.
3.2.1 Intuition Behind the Proof
Bayesian statistics are a form of case-based reasoning. Each data point is an
individual case and the goal is to extract any relevant information from each data
point. This happens through the likelihood function. Looking at the data on a
point-by-point basis, the question is whether a natural likelihood function exists
for R from which to extract information.
The intuition behind the proof for the distribution of returns can be constructed
from a far simpler method already used by economists; that is, to divide the realized
future value by the present value. In this case, since Bayesian methodology permits
viewing one data point at a time for information, that process will be adopted
here. Given any one observation at an arbitrarily chosen time t and given the




,Pr(wt 6= 0) = 1 (3.1)
Rt is now data and so each value of Rt is treated as a fixed point. Bayesian
statistics has a construction called a predictive distribution; since Rt+1 is yet to be
seen, it is a random variable until it is observed, drawn from a distribution with
a center of location to be defined as µR. Once observed, R1 . . . Rt become fixed
points from which inference about µR can be performed.
For any observation about Rt, its important to note that:
wt+1 = µRwt + εt+1 (3.2)
where wt is
wt = µRwt−1 + εt, (3.3)
and this resolves to:
Rt =









Since µRwt−1 is a constant, Rt is a function of the ratio of two random variables.
The question is “what is the distribution of the shock?” If the ubiquitous answer
in economics is used, which is that ε converges to a normal distribution, then by
well known theorem the distribution of R about its center of location across time
is a Cauchy distribution.[37, 42]
On the other hand, accepting a basic tenets of mean-variance finance, that of
many buyers and sellers and noting the presence of a double auction so that in
equilibrium there will be no winner’s curse, it follows that the rational choice is to
bid or ask the expected appraisal value. The distribution of expected bid and ask
appraisals will, by the central limit theorem, converge to normality as the bids are
in fact the expected future sample means of each actor’s distribution of appraisal
values. In that case also, the Cauchy distribution will be present for the returns.
Under very mild assumptions, the likelihood for R should converge to a Cauchy
distribution in each static period in a Bayesian framework. This intuition permits
the transition from an estimator of R̂ to R̂|wt+1 = Rwt + εt+1. The best way to do
this is to begin with the Frequentist proof by White.
3.2.2 The Frequency Based Solution
Frequency based statistics are a form of deductive reasoning. The goal is to create
a statistical form of modus tollens. An hypothesis is created and then the data
is tested as if the hypothesis were true. If the test rejects the hypothesis, then
to some degree of confidence, the hypothesis is false. The concern here is the
construction of a test which could falsify an hypothesis.
Noting that R is a fixed point, the goal is to construct a test which could be
based upon an hypothesized R and an estimator R̂. White notes that from prior
research, the maximum likelihood estimator for R̂ given that wt+1 = Rwt + εt+1 is
the least squares estimator, for all possible values of R.[114] Normalizing the scale
parameter to 1, he notes that the limiting distribution of R̂ − R is the Cauchy
distribution, where ε follows any distribution with finite variance and is centered
on zero. It is also assumed that εt ⊥ εt+1.
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3.2.3 Impact of White’s Frequentist Proof on the Bayesian
Likelihood Function
A Bayesian solution could follow directly from White’s proof for two reasons. First,
the form of the proof has a Bayesian interpretation; but secondly, under suitable
regularity conditions the asymptotic posterior can be estimated from the Fisher
information and the maximum likelihood estimate.[102]
While the Bayesian method has made use of the method of maximum likeli-
hood since at least Laplace and Gauss, it is used as a special case of the method
of maximum a posteriori. Bayesian methods require a prior distribution for the
parameters of interest. If that prior distribution is the uniform distribution then
the two methods are computationally identical. This is important as it also means
the distributions are identical, although White was solving a Frequentist problem.
While White was solving a different type of problem, his proof happens to have a
Bayesian interpretation.
White solves for the distribution by normalizing the distribution of the differ-
ence between the estimated value and the true value of the center of location with
the square root of Fisher information. In Bayesian statistics, the square root of
Fisher information is known as the Jeffreys’ prior.[55] Although the Cauchy dis-
tribution has no Jeffreys’ prior, the likelihood estimator of R given the difference
equation does have one. For all finite samples of fixed size T , it is a constant.
The Jeffreys’ prior is an uninformative prior that is invariant under transfor-
mation of the data. By multiplying the distribution about the estimate by the
Jeffreys’ prior, it added no information to the posterior distribution and only the
information contained in the likelihood function passed into the posterior.
There is a question then about the likelihood function. White’s proof indirectly
addresses this. In White’s proof it is observed that product of the Jeffreys’ prior
and the distribution of the error maps to the product of the Jeffreys’ prior and
the distribution of the ratio of two normal random variates. This ratio is shown
to converge to a Cauchy distribution. This ratio is the likelihood function.
Effectively what White has shown is that the product of the likelihoods, also
known as Bayesian updating, has the same distribution as the ratio distribution of
a future value and a present value. Since the product of a series of Cauchy distri-
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butions is a Cauchy distribution, and White shows that for ε of any distribution
which admits a mean of zero and finite variance, the distribution of R about the
true value is a Cauchy distribution. The predictive distribution of returns is also
a Cauchy distribution.
The question becomes then, “is an uninformative prior reasonable?” At time
zero, before humans invented capital there was no information about the value of
capital. As time goes to infinity, that value becomes more certain. Since there
was no information at time zero about its value, then it is reasonable to use an
uninformative prior. As the likelihood function, though not its value, can be
assumed to be invariant across time, then it is reasonable to apply a Cauchy
likelihood function to the data.
3.3 Effect on Current Theory
The effect of the Cauchy distribution on existing theory depends, of course, on
what part of theory . For some areas of finance and economics, the use of a mean
or a variance was only a convenience and the results would be approximately the
same on a distribution free basis. For others, the problems are more extensive.
3.3.1 Mean-Variance Finance
There are three principle normative models in mean-variance finance: the Capital
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT), and the Black-
Scholes Option Pricing Model and related Itô calculus based methods (OPM). It is
simplest to begin the discussion with the CAPM as Black-Scholes can be derived
from it. The form of the Black CAPM is the simplest in that it has the fewest
number of assumptions.[15] The goal is to choose a portfolio of securities while
minimizing the portfolio’s variance by choosing a desired level of return. The dual
problem of maximizing return while choosing the variance would have the same






s′1 = 1 (3.7)
and
E(s′R + s′Λ) = µportfolio (3.8)
In these equations: s′, is the vector of allocations; Σ is a covariance matrix;
1 is a vector of ones; Λ is a vector of normally distributed errors; and R is an
unobserved true growth rate. Two implicit assumptions of mean-variance finance
are brought out here.
Assumption 3. In models of mean-variance finance, an expected return on in-
vestment (or alternatively expected reward) exists.
Assumption 4. In models of mean-variance finance, a variance of returns exists.
For multi-asset models, a positive definite covariance matrix of returns exists.
3.3.1.1 Bayesian Interpretation
The Bayesian interpretation of this formulation would have the vector of returns
to be drawn from Cauchy distributions. The share of the portfolio for any given
asset is not stochastic and as such can be treated as a constant for the purposes
of forming the expectation. What does need to be solved is the predictive expec-
tation of Ri|w1 . . . wt, for each asset i. Given the most general form of the Cauchy
distribution, the expected return is:




π(σ2i + (Ri − µi)2)
dRi (3.9)
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It follows that E(Ri|µ,σi, w1 . . . wt) does not exist, for any i. This contradicts the
above assumption that it does exist. The CAPM is false by contradiction.
Similar assumptions about returns are present in the APT and the OPM. Since
the mean does not exist, the variance about the mean does not exist. Nothing about
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the CAPM is mathematically coherent in Bayesian statistics. Since the math is
not valid, it cannot be a valid scientific model.
3.3.1.2 The Frequentist Interpretation
The Frequentist interpretation of the same set of equations is quite different. In
the Bayesian interpretation, none of the necessary expectations for the model to
function exist. In the Frequentist interpretation they must exist as they are non-
random fixed points. Anyone can construct a model made up almost entirely of
fixed points. The expectation operator only has the effect of getting rid of the
diffusion term as the drift term is fixed though unknown. The question isn’t “can
such a model be constructed,” but rather “can the data falsify it?”
At this point, it is important to be careful how to interpret this model of fixed
but unknown points. There are a number of dangerous statistical traps to be found
in this construction. Consider, for example, “how do people find the equilibrium
conditions?” Whereas Bayesian methods could be interpreted as a tool for the
search algorithm, Frequentist methods posit finding the equilibrium as true by
assumption.
There are two paths possible. One leads to the idea of fiducial statistics and
the other to perfect foreknowledge. While fiducial statistics is a largely discredited
topic, research on the field still continues.[43] The alternative, perfect foreknowl-
edge has a deus ex machina element to it.
The attempt to construct fiducial statistics by R.A. Fisher was based on a very
simple observation. In performing a significance test on an hypothesis, say µ = 5,
it should be possible to perform a significance test for every value on the real
number line, not merely at five. This collection of tests does not end up forming
a proper density function. As tempting as fiducial statistics is, it turns out to not
be valid.
The mechanism to arrive at the equilibrium is unclear; it only matters that
it is assumed that the arrival happens. Although this creates some philosophical
discomfort, it is necessary discomfort. It must be posited that the model of fixed
points is true. The mechanics of the process remain a mystery.
Noting that R̂i−Ri is drawn from a Cauchy distribution and that Ri is a fixed
point, it follows that R̂i is drawn from a Cauchy distribution. It was noted earlier
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that prior proofs have shown that the maximum likelihood estimator for Ri is the
least squares estimator.
The least squares estimator is the estimator for the expectation for the slope.
The algorithmic solution for the least squares estimator represents the effect of
the sample on the test. The question, however, is about the ability to perform
inference on the CAPM. Can it be shown as true or false?
What are the properties of any significance test of the CAPM(or any stan-
dard mean-variance model), given the mathematical properties of the model(s) are
strictly true?
As precision is defined as the reciprocal of the variance, one can find the pre-
cision of a test by finding its asymptotic variance about a point. For all Ri the
precision of the test for a sample is estimated knowing that R̂i is drawn from a
Cauchy distribution.
Although a variance is a form of expectation, in order to construct this, the
Cauchy principal value will be used instead as no variance about the mean can
exist.






























Therefore, at the limit, any significance test is of precision zero even with an infinite
amount of data. The CAPM is immeasurable in the Frequentist paradigm. While
by construction it must be a valid mathematical model, it is not a valid scientific
model as the CAPM and any other mean-variance model cannot be constructed
with valid measures as written.
It is important to note that there is a valid methodology when dealing with the
Cauchy distribution in both frequency based and Bayesian statistics, but to go to
those methods is to assume mean-variance finance is false.
A separate estimation issue occurs when economists estimate the CAPM and
related mean-variance finance tools by directly taking market returns, subtracting
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the risk-free rate and using that difference to form the standard beta-based solution.
If the returns are treated as data, then they become random variates and from
this random variate is subtracted a constant, the risk-free rate. As a constant by
assumption, the risk-free rate cannot have a distribution associated with it at any
time t. As in the Bayesian intuitive solution, returns will converge to a Cauchy
distribution and be translated by an amount equal by the risk free rate. The
question then becomes “if we use the least squares method as an approximation,
what impact on the interpretation of results should occur?”
Fortunately, this is already answered in the literature. Sen finds that the
asymptotic relative efficiency of the method of least squares is zero compared
to any median based method.[87] To adopt a median based method is to aban-
don the mean-variance method. If it is used as an approximation, then anyone
using Theil’s method of regression would gain an immediate advantage over the
mean based method as Theil’s method, especially if augmented with other median
estimation tools, has the highest known efficiency. That being known, it should
be possible to form a statistical arbitrage process over mean-variance users and
systematically win. Standard economic theory rules that out, so this approxima-
tion should be excluded by both statistical theory and economic theory. Why
would someone knowingly adopt a perfectly inefficient tool or even a tool which is
perfectly inefficient on a relative basis when standard tools exist that are efficient?
Finally, there is the log difference approximation. This one is a bit more chal-
lenging to address. There are two reasons to use the logarithmic transformation
of prices to arrive at an approximation of return. The first is to linearize the data
to make it easier to work with. The other is to use it for reproducibility with
older studies. Older studies took the differences in the logs of the prices as an
approximation due to poor computing power.
There are two real issues with this latter usage. First, the underlying theory
makes no sense in logarithmic space. People do not purchase log(5000 shares) for
log($5 per share). Second, using a distorting approximation simply because the
last person did so defeats reason. Things do not gain validity simply from tradition
or age. The originators of the practice did it from computational necessity. That
constraint no longer exists.
The first case, linearizing the data, is a valid goal. Nonetheless, the use the
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logarithmic transformation is not problem free. The logarithmic transformation
trims the tails so that the distribution is no longer heavy tailed because the reward
(or return) on prices is no longer what is being measured. To understand why, note
that systematic rewards must be greater than one but also less than e, the base of
natural logarithms. Transformed into logs if p1
p0
= 1.05 then log(p1)− log(p0) ≈ .05.
If this is systematically true, then the regression estimator of return will be between
zero and one. So by the results of Mann and Wald, it follows that returns will
converge to normality as the sample size becomes very large.[61]
Unfortunately, it is no longer possible to determine what the coefficients mean.
The value of the regression constant is now multiplicative, when theory says it
should be near zero and additive. The allocations are no longer allocations and it
isn’t clear what they have become. Finally, β should map onto Theil’s regression
if the various components of the stock market are strictly independent, but they
are not.
It is not invalid to use the logarithmic transformation, but this doesn’t support
mean-variance finance either. Indeed, it is somewhat difficult to determine what is
being supported. There is an information loss in the logarithmic transformation,
but it isn’t clear what that implies for human behavior acting in markets.
3.3.2 Heavy-Tailed and Econophysics Methods
Although the Cauchy distribution lacks an expectation, certain utility functions
will have an expectation. If wealth is drawn from a Cauchy distribution and
the utility function is logarithmic utility, then expected wealth is a function of









































The Li2 operator is the dilogarithm, a special case of the polylogarithm. Although
the polylogarithm can be defined as a series, it can also be defined as the Bose-
Einstein distribution divided by the gamma function. This would bring equity
securities into Bose-Einstein statistics by simply solving the above problem with
reference to logarithmic utility. If the same problem were solved using zero as the























Another important utility function has been exponential utility. The indefinite
integral for the expected utility of wealth, where U(w̃) = −e−αw is:
E(U(w̃)) = −i (e
2iασEi(α(−w + µ− iσ))− Ei(α(−w + µ+ iσ)))
2eα(µ+iσ)
(3.16)




i(e−α(µ−iσ)(Ei(α(µ− iσ)) + log(−µ+ iσ)− log(µ− iσ))
− e−α(µ+iσ)(Ei(α(µ+ iσ))− log(µ+ iσ) + log(−µ− iσ))). (3.17)
The Ei operator is the exponential integral operator used in neutron transfer
and interstellar heat problems. Very quickly, simple models of rational expectations
turn into deep physics problems.
Alternatively, there is the observation from behavioral finance that the utility
function should be concave in gains and convex in losses. Although a complicated
model could be constructed, a simplified model has interesting implications. A
function that naturally is convex on the left and concave on the right is the arc-
tangent. The arctangent is also the cumulative density function of the Cauchy
distribution. Behavioral finance implies that losses are weighted more than gains,
but ignoring that for a second, one can note that unweighted arctangential utility
is risk neutral.
Unfortunately, there isn’t a known analytic solution for a general form of ex-
pected arctangential utility, but there is one if the utility of wealth is centered on
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µ. In that case, if utility is:






where α is a weighting over some segment of the function. This allows for piecewise
integration to meet the needs of behavioral finance. Under this set of assumptions,









This is a very simple mathematical function with the interesting property that
it is the square of the cumulative density function. In all three of the above cases
with definite integrals, it should be possible to construct allocation models using
the Envelope Theorem as they are all functions of the portfolio mode and probable
error.
What may not be obvious is that the Cauchy distribution is intimately linked to
complex numbers, the logarithm and the trigonometric functions. Another aspect
that may not be apparent is the absence of a Taylor expansion. Because the cu-
mulative normal distribution lacks an analytic form, it is common in economics to
perform estimates around a point. This is not an issue for the Cauchy distribution,
but as the Cauchy distribution lacks moments, if a Taylor expansion were needed,
it does not exist. These seemingly mild changes have significant consequences for
standard modeling tools.
Heavy tailed studies have generally discarded the Cauchy distribution in empir-
ical studies since the broader class of four parameter stable distributions provides
a better fit and also have no defined variance as implemented. This gives the
possibility to explain certain elements of the Keynesian/Classical split.
Consider a purchase on January 3rd, 2011 of 100 shares of IBM stock at $147.50
per share from a family’s endowment of cash. The changes in prices seen in the
market are changes in the endowments in the budget constraint of the various
households and firms as time unwinds. One year later, the position is closed at
$187.00 per share. The cash is moved from the endowment of cash of another
household or firm to the current budget constraint of the family in question.
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Decisions about what to do with the funds are part of a constrained opti-
mization problem for the household. The question in forming the model by the
economist is “what does the model need to do?” A choice of distributions then
determines the model, or alternatively, choosing a model determines the nature of
the possible distribution in use.
Assuming that the two models are rough equivalents in the sense that they
both map onto the observed sample of returns. The two models can be treated as
equivalent in that it isn’t obvious one model is better than another. One model
features a possible set of returns that are drawn from the best fit four parameter
stable distribution. The other model features a possible set of returns from a
mixture distribution. Both models are supported only on the non-negative real
numbers to allow for bankruptcy. The mixture model is a mixture of a Cauchy
distribution, as above, with a distribution for constraints on the budget constraint.
Although not directly observable, external constraints determine the frontier of
the family’s budget. As an example, bank reserve requirements, legal lending limits
as a function of bank capital, prudential regulation and loss reserve requirements
all play a role in the limitations on the capacity of the family to access liquidity.
The model with the stable distribution implicitly has no form of borrowing
constraint. It is conceptually possible to borrow infinite sums. The distribution
is skewed, but the sources of skew are not part of the model. Had those sources
been separately modeled, then the distribution of returns, subject to those sources,
would become a symmetric Cauchy distribution. Skew in the data warns of the
possible existence of information not accounted for in the model.
Now consider a relatively simple model that includes planetary product as well
as a constraint on what portion of planetary income could be spent on investment
activities. With Y being planetary product, γ the growth rate, and ε a normal
error, let the difference equation for planetary product be:
Yt+1 = γYt + εt+1, γ > 1 (3.20)
Let the same equation of value persist, wt+1 = Rwt + εt+1, but with an added
constraint:
wt+1 ≤ αYt+1, 0 < α < 1 (3.21)
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Positing that α is a prudential or political constraint that limits the external
costs from over investment. In this model there is no money supply, although it
would result in a similar outcome if a money supply were used. In this circum-
stance, α is a non-market constraint on the budget constraint.
From Bayes law it follows:
Pr(wt+1|wt+1 ≤ αYt+1) ∝ Pr(wt+1 ≤ αYt+1|wt+1) Pr(wt+1) (3.22)
Since the distribution for αYt+1 must be a Cauchy distribution, given the as-
sumptions, it follows that the probability of choosing a value for wt+1 such that
it is also less than or equal to αYt+1 is the cumulative density function from 0 to
wt+1. Further, since it is truncated at 0, this probability is:
Pr(wt+1 ≤ αYt+1|wt+1) =





















(σ2w + (wt+1 − µw)2)
(3.24)
So the density function for Pr(wt+1|wt+1 ≤ αYt+1) is the product of the two
terms, divided by the constant of integration. Currently, the constant of integration
is unknown. An analytic solution is yet to be found. Nonetheless, numerical
methods to estimate it exist.
If the value of physical capital, kt+1 is modeled using the same autoregressive
of degree one explosive process as elsewhere, then it will be independent of wt+1,
even if both processes depend upon kt. Then its possible to talk about binding
constraints on the capital markets not permitting prices to reach a free market
clearing price in the short run. In such a model, the present value of cash flows
from physical capital, the price of capital and the price of the financial capital
representing it should be equal.
The classic Keynesian prescription to lift the constraints would either to be to
relax α or to increase Y . However, it isn’t clear this is the correct solution.
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How the constraint is set should matter. All that is posited is that a constraint
exists. It may serve prudential goals to protect the broader society. It could also
serve purely political goals to protect elected officials and regulators.
When the regulatory constraint is binding, it is quite possible that the liquidity
available would prevent the market price of financial capital from equalling the
discounted present value of the physical capital in the system.
Since physical capital is a slowly decaying stock, compared to the speed of
capital market trades, it can be completely unaffected by capital market errors in
the short run. However, if the constraint is systematically binding for some time,
the real economy can be impacted as there are two channels through which new
physical capital is formed.
The first channel is through the reinvestment of cash flows. The second is
through the formation of new capital. Although there are no explicit loans in this
model, if one disaggregated the components of wt+1, then both equity IPO’s and
loans could be made.
Assuming that both financial capital and physical capital can be purchased by
firms. If the yield on financial capital is higher than the yield on physical capital,
to some degree of probability, then the capital stock should fall to meet the market
value of the capital stock in the capital markets. In the classical model this would
be a very desirable response. Actors who over-built would find the market respond
adversely and the excess physical capital would depreciate out of existence. The
market would adjust on its own. No activity from the constraint setting body
would make sense.
In this case, a prudential regulation serves an efficiency purpose.
If the appropriate value of α is uncertain set then the problem of a binding
constraint is multi-fold. If a prudential constraint is reached, should it be relaxed
if it is actually prudential?
This triggers two possible cases. If it is believed the value of α was correctly
set then it should not be changed. If the value was incorrectly set, then it should
be altered up or down to the appropriate prudential level.
What if the constraint is a political constraint instead of a prudential one,
such as maintaining employment? Then it is quite possible the government should
expand spending to increase the value of Y to make the constraint slack in the fol-
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lowing period. Alternatively, the terms of the constraint could be relaxed, possibly
through open market operations to support the value of capital.
This begs the question of the distribution involved. In the four parameter alpha
stable model the budget constraint and constraints on the budget constraint, such
as reserve requirements, are implicit. This can only be a classical style model.
In its Keynesian form the above mixture distribution depends upon the struc-
ture of such regulation. Of course if the constraint is non-linear, the above distri-
bution would be a poor fit. Another distribution should be modeled.
Although the above is less than a toy model of the economy, it is an attempt to
point out that one should not assume distributions into existence. Distributions
should follow from the models employed.
3.3.3 Regnault and Bachelier
So why did Regnault and Bachelier observe what they observed?[9] They were
studying the price movements, over short periods of time, of rentes, a fixed income
investment. While an investment in stocks has an uncertain future value, an
investment in bonds does not. Each cash flow discounted from face value for a
fixed rate bond will mature with fixed value, assuming that payments are made
as agreed. The risk at time zero is in appraising the probability of a failure to
pay. Although there are a number of ways to model that probability, one of the
simplest is the normal distribution.
Indeed, with all things except the probability of payment being fixed and cer-
tain, the only appraisal risk comes in a failure to estimate bankruptcy risk. While
the reinvestment risk for the portfolio of cash flows probably does converge to
a Cauchy distribution, each specific bond has an upper bound payment, a lower
bound at zero and a probability for each intermediate cash flow. An expected value
exists and it is usually associated with a finite period of time, not the unbounded
life of the equity of a corporation.
101
3.4 Special Cases–Mergers and Bankruptcy
Bankruptcy and mergers create a special case for the likelihood function. In both
cases, the firm ceases to exist. Unlike the perpetual existence case described above,
both existential states provide for conditions different from those predicated on
perpetual existence. In the case of bankruptcy, the value of the allocation goes to
zero. Indeed, given that a future bankruptcy state is true, the return is exactly
-100%. For mergers, this also creates special circumstances. Although mergers
superficially resemble the continuous case, there are boundary conditions from
economic theory which would make them different. As such, the likelihood function
of either should be explored.
3.4.1 Bankruptcy
A Bayesian consideration of bankruptcy returns would look at the product of
probable returns, given bankruptcy, by the probability of bankruptcy. Returns
in bankruptcy are conditioned at -100%. The returns collapse to a fixed point
multiplied by either a beta distribution or its trinomial Dirichlet extension.
It is important to note that there is no specific reason that bankruptcy must
be modeled using the beta distribution. Logit and probit models as well as other
approximations should be perfectly valid, if the underlying assumptions can be
met. The article by Nwogugu should be consulted first.[70]
3.4.2 Mergers
Mergers have certain properties not shared by going concerns. First, acquiring
firms would not wish to lose value by purchasing a firm. So they would seek
firms where the value of the financial capital is less than or equal to the value of
the physical capital. As this should not be the case in equilibrium, these are non-
equilibrium transactions. Indeed, it isn’t possible to discuss mergers in equilibrium
as transaction costs would preclude their existence.
This implies that the center of location for mergers should be greater than the
center of location for going concerns, at least before transaction costs are accounted
for.
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Second, for a variety of reasons it is reasonable to assume there is no defined
variance. In the case of a stock for stock merger the returns after the acquisition
should converge to the Cauchy distribution with a gain in value for the acquiring
firm triggered by the capture of undervalued physical and human capital. It is,
however, this period leading up to the merger that is of interest for one year option
contracts. A return is still a future value divided by a present value but with the
added dimension that the acquired asset should be undervalued relative to its value
as physical capital.
Third, mergers take place over time periods generally of less than one year,
often much shorter periods than a year. As such, the distribution should be a
mixture distribution of a before and an after announcement distribution.
Fourth, from the literature it has been observed that larger firms tend to ac-
quire smaller firms. Abbott has shown, with the exception of the largest firms,
that liquidity costs tend to decline with size. The prior model had constructed
liquidity costs implicitly into R. As such, liquidity costs were effectively treated as
a constant with differences showing up in the error term. This effect should further
shift the distribution to the right as selling shareholders should see an increase in
overall liquidity.
3.4.2.1 Focusing on the Knowable
There are a wide variety of types of mergers. There are offers payable in cash, offers
payable in the shares of the acquiring firm, combination offers and also offers for
property. An example of an offer involving cash, shares and property could be in
the acquisition of a restaurant chain.
Assuming the existing shareholder owned the land and buildings as well as
the remaining property and equipment, a risk averse buyer may offer ownership
in the acquiring firm, but also return the land and buildings to the pre-existing
shareholders with cash. This would make the existing shareholders future landlords
for the acquiring firm and would also receive dividends from the broader and more
diverse acquiring firm. If the restaurant fails the shareholders of the acquired firm
still hold the land and would continue to receive the dividends of the acquiring
firm, albeit likely reduced due to the failure of a component of the merged firm. If
the restaurant continues as a going concern then the landlords get the dividends,
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but they also collect rents from the acquiring firm possibly giving them a higher
return than had the acquiring firm taken all the risks.
Such a transaction is problematic for this study. There is no way to know such
deal terms given the properties of the CRSP database. Further, valuation of the
property received isn’t possible. A convention is used for non-cash only transac-
tions in valuing the merger. A selling firm valued at $10 per share being acquired
by a firm valued at $50 per share would be treated, for purposes of calculating
return, as a five to one swap of shares. By assumption, the selling shareholders
could have marketed whatever cash and property they had and bought the shares
of the acquiring firm. That is on the merger day, the selling shareholders taking
stock and other property would not accept a loss and would demand approximate
parity with a stock for stock transaction.
This may not be true. It stands as a definite limitation on this research,
but does not adversely impact option pricing either way as any tests of option
prices would be scaled by the same error as the data. A scaling error would be
undetectable for the purposes used here.
3.4.2.2 Stock for Stock Mergers
It is the overall contention of this dissertation that distributions exist for a reason.
That is they should follow for underlying economic reasons and should not be
chosen arbitrarily simply because they fit well. Although it may be the case that
the true distribution is unknown, research into what distributions should be present
should proceed. Although a best fit, but arbitrary, stable distribution would be a
valid candidate, such a model lacks interpretive features. It would be difficult, at
best, to investigate. Further, generic stable distributions lack closed form solutions
and so are difficult to model.
Still, many parameterized stable distributions exist and serve a variety of roles.
A good candidate distribution for the mixture of returns would be a mixture of
the Landau distribution and the Cauchy distribution.
The Landau distribution is used as a distribution for energy transfers on rare
collisions. Similarly, there is an transfer of unrealized value from one set of share-
holders to another. Under boundary conditions it is the more general Vavilov
distribution. The danger of doing this is that it is reasoning by analogy. Firms are
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not elementary particles. Mergers are not collisions.
If it is a Landau or Vavilov distribution the important question is why that
should be the case. The Landau distribution is derived with respect to the Bethe
equation for the change in energy with respect to distance travelled. The Landau
distribution can be thought of as a limiting case of the Vavilov distribution. There
is nothing in the Bethe equation that should lend itself to financial economics
except the concept of a tender offer as having a stopping power over the time
series. Caution should be exercised unless it becomes clear such a relationship
exists with natural first principle reference to economic behavior.
As with the Cauchy distribution, the proper distribution should be a ratio
distribution, but in stock for stock mergers certain special boundary conditions
should first exist. It is the mathematical formulation of the boundary condition
that has prevented the author from a derivation.1 The first boundary condition
is that the proposed buyer has subjectively judged the market prices far enough
below the fair market value of its capital that it is more valuable to buy out the
firm than it is to buy additional physical capital. Only the proposed buyer knows
their hidden evaluation of the equilibrium valuation. The second boundary is that
there is sufficient space to the right of the current market price to accomplish
two distinct things. The first is that the buy-out price is far enough below the
equilibrium to justify the transaction costs, second that the price is sufficiently
large compared to the current price to gain operational control of the firm.
This depends upon the subjective review of the buyer and the subjective al-
ternatives of the seller. If enough potential sellers refuse to sell because the price
is too low then the potential buyer loses their evaluation and proposal costs. On
the other hand, if the price is large enough to allow the buyer to take control then
unwilling sellers are faced with two bad alternatives. The first is to sell at a price
that is possibly well below fair market value. The second is to retain the shares as
a minority shareholder losing any control of dividends, operations and cash flows.
Further, if the firm is no longer traded then the potential seller may own a nearly
perfectly illiquid investment that may never again provide a cash flow.
This implies that for one boundary condition the current price is far below the
center of location. Of course this is subject to both Type I and Type II errors.
1See Appendix A for a partial derivation under simplified assumptions
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Figure 3.1. One Year Returns, Measured in Basis Points, in Stock-forStock Mergers
1925-2008
The second boundary condition appears to be contingent upon a threshold function
that may consider past prices. If many buyers purchased the firm at prices that
are low relative to buyout price then there may be many motivated sellers. On the
other hand, if there is a large insider with good knowledge of the fair market value
there may be substantial resistance to a merger.
For equity options that will be subject for a stock for stock merger there
should be a mixture of two distributions, the proposed Landau distribution and
the Cauchy distribution. During the period from the start of the contract until the
contractual acceptance of the merger the Landau distribution should be present
as the private information of the actors should govern the distribution. From the
moment that the merger is considered a “done deal” then a Cauchy distribution
should be present as the new firm is just a going concern with a proposed infinite
life.
3.4.2.3 Cash for Stock Mergers
Cash for stock mergers are a special limiting case. Whereas stock for stock provides
the selling shareholders a contingent claim, cash for stock provides perfect liquidity.
As cash is expensive, a cash purchase should have additional properties.
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As with the stock for stock mergers, some stable skew distribution is reasonable,
again the Landau distribution is proposed as a candidate distribution, but this
is not reasonable once the merger is certain or even very likely. At that point a
distribution with finite variance would be preferable. If it is assumed that the rates
of return are efficiently priced once perfect liquidation is certain then traditional
economic tools should solve this problem. Going back to equation 3.1 note that
the future value is now fixed.
For a single period discount bond with a total return at time t of Rrt in the paid
state and a $0 return in the loss state provides a simple mechanism to evaluate the
bond. If the bond has a probability of no payout equal to B and a probability of
full payout equal to 1-B. The expected utility of wealth becomes E[(1−B)U(RRt )+
BU(0)].
Because the numerator in a single period discount bond is fixed and not subject
to variability, the purchase price can be thought of as a discount to a face value








If it is assumed that actors are concerned with their rate of return a uniform
mechanism of comparison is required. The instantaneous rate of return provides a
uniform measurement then the concern is with log(Rrt ). This would permit simple
multiplication in the exponent to rescale a reward.
The problem of the actors, but not the economist, is to estimate the probability
of bankruptcy. The actor needs to calculate a required expected return given a
bankruptcy rate.
If it is assumed that each actor makes estimates of price given a measure of risk,
denoted by a scale parameter σ that varies from risk to risk and is subjectively
determined then the actors could be thought of as solving:
Pr(log(Rr)|σi),∀i ∈ I (3.26)
The economist, on the other hand, usually only sees events after transactions
actually happen and almost never get to see the information available to the actors.
Whereas the actors are anticipating net returns, economists only see realizations.
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The actors are attempting to set prices given risks, but the economist is attempting
to estimate risk given prices. While the actor is concerned with an expected total
return of (1− B)Rrt , the only concern here is the distribution given that the bond
pays off. While the actor is concerned with both states, this study only cares about
the successful state. Further, errors would have to be estimated with reference to
other transactions and not actor information. The economist’s measure has its own
error distribution. If that error is denoted ε and it is thought to be small relative
to σ and independent of the errors of the actors, then the economist’s estimate of
what a return should be can be modeled as:
log(Rm) = log(Rr) + ε, (3.27)
where Rm is the modeled return.
If
Pr(log(Rr)|σ) = Pr((log(Rr)|σ) (3.28)
and
q(ε) = Pr(ε) (3.29)




If the additional condition is imposed on the economist’s error term that the
expectation of the economist’s error is zero, then expanding the integral brings the
Fokker-Planck equation, the result of such a derivation has been shown to be the
Gaussian distribution.[46, 51] This implies that the distribution of total return for
a single period discount bond should be the log-normal distribution. That is to
say:
Pr(log(Rr)) ∼ N (µ, σ2) (3.31)
It follows that prior to announcement that prices should fluctuate with a sta-
ble distribution lacking variance, probably the Landau, but should fluctuate as
a log-normal distribution following the general acceptance of the merger’s likely
completion.
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It may be useful to note that successful and failed cash-for-stock offers may
inform the general question of the necessary boundary to overcome seller resistance.
3.5 Conclusion
Standard models assume a very simple, very gentle statistical distribution exists
to model option prices. Bankruptcy does not exist, mergers do not impact pricing
and variance ends up being the only concern.
Bayesian methods are built around uncertainty rather than errors due to chance.
Bayesian distributions are not distributions of shocks, innovations, model errors or
chance events. Bayesian distributions are a quantifications of uncertainty. They
describe the impact of incomplete information on a decision. Chance effects are
contained inside this uncertainty, but the uncertainty is wider than the impact of
chance.
The surface argument here is that mean-variance finance is false by contradic-
tion, but the deeper argument is that statistical distributions exist for a reason.
Preferably they would never be assumed into existence, but rather determined by
the nature of the problem faced by the decision maker.
Of course all of this is of no practical importance if the data support the
existing model better than the proposed likelihood functions. It isn’t enough to
make a reasonable argument, it is necessary to perform empirical analysis. Model
adequacy is a question of reasonableness of both reasoning and empirical outcome.
Fortunately methods exist to test empirical model adequacy.
When reasoning conflicts, math disciplines the discussion giving three possi-
ble outcomes. The first is that the existing models are clearly better than pro-
posed models. Unlike Frequentist methods, Bayesian methods provide a method
to weight the adequacy of models. The second is that proposed are clearly inferior
to existing models. The third is the dreadful state of being unable to choose among
models. In that dreadful state science should go down both paths to explore the







To move mathematics from being in the realm of opinion to the realm of science, it
is necessary to test logical assertions to determine their validity. Up to this point,
everything has been a series of logical assertions. It is fundamental to collect and
test data against propositions. The methodology chosen is Bayesian, but subject
to some additional qualifications, a Frequentist solution is provided as well. As
Bayesian methods tend to be unfamiliar to economists, a general explanation is
provided.
4.1 Bayesian Hypothesis Testing
Bayesian methods have two nearly equivalent methodologies to solve inference re-
lated problems. The methods are either to integrate the posterior density function
over the region of each hypothesis or to construct odds ratios from either the
posterior density or the likelihood functions.
The advantage of integrating over the posterior distribution is that the posterior
probability always contains the exact probability an hypothesis is true given the
data and the prior information. Its disadvantage is that it requires a region to
integrate over. If the hypothesis can be stated as a region of points then a solutions
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exists, but if the hypothesis can only be constructed as individual points then no
solution for the integral exists.
Frequentist methods generally handle point or “sharp” hypothesis well. Bayesian
methods do not.
The weakness of using a sharp hypothesis becomes apparent as the sample size
becomes very large, even for Frequentist methods. As the sample size grows, the
power of Frequentist tests against trivial but real departures from the model in the
sharp hypothesis have caused critics to note that unless the hypothesized model is
the exact true model in nature then all null hypothesis are guaranteed to be false
once the sample size becomes large enough.
There are two partial Bayesian solutions to the sharp hypothesis problem. They
are the Bayes factor, due to Alan Turing and I.J. Good, and Lindley’s method
which in many respects resembles a Pearson-Neyman acceptance region.[46, 55]
Although Lindley’s method superficially resembles the Pearson-Neyman accep-
tance region, this is only literally the case where a binary hypothesis is mutually
exclusive and exhaustive of possibilities. Still, there are important conceptual
differences. An analogy would illustrate the differences.
It has become common in medicine to provide a placebo as a control against a
medicine that is to be tested. In cases such as this, Fisher’s “no effect” hypothesis,
often implemented as µ = 0, can break down in large samples. The reason is that
no physician really believes that a placebo, which is a sugar pill, has no effect on
the human body. Rather the belief is that either the effect is small enough to
be unnoticed, uncorrelated with the effects of the drug, or result in psychological
effects that swamp any physiological effects created by the sugar. Lindley’s method
resembles the Pearson-Neyman acceptance region in that it creates a region around
µ = 0 and determines if the high density region encloses zero. This usually differs
from Frequentist methods due to the presence of non-binary hypothesis. Under
many circumstances it would suffer from the same problems that Frequentist tests
possess.
Lindley’s method, to some extent, evades the sharp hypothesis by encapsulating
the sharp point in a region, in essence a region indeterminably different as from if
the true value were strictly zero.
The Bayes factor is the ratio of the likelihoods of one hypothesis versus another
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hypothesis. Data drawn from a binomial likelihood provides a simple example.
Given an hypothesis that p = i,∀i ∈ [0, 1] a question arises as to the relative prob-
ability of any two points in the supported region. There are an infinite number of
hypothesis, but consider a concrete example were there were two successes viewed
and one hundred and ninety eight failures, and two important hypothesized points
of p = .01 or p = .02.




This implies a 1% rate is 1.866 times more probable than a 2% rate. At an
odds ratio either greater than 19 or less than 1
19
there is some comfort that one
hypothesis is substantially more likely than another. In this case, the evidence for
either hypothesis over another would be considered pretty weak. Using Fisher’s
five percent criterion a nineteen to one ratio could be considered significant. The




The interval probable values for the parameter then becomes (.00093,.03757).
Effectively the set of point null hypothesis have been turned into three regions. A
region of likely solutions, a region of solutions that are too small to be probable
and a region of points to large to be probable given the data. It is also important to
note that this region differs from the posterior region with a beta prior distribution,
either uniform or Haldane. Under the uniform prior the 95% high density region
is (.00309,.0355).
For the purpose of testing a Cauchy model versus a normal model, Bayes fac-
tors are used for reasons that will become apparent. Caution should be used in
interpreting Bayes factors for non-binary hypothesis as they share many of the
issues reported as problems with using p-values for inference.[53]
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4.2 Bayes factor
Bayes factors take advantage of the structure of Bayes theorem and is an odds ratio
rather than a probability. The Bayes factor describes how rational scientists should
change their beliefs given only the models and the data. Bayesian analysis, being
subjective, roots itself in the subjective views of the scientists allowing scientists
to hold a wide variety of beliefs prior to seeing the data through the eyes of the
models, but transforms that belief numerically into new beliefs.
A highly partisan and fully rational scientist faced with a very large Bayes
factor in the direction opposite of their pre-existing beliefs would cease being a
partisan scientist. In the case of this research, the Bayes factors are so large as
to foreclose any possible debate. Even a scientist that accepted mean-variance
finance with a prior probability of 99.9999% probability that it is true would have
to reject mean-variance finance overwhelmingly.
The Bayes factor can be defined in two ways. The first way, as the ratio of
beliefs before and after seeing the data, is totally subjective. The definition is:





where pn is the posterior probability the mean-variance model is true, given the
data and prior. The posterior probability the Cauchy model is true is denoted pc,
given the prior for the Cauchy distribution. πn and πc are the prior probabilities
for the normal and the Cauchy model being true, respectively.
The advantage of this definition is that it describes how a rational scientist
should adjust the odds of their beliefs based on the observations. To provide an
example, imagine some scientist was 99% sure some model was better than another
model, prior to collecting the data. The prior odds would be .99/.01 = 99 : 1. If
after seeing the data through the eyes of the competing models the posterior belief
was 75% belief in the model, then the posterior odds would be .75/.25 = 3 : 1.






This constitutes 1:33 odds. This implies that the evidence runs strongly against
the original beliefs of the scientist. Note that the scientist still favors the original
belief. Why? Because this was only a single experiment and the scientist is basing
this not only on the one experiment but a lifetime of experience.
The scientist’s beliefs are no longer firm, but one experiment was not enough to
sway belief even though the evidence was reasonably strong. On the other hand,
an indifferent scientist, one who had not decided on a model and gave both of them
even odds would assign a 97% probability of truth to the alternative model. An
indifferent scientist should become partisan.
On the surface it would appear that this method of testing an hypothesis be-
tween two models would be terribly subjective, until one realizes that the Bayes
factor is a constant for a given set of data. The alternative definition of the Bayes
factor is strictly data and model dependent.




Note that both the numerator and the denominator are of the form of a fre-
quency based hypothesis test had an optimization process been included.
The relationship to Bayes theorem can be more readily seen by setting the two







Then if both sides are multiplied by the posterior probability of the Cauchy





This second definition is powerful because it gives the odds one model is true
over another, given the data, by looking at the ratio of the probabilities the data
would appear as it did given that those models were true. The difference be-
tween this method and a test such as the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is that the
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Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is complete for purposes of deduction in that one of the
two hypothesis must be true. Neither hypothesis need be true for the Bayesian
test.
4.2.1 Composite vs. Simple Hypothesis
A significant issue missed in the above definitions is the distinction between a sim-
ple and a composite hypothesis. The above definitions leave two issues untouched.
The first is “how are the model parameters known?” The second issue is all the
other possible models that could have been considered but were not, such as using
a Poisson jump or skewed stable distributions?
4.2.1.1 Infinite Sets
Frequentist methods have a simple solution to the problem of a set of uncountably
many possible mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypothesis by creating a binary
hypothesis. To use Fisher’s initial example, if it is assumed to be true that Mendel’s
laws have no effect in nature, then the natural alternative hypothesis would be that
Mendel’s laws do have an effect in nature. Then it follows from falsification of the
null that Mendel’s laws hold.[117]
This excludes all possible models of nature that do not include Mendel’s laws
including Darwin’s own explanation of inheritance, Creationism, Intelligent Design
and everything else to some degree of confidence.
The problem of formal hypothesis construction and the distinction of Frequen-
tist methods as a truth telling engine versus Bayesian methods as an explanation
sorting engine should be important to any economic inquiry. Frequentist tests
such as the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test or Lilliefors’ test partition the world into a
set of only one possible distribution and a complementary set of all possible other
distributions. The complement is a set of infinite membership.
A similar Bayesian solution should not exist as the set of all possible distribu-
tions, including mixture distributions, would of necessity result in infintismals as
prior probabilities.
This highlights the incomplete nature of Bayesian reasoning in unbounded and
uncountable problems. The Bayesian method must be restricted to at most the set
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of existing ideas. Bayesian probabilities are built around beliefs. The Bayesian so-
lution sorts existing explanations. Possibilities still unknown in human imagination
are outside the framework of Bayesian inference, but not Frequentist inference.
4.2.1.2 Formal Approach to Hypothesis Testing
A more formal structure is required to discuss this and so each one will be explored.
It is necessary to first define some logical assertions.
S = set of all posited statistical distributions and models representing returns.
(4.6)
S1 = Returns converge in probability to a normal distribution. (4.7)
S2 = Returns converge in probability to a Cauchy distribution. (4.8)























The data from a random variate ỹ is y.
Noting that Pr(S) = 1 it follows that:
Pr(S|y) = 1, (4.12)
regardless of the relationship between S and ỹ. Rearranging, it becomes
Pr(S1 + S2 + S3|y) = Pr(S1|y) + Pr(S2|y) + Pr(S3|y) = 1. (4.13)
Only two of the possible logical propositions are of interest, S1 and S2. Suppose







As an odds ratio can always be constructed in the form p



























Since p1 + p2 = 1, the odds ratio is a valid measure of the relative probabilities
that either model is true.
4.2.1.3 Composite Hypothesis
A composite hypothesis has two unknowns; in this case, the distribution and the
parameters are unknown. The parameters of the distribution are a nuisance pa-
rameter in that the actual value is irrelevant to the matter at hand. To test two
distributions for their probability, it is necessary to derive parameters. The two
hypothesis for this are:
H0 : S1 is true. (4.20)












The likelihood function for this equation is:




The prior distribution is Pr(S1) and the normalizing constant is Pr(y). Of im-
portance, the prior distribution is now included in the likelihood function. Without
it, the weight of the evidence would depend entirely upon the data and the model.
The prior distribution normalizes the likelihood due to the compound nature of
the hypothesis.[55]
With a subscript change, the same is true for inference about S2. As they
both have the same denominator, the concern is not the exact value, but rather a
proportion. While the inclusion of the prior probability into the likelihood function
removes its objectivity, it also provides a range of weights times the evidence that
must be met to overcome some level of objection. A person 99% sure of mean-
variance finance will increase the weight by about one percent on the objective
portion of the mean-variance likelihood function, but will increase one hundred
fold the weight of the Cauchy objective portion. An indifferent scientist will have
only the objective portion to consider as the prior probabilities will cancel to unity.
Pr(S1|y, θ1) ∝ Pr(S1)L(S1,θ1|y) (4.26)
Pr(S2|y, θ2) ∝ Pr(S2)L(S2,θ2|y) (4.27)
It is not known what parameter is valid, so the parameters are integrated out over
the set of all possible values. The factor becomes:
B =
∫
θ1∈Θ1 Pr(y|θ1, S1) Pr(θ1, S1)dθ1∫




The fundamental lesson of this derivation is that a partisan actor should dis-
count favorable evidence as it is obviously true and be deeply disturbed by contrary
evidence. Another pragmatic solution exists given the peculiar nature of the data
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and the problem at hand.
It is not required to solve the problem in terms of a single parameter. Al-
though only the model is specifically in question, Bayes theorem allows for solving
the problem jointly and then to remove the nuisance parameters through marginal-
ization. In particular, an obvious feature of the data is that the mode is clearly
one. This is true regardless of the granularity used to measure this. Further, this
is observable in the data by the end of the first year of data.
As it is clearly increasing on the left and decreasing on the right and as the
distribution is truncated, then it follows that it is harmless to condition both the
normal distribution and the Cauchy distribution on a center of location precisely
equal to one. This reduces the uncertainty in the posterior distribution and reduces
the computational complexity.






The prior can be decomposed as:
Pr(S1,θ1) = Pr(θ1|S1) Pr(S1) (4.30)
As µ has been conditioned to be equal to one:
Pr(µn = 1) = 1 (4.31)
This simplifies the prior distribution as:
Pr(S1, σn) = Pr(σn|S1) Pr(S1) (4.32)
Two simple conventions for the prior distribution can be acquired from eco-
nomics and rhetoric. Because both the normal and the Cauchy distribution are
symmetric distributions, certain shape parameters are unreasonble due to the im-
plied economic behavior. This very unreasonableness is quite valuable for setting
a prior distribution.
The real concern with setting a prior distribution is that the prior could so
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influence the posterior distribution as to be able to rig the experiment so that the
outcome is determined by the strength of the prior. As the location of the shape
parameter is unknown, the goal is to make the prior distribution sufficiently flat
over the reasonable range, probably make it flat in the somewhat unreasonable
range, and vainishing over the incredible range.
Noting the center is one, a shape parameter of one would imply one-third of all
capital transactions result in greater than a one hundred percent return on invested
capital under the Cauchy model and one fifth for the normal model. Further, it
implies an incredible instability of daily price. Prices would still have one as the
basin of attraction, but with prices that oscillate wildly. Further, as the Cauchy
distribution has no variance, using it in a prior is perfectly imprecise. So one could





: 0 < σn,c ≤ 1
2
(2+π)(1+(σn,c−1)2) : σn,c > 1
(4.33)
The second convention is an extension of Fisher’s original inspiration for the
Frequentist school of statistics. The null hypothesis should always concede the
point trying to be proved as false by assumption. By falsifying the null, the subject
of controversy is proven to be true, to some degree of confidence.
A similar concession should be made here. That is the other side should be given
extraordinary prior weight, indeed, nearly degenerate prior weight. Nonetheless,
there is a scale of probability so small that it isn’t meaningful to speak of it in
terms of human perception of differences in probability. In order to support this
principle, granting a prior relative probability of:
Pr(S1) = 999, 999× Pr(S2),Pr(S1) + Pr(S2) ≤ 1, (4.34)
is very adversarial to the proposed model.
This is eminantly unreasonable and therefore a good test. For a test of two
hypothesis to overcome such a profound prejudice effectively excludes all remaining
support for the normal distribution. A highly prejudiced prior serves roughly the
same function as Fisher’s null hypothesis and the use of minimax distributions to
evaluate hypothesis.
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This should result in the joint estimate:
Pr(S1, σn|y) =
Pr(y|S1, σn) Pr(σ|S1) Pr(S1)
Pr(y)
(4.35)
Since the estimator of σn,c is only of incidental significance to the question at
hand, the next step would be to marginalize out the shape parameter.
∫ ∞
0
Pr(S1, σn|y)dσn = Pr(S1|σn,y) =
∫∞
0
Pr(y|S1, σn) Pr(σn|S1)dσn Pr(S1)
Pr(y)
(4.36)
This still pulls the prior into the likelihood function, but over the region of
interest it is sufficiently flat as to have no material impact on the Bayes factor.
The advantage of this methodology is that it directly considers the set of all
possible parameters. If each possible combination of parameters can be thought
of as a model, then it is averaging the solution giving trivial weight extremely im-
probable parameters and giving greatest weight to the most probable parameters.
The uncertainty in parameter selection is removed by considering the entire set.
4.2.1.4 Simple Hypothesis
For a simple hypothesis, the only unknown is the statistical distribution. The
parameters are chosen by the researcher. This increases the number of hypothesis
since there is an infinite plane of possible parameters for the normal and Cauchy
distribution. The parameter uncertainty is gone because the researcher has ex-
cluded it by design. The hypothesis goes from being of a choice between two
models to being a choice between a model and chosen parameters versus another
model and its chosen parameters. Calculations become increasingly simple, but
there is now a fuzziness to the probability statement. It is no longer based upon
the shape of the curve, it is now based on two specifically defined curves that is
curves with parameters.
The hypothesis become:
H0 : S1 and θ1 is true. (4.37)
HA : S2 and θ2 is true. (4.38)
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There then become two reasonable possible methods to choose parameters.
The first is to choose the maximum likelihood estimate, the second is to choose
scientifically interesting parameters. They may of course be the same.
4.2.1.5 Properties of Maximum Likelihood Estimator Based Ratios
There is an enormous advantage to choosing the maximum likelihood estimator for
the parameters of either distribution. By choosing the likelihoods that maximize
the numerator and the denominator, it becomes a test of best case versus best
case, given the data actually observed.
Had the alternative been considered complementary to the null then this would
have been identical to the Frequentist Likelihood Ratio Test. It could be argued
that both the normal and the Cauchy distributions are the result of a summation
process and are the only two options possible. The question would be “are these
the only two limiting forms for returns?”
The three big candidates are jump diffusion models, the log-normal distribution
and the broader class of stable distributions. The jump diffusion model can be
excluded by White’s proof.[114] White only assumed finite variance and errors
with a zero mean. The reason to force a Poisson jump into the error term is to
try and replicate the large sudden departures in price observed in the data. There
is no theoretical basis for it. As this is simply a mixture of normals then as time
goes to infinity, it follows the test statistic will be the Cauchy distribution.
The log-normal distribution is a rather interesting special case. It is skewed and
the real data is skewed. Under proper transformation, the returns could become
log-normally distributed if the raw data is the Cauchy distribution. Still, it should
be possible to rule out the log-normal due to nature of the error terms.
The log-normal is the result of a single error and not a dual error. The log-
normal should appear in discounting situations, but there is no reason to see it
with equity securities other following the approval of a cash for stock merger. The
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log-normal distribution will receive its own special discussion in its own section.
This leaves the normal distribution. Although the normal distribution should
be excluded by prior proof, it is the basis of the contention. Economists normally
assume data is normally distributed in Frequentist tests.
The broad class of stable distributions includes both the normal and the Cauchy
distribution. There are three reasons to exclude the broad class of stable distribu-
tions from consideration.
The first is that the trinary hypothesis of using a Cauchy distribution, a normal
distribution, or some other stable distribution will run afoul of Lindley’s paradox.
The normal and the Cauchy distribution are the result of specific parameterizations
of the broad class of stable distributions. As the parameter in question for the
stable distribution is a subset of the real numbers and the Cauchy and the normal
are precise values, the prior probability of a random variable being exactly equal
to a fixed number is zero. Its another form of the infintismals problem again.
The second is more grounded in economics. It should be the case that distri-
butions exist for a reason. They are the result of behavior. Distributions should
be chosen as a result of consequences. Although it may have to be tolerated as a
reason for a time, the “just because,” solution to an unknown phenomenon should
be unsatisfactory.
The third is that prior research on stable distributions have been from a Fre-
quentist perspective. This is quite important as Frequentist measures can be very
sensitive to matching underlying assumptions. Truncation is a massive departure
for stable distributions.
An extreme example of this is a study by Lee and Lee.[54] Although this work is
troubled in other ways, there is no reason to believe the math itself is suspect. Not
discussed in the article is that the parameter estimates for the Korean stock ex-
change imply that probabilities are not additive in South Korea as the distribution
is not stable. Assuming the formulas were correctly implemented, this incredible
result can only be an artifact of the method used.
A more prosaic and simple example is the truncated normal distribution. Stan-
dard tests of skewness will show a perfectly non-skewed but truncated distribution
as skewed. The minimum variance unbiased estimator of the center of location for
the Cauchy distribution, using Rothenberg’s method is biased by two per cent per
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annum in this data set.[83]





From the Neyman-Pearson lemma, this implementation is the uniformly most
powerful test. If this is a binary hypothesis, then the result of this test excludes
normality in both the Bayesian and the Frequentist paradigms.
4.3 Implementation
4.3.1 The Data
The data chosen was all end of day data from the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP), a commonly used data set. Each security was equally weighted.
An alternative would have been to weight the returns by volume. Given liquidity
costs as well as asymmetric volumes at the start and finish, this is impractical. This
is equivalent to purchasing an equal dollar amount of each security each day and
holding it for the designated holding period. Transaction dates run from December
31, 1925 to December 31, 2013.
4.3.2 Empirical Results
4.3.2.1 The Likelihood Function and the Posterior Distribution of σ
With a Normal Likelihood
The likelihood function is a unnormalized distribution function. It measures the
exact probability of observing the precise set of events appearing in the sample.
With a uniform prior distribution the likelihood distribution is a scaling of the
posterior distribution.
In order to find the maximum likelihood estimator for both models, a fine mesh
of one-tenth of a basis point was created to cover the densest region. The portion
of the data considered a going concern was used due to the nature of the underlying
theory and the mixture nature of the distributions involved. There were 49,645,521
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observations.
Survivorship effects are handled in a mixed way here. It appears in the like-
lihood as a truncated distribution, see Eq. 2.23. The constant of integration is
adjusted so that support is over the range of zero to infinity rather than negative
infinity to positive infinity.
Using the truncated likelihood function is necessary because it does shift the
parameter estimates, otherwise. Further, the shift is different between the normal
and the Cauchy distribution.
On the other hand estimates of the probability of merger or bankruptcy are
dropped as they would appear identically in the numerator and denominator of
the Bayes factor and cancel out. The distribution from merged firms was excluded
because it is so very skewed and on theoretical grounds as well.
The mean-variance models assume that the markets are in equilibrium. Mergers
can only happen when securities are under valued, or at least perceived to be
undervalued, as the alternative is to buy physical capital and expand, issue a
dividend, or give pay raises to management. Its not rational to engage in mergers
when a market is in equilibrium. Purchases in equilibrium should only happen as
false positives.
The purpose of this section is very narrow, that is to justify the use of the
Cauchy model empirically rather than the normal model or log normal model
of Black-Scholes for going concerns. As standard models ignore bankruptcy and
require information to be fully incorporated into prices at the time of option pur-
chase, it would be unfair to the models of mean-variance finance to include elements
known to violate the assumptions of the models.
The dispute is narrow. Should models of return have a variance or not have a
variance? That is the open question.
Model Likelihood of Observing σ
at Most Likely Location
Most Likely Location of σ in
Basis Points
Cauchy Model 10−15,055,291.23 2828.4
Normal Model 10−23,713,281.08 9962.0
Table 4.1. Table of Maximum Likelihood
The Likelihood Ratio Test excludes the normal model with an odds ratio of
108,657,989.86 : 1. If it could be shown that these two models are the complementary
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set of hypothesis, given the sources of skew would impact each distribution in the
same manner and cancel out, then in both Frequentist and Bayesian methodologies,
mean-variance finance is excluded.
A strictly Bayesian solution is the summation over all possible values, but
within just a short distance from the maximum point probabilities fall off with
over 90 orders of magnitude. As such, summation over the real number line is
impossible given the discrete nature of computation. Conversion of the likelihood
into a posterior density is a bit easier to understand. Although the posterior is
the normalized product of the likelihood and the prior, for the regions involved the
prior distributions were flat.
Figure 4.1. Marginal posterior distribution for the Cauchy model for σ, measured in
basis points.
Figure 4.2. Marginal posterior distribution for the Normal model for σ, measured in
basis points.
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The posterior density function for the normal distribution is more diffuse than
the Cauchy distribution. This results in a Bayes factor of 108,657,990.19, which makes
the Cauchy model about 1.4 times as likely as the normal model when compared
to the likelihood ratio. However, given the magnitudes of the falsification, this is
of no import.
Model Lower Bound MLE Upper Bound
Cauchy 2826.9 2828.4 2829.9
Normal 9958.9 9962.0 9965.3
Table 4.2. Interval and Point Estimates of the Shape Parameter of the Competing
Models, Measured in Basis Points
The ninety-nine percent highest density region for the Cauchy model is only
three basis points wide with a peak at 28.284%, a very reasonable measure of
uncertainty in returns. Simple integration implies that the interquartile range in
the data should be between a loss of 26.4% and a gain of 26.4%.
The 99% highest density region for the normal distribution is economically
unreasonable. While it is 6.4 basis points wide, that is not enough to bring down
the estimate to reasonable levels. Peaking at 99.62%, the implication is that nearly
one-fifth of all returns are greater than 100% per annum. The interquartile range
for the data implied from the parameters should range from a 33.6% loss to an
80.1% gain. Even without performing a statistical test, the normal model can be
excluded.
4.3.2.2 The Likelihood Function and the Posterior Distribution of σ
With a Log-Normal Likelihood
The 99% highest density region for the log-normal likelihood was not found. A
search was made for σ over the range of .01 to 3. What was found was that it is
very likely no proper posterior distribution exists for σ given the data.
Treating the likelihood measurements as data points, the log-likelihood of σ over
the range was approximately −1/x times a constant. This implies the likelihood
would maximize when σ went to infinity.
On economic grounds alone the log normal distribution can be excluded.
If the log-likelihood is hyperbolic over the parameter space, then the proposed
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Figure 4.3. Log-Likelihood for σ for the Log Normal Distribution
posterior distribution could not integrate to unity. This is visually obvious in
Figure 4.3
It was totally unexpected that the likelihood would fail to integrate to one.
Although it was expected that the Log Normal distribution would be a poor fit, it
wasn’t expected that the fit could not be measured.
One factor that may have played a role is the observation that the mode is
unity. This was included in the estimate as it was for the normal and the Cauchy
model. This may have restricted the possible values for σ. This forces the identity:
exp{µ− σ2} = 1 (4.41)
This leads to the obvious identity:
µ = σ2 (4.42)
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It may be true that estimates for µ and σ may have been realistic had the mode
not been conditioned to unity.
4.4 Discussion
The information loss due to using a normal distribution is nearly total. Although
not calculated as the magnitudes are already so large, the Kullback-Leibler di-
vergence is closely related to the log-odds in an expectational form. The normal
distribution is sometimes used as an approximation for the Cauchy distribution,
particularly when computational resources are limited. This would be very unfor-
tunate here as the information loss would be catastrophic. The normal model is
unrealistic and can be excluded. By moving to the Cauchy model, it is clear that
an improvement has been made.
The data imply fundamentally different sets of human behavior. Because the
data set is so large and represents such a long period of time, it is clear that the
normal distribution should not be used and this is true almost regardless of the
prior distribution for the parameter set. To get the normal distribution to provide
a good fit to the data a distribution approaching the Dirac functional would have
to serve as a prior distribution. Such a prior would be considered degenerate by
any ordinary person.
It is also obvious that the log-normal distribution cannot be used to model
returns. This may not be true if log return is mapped to another log return using
standard regression models. The open issue is what the covariance matrix would
mean. Prices do not covary, but they do appear to co-move. The mean of the
log return maps to the median of the raw returns. It is an open question as to
what the covariance between two sets of log returns would imply. Although the log
return should converge to the hyperbolic secant distribution, regression mappings
should converge to normality.
It is open to debate as to the interpretation of the covariance of instantaneous







The exclusion of Itô based methods for option pricing requires a fundamental
second look at prior research and models. By excluding Frequentist methods due
to admissibility issues it becomes possible to narrow the tools to Bayesian methods;
this is still too large a class of possible solutions to consider.
It will be shown that a profit maximizing market maker is choosing a risk
minimizing strategy, therefore it becomes possible to focus on profit maximization
as a bounding condition for a point estimate of equilibrium prices. Still, it is wise
to look again at prior attempts to price option contracts in order to construct a
model.
5.1 Introduction
In order to price options, it is necessary to frame the model inside some greater
framework. The primary logical framework is the study of financial asset pricing.
The study of financial asset pricing is relatively short. The first such aca-
demic study is by Bachelier in his doctoral thesis. Leonard Jimmie Savage mailed
postcards out to leading economists and mathematicians to read Bachelier’s dis-
sertation. His work was derived from work on rentes and was preceded empirically
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by Regnault.[9] This set off a flurry of work on Brownian motion and also option
pricing. Work by Osborne extended the Brownian motion argument which was
followed on by Samuelson, Boness and Sprenkle.[17, 74, 85, 94] As this disserta-
tion is fundamentally a reworking of the math the approach resembles their work
in some ways but not in others.
Like Bachelier, the study is using the limiting distribution of returns, but in-
stead of the normal distribution, the limiting distribution is the Cauchy distribu-
tion. Like Boness, this dissertation assumes non-negativity of prices, but unlike
Boness who used the log-normal distribution to evade the issue this work uses
the Cauchy distribution truncated at zero for bankruptcy. Like Sprenkle who dis-
counted at the expected rate of return for the stock price, this work considers the
terminal value of the security, but discounts at the subjective opportunity cost of
funds. Like Black and Scholes, this work considers the no arbitrage equilibrium
but does not use Brownian motion to calculate the option price. Like the mean-
variance models, the game in which the price is constructed provides actors with
complete historical information and there is no informational asymmetry. Unlike
these articles, this study includes liquidity costs, merger risk and the probability
of bankruptcy.
Because European options have a definable terminal value without the possibil-
ity of early exercise, the simplest solution is to look at the distribution of possible
terminal values. For put prices, the values are bounded at zero and at k, the strike
price. An expected value therefore exists regardless of the distribution chosen.
Ignoring time values and liquidity costs, the simplest mechanism to value a put
contract is to integrate over the set of possible final values. Everything else be-
comes setting values to present value and adjusting for the costs of liquidity. With
call options there can be no expected value as the future value diverges without
bounds. However, it is possible to price calls through equilibrium pricing.
Certain things then become necessary to price European style option contracts.
The first of these is an interest rate. In the real world there are a wide range of
available interest rates. In practice there are offers that are available nationally,
such as those from purchasing a bond over an organized national exchange, and
there are those that are only available in certain localities or to certain people,
such as from credit unions.
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In this model there are two rates, a deposit rate and a loan rate. The existence
of the spread isn’t for realism. It is for coherence under de Finetti’s Coherence
Principle. From the Coherence Principle it is possible to derive Kolmogorov’s
axioms of probability. If there isn’t a deposit and loan rate spread, then the most
basic laws of probability cannot be assured to hold.
This split can be thought of as similar to a sales commission and indeed would
encourage market makers and dealers to seek out sales staff in order to capture as
much of this spread as possible by creating deals.
The second of these is the bankruptcy rate. Although it may be surprising,
it simply isn’t possible to solve the problem without a legal bankruptcy process.
The political process precedes the economic process. Without either enforceable
bankruptcy contract provisions or existing statutory provisions there is no way to
find the expected value of a European style equity put option contract.
The strike price is the right boundary, bankruptcy creates the left boundary at
zero. It is only between these two boundaries that an expected value can form.
The third required aspect is the bid-ask spread. Like the deposit-loan spread
required for coherence, the bid-ask spread is required for coherence. Coherence
permits the existence of call contracts even though no expected value could exist.
The fourth required tool for pricing options are initial endowments. Actors with
different endowments may face different decisions. An actor indebted by $100,000
is in a different position than one flush with cash.
There is a fifth factor not required for pricing, except of course in the real
world, but which is quite useful. That is to include a probability of merger.
Mergers are often bankruptcy alternatives and a firm that is merging is really
selling out its underlying physical capital. As financial capital is a claim on physical
capital, by prohibiting mergers under any circumstance inefficiencies would form
in the primary markets for physical capital and, through competition, labor. One
would have to wonder at such an arrangement. It is unsurprising that this is not
seen in the real world.
One other thing is helpful, heterogeneous preferences. Although not necessary,
they permit a spectrum of risk premiums and do not require a wide range of
necessary random events to converge properly in order for the supply curve and
the demand curve to meet at least somewhere.
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5.2 The Game
This game proposes a simple option pricing model, but it is not the model of
option pricing. Fortunately, through the use of Bayes factors, it should be possible
in relatively short order to find nearly optimal solutions for pricing by changing
the information inputs. The data is not available for this study to attempt this.
Actors in the game engage in several actions prior to deciding on portfolio allo-
cations. They set a prior distribution, estimate parameters using a cost function,
construct a predictive distribution and use that distribution to engage in decisions
regarding securities positions.
The game exists as a limited game inside a set of games, one game for each
possible security and at one subsection of time in an infinitely repeated game.
5.3 Notation
Depending on the circumstances, most of the appropriate notation is suppressed.
This notation will vary slightly from section to section and will be annotated in
the text. For example, the bid price for a call option would be ψ
z(n)
while the asked
price would be z(n)ψ. While this is relatively mild, the complete representation a
call as a function of the variables that map onto it would be:
ψ = ψ(pt, k, t, T,∆t, iD|∆t, iL|∆t, δ|[t, T ], n, B,M) (5.1)
Likewise the full notation for a put would be:
φ = φ(pt, k, t, T,∆t, iD|∆t, iL|∆t, δ|[t, T ], n, B,M) (5.2)
In addition, there are multiple interest rates in the game. For some calculations
a deposit or a loan rate is specifically important and would be denoted iD or iL.
In some places the interest rate is denoted iX where X ∈ {D,L}.
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5.4 Actors
The game has three types of actors; they are nature, market makers and par-
ticipants. At time zero, nature makes an initial move for each actor endowing
them with resources. Participants are endowed with m̄i of liquid wealth, such that
−∞ < m̄i < ∞ and m̄i ∈ <,∀i ∈ I. I is the index of participants. In addition,
nature endows market makers and participants with ωi in risky wealth. Resources
are endowed so that
∑
i∈I m̄ = 0 and
∑
i∈I ωi = ωuniverse. Market makers are
assumed to be near their equilibrium balance sheets. Likewise, participants are
near or at their equilibrium balance sheets.
5.5 Actions
Securities are in decision theoretic terms, lotteries. Buying n shares of an asset
has a different probability distribution than buying n call contracts when seen in
reward space. As such, they are different lotteries with different density functions.
Some combinations of lotteries map to the same probability distribution as another
lottery. Buying an equity security is the same as buying a call option and selling
a put contract in the sense they have the same density function. The game is
restricted to decisions to be executed at time t. Although actors have access to a
wide range of risky assets, all assets except the one of interest are collectively held
as an individual’s portfolio designated ωi. That portfolio contains all other risky
wealth. This serves two functions.
First, instead of having the notation pt each firm would have to be identified
and so there would end up with some notation such as pft for each firm 1. . . f in F .
This would add no information. Second, the purpose of this article is to formulate
a model of option pricing based on a single security. While it is true that there may
be demand for a set of options from many different firms, that is a portfolio effect
and should be already included in the prices of the underlying security. Derivatives
derive their value from the pricing of the underlying.
Actors have several possible actions, denoted a or sometimes a′ etc, they can
take on several possible lotteries. The actions are:
 Place market order to:
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– Buy
* shares in the underlying security
* contracts in a European style option on the underlying security
(also called going long)
– Sell
* shares in the underlying security
* contracts in a European style option on the underlying security
(also called writing)
 Place limit order to:
– Buy
* shares in the underlying security
* contracts in a European style option on the underlying security
– Sell
* shares in the underlying security
* contracts in a European style option on the underlying security
 Place multiple orders in a convex combination of the above order types
 Do nothing
The set of all possible actions over all possible permitted combinations of se-
curities is denoted A.
Some actions are functionally excluded by dominance. For example, buying a
call and selling a put while short selling the underlying security would be equivalent
to “do nothing,” except that there would be transaction costs. Hence, do nothing
dominates doing something, where that something is more costly than a simpler
solution. Although the move is not excluded in the game by rule, it is dominated
and so including “Do Nothing” permits a pragmatic rationality-based bounding
for the set A.
For most practical purposes, limit orders are the same as “do nothing.” If a
security is trading at $10 per share and a sell limit order for $15 is place, this
is generally no different than placing a market order and so will be treated as
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a market order. However, a security trading at $10 per share when a sell limit
order of $5 is issued will result in no action. As only one static moment is under
consideration here, though it is a generic moment, limit orders will either map to
a market order or orders to do nothing.
This general rule undergoes further discussion and elaboration in the segment
on liquidity.






Compound lotteries are made up of several simple lotteries.
The outcome of the deposit and loan contracts are known with certainty and
so result in the same outcome in all states of nature, except in the case of the
bankruptcy of the obligor. If a buy order would exhaust and exceed all possible
liquid assets then a loan would automatically be granted. Likewise, any net cash
generated by transactions would automatically create a deposit contract to the
extent the cash exceeded any outstanding debt.
5.6 Utility Functions
Utility functions can be represented in one of two manners. The first and the
most common in economic models is the utility of some uncertain variable, such as
wealth. This is often represented as U(w̃). This is also sometimes represented in
terms of consumption in economic models. The realized utility will depend upon
the final state of w.
The other possibility is to use the utility of the action chosen. This would be
represented as U(a) or U(a′). Once an action is chosen, alternative lotteries would
no longer matter. In this form, regret utility is being used. Regret utility, not in its
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expectational form, is the utility of an action in a given state of nature, θ, where
Θ is the set of all possible states. It can be expressed as:




There are six explicit prices in the game, four of which are exogenous. They are pt
and pT which are the current and future price of some security; iD and iL, which
are the interest rates on deposits and loans respectively at time t; and φ and ψ,
which are the current prices for put and call options if liquidity costs are ignored.
They are endogenous variables. There is also an implicit price λ, which is used to
price the cost of liquidity. The cost of liquidity is treated as exogenous.
For participants all moves happen at time t, denoted t. The consequences of
these actions are paid out at time T . The interval T − t = ∆t. For the market
makers, it is possible for moves to be made in continuous time over the interval
[t, T ] and implicitly there will be other participants available as counter-parties
over the interval.
In addition to the current exogenous market prices, there are three other vari-
ables which affect the price of option contracts. They are the strike price, denoted
k, the number of contracts or shares purchased denoted n, and δ, which is the
future value of dividends over the interval (t, T ] marked up to future value at the
deposit rate iD. As is standard in economic notation, a variable noted with a ∗ is
at the equilibrium quantity.
Although securities are priced at pt, pT , ψ, and φ, they are marked up or down
to the bid and ask price by requiring a liquidity premium. The liquidity premium,
from Abbott[1], is being modeled as a function z(n) such that:
z(n) = enλ (5.4)
In addition to price variability, securities are subject to existential risks. In
particular, the probability of bankruptcy or merger whose probability is denoted
B and M .
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Both ψ and φ are unknown functions of the above variables. For purposes of
notation, most or all of the function variables are being suppressed to either ψ or
ψ(n) and either φ or φ(n).
Interest rates and the future value of dividends are, of course, dependent on
the interval of time over which they are to happen. Likewise, to simplify notation
iD = iD|∆t, t (5.5)
and
iL = iL|∆t, t (5.6)
and
δ = δ|[t, T ] (5.7)
Market makers and participants that write options are assumed to be profit
maximizers. Participants that are option buyers are assumed to be either profit
maximizers or utility maximizers. Utility maximizers are assumed to have strictly
concave utility with heterogeneous preferences.
Participant actors have heterogeneous endowments. A consequence of this is
that different actors face different interest rates. A result of this is that they have
different reservation prices.
All participants are assumed to have access to sufficient credit facilities that
they could engage in any profitable transaction up to and past the point of prof-
itability.
Participants in the game have perfect knowledge of all relevant historical data
and the data set is very large. Actors base their actions on the predictive distri-
bution created from the data from the beginning of the data set to time t − 1.
As the set is very large, it is assumed that the differences in parameter estimates
are less than the number of significant digits and so in a discrete space are equal.
Implicitly this presumes no actor holds a degenerate prior.
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5.8 Nature of the Contracts
Participants are able to either write or buy an unlimited number of European style
put or call options. A European style equity option is an option on an underlying
security that can only be exercised at maturity. In this case maturity is at time
T. In addition, or in lieu of, they could purchase or sell an unlimited quantity of
the underlying security.
A put contract grants the buyer the right, but not the obligation to require the
writer to buy a security at a predetermined price denoted k and called the strike
price. A call contract grants the buyer the right, but not the obligation to require
the writer to sell a security at a previously chosen strike price, denoted k.
Unlike equity securities or bonds, which are fixed in quantity over the short run,
option contracts can exist without limit. Financial intermediaries create financial
contracts and these contracts are flexible in quantity. This mechanism is similar
to the manner in which banks create money.
When a new bank forms the equity is loaned out, these loans cause the recipients
of the money to deposit it in banks. This money is then loaned out again, creating
new deposits in the process, until some contractual or regulatory limit is reached.
Similarly, market makers in this game insure the market against adverse move-
ments by writing options and by making a market for those parties that wish to
absorb those risks. This assures the market that participants can become under-
writers of those risks. In a sense, the market maker acts as a Lloyd’s association
does in insurance when combined with a reinsurer to cover risk of failure by the
contract writers. For purposes of the game, only market makers can create deriva-
tive securities.
Like a bank certificate of deposit, no option obligation exists until a market
maker agrees to open an account and create one. Likewise, a risky option po-
sition cannot be closed early without a counter-party willing to absorb the risk.
By insuring the primary markets against certain types of risks, it makes it pos-
sible to increase the size of the primary markets by permitting risks considered
unacceptable to one party to be sold to another party.
As a consequence, market makers are at risk with every potential transaction.
Consider, for example, a party that wishes to go long 1 call option in ABCorp.
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The market maker posts a price. If that price is acceptable to the counter-party,
the position is opened. Another party comes along wishing to write a call option
on ABCorp. The market maker posts a price. If it is acceptable to that party then
they write the contract.
In the first position the market maker is short one contract. In the second
position the market maker is long one contract. On the surface the market maker
bears little or no risk. If the second party declares bankruptcy and defaults on
the written call, should it be exercised, it is the market maker who is obligated to
fulfil the long contract.
In the absence of counter-party failure there is in practice only one open con-
tract with the market maker acting primarily as a clearing institution. In the real
world, two contracts exist. In this game, each separate position will be accounted
for, even if participants effectively clear out the position by absorbing the market
maker’s risk.
5.9 The Profit Function for Short Puts
5.9.1 The Critical Importance of the Short Put
The capacity to solve any element of the system revolves around the short put. It
is the only portion of the system where an expected profit exists. As such, puts are
necessary for financial stability. Although the European style short put seems like
an esoteric concept, it is in fact a simpler mathematical construction than a bank
deposit. It is quite possible bank deposits exists in this sea of instability because
of the nature of the put contract.
To understand the relative simplicity of an equity put contract when compared
to a bank deposit or a bank loan, it is important to think about what a bank
deposit grants the actor. Depositors receive a debt obligation and a long put that
they didn’t pay a premium for. If interest rates increase enough, then a depositor
will remove their deposit and redeposit the money at the higher rate. If interest
rates fall, then the depositor can continue to receive the higher rate.
Banks create a bond, often at a fixed rate of interest, and includes a long
American style put. Implicitly the bank would loan the customer the money for
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the premium through a discounted deposit rate and possibly a penalty for early
withdrawal. For a time deposit, the depositor receives a rate iD from time t to time
T unless a higher rate appears. Then the depositor is free to choose the higher of
the two rates. In the absence of a penalty for early withdrawal, the depositor is
guaranteed the supremum of the available rates up to some maximal time period.
This is mathematically far more complex than a European style put on an
equity security. The obligation is only at the end of the period. It defines a payoff
only at that time. The writer has no automatic future obligation to the buyer, such
as the obligation to write another put. A bank, on the other hand, as a common
carrier, must agree to accept a rate marked up deposit from the same customer
who cancelled the prior agreement.
When one considers that central banks attempt to control the static volume of
the real supply of deposits, there exists an implication that the private production
of a public good by banks includes the mathematical elements of that provisioning
of public goods. A bank contract is a good deal more complicated than the goal
of pricing European style equity options.
Still, this relatively simple contract is the building block of all American style
options, European style call options and standard banking products.
5.9.2 The Profit Function
The profit functions1 for participants are such that revenues are marked down
by an exponentially growing cost of liquidity in n and costs are marked up by an
exponentially growing cost of liquidity in n. The long option positions are cost plus
profit positions and as such maximize utility by insuring against risk rather than
generating a profit. By assumption, at the margin, actors are risk averse and so
for purposes of this game there are no speculators. The presence of speculators in
the market can have an impact to be discussed later in the section on speculators.
As market makers could be the permanent holders of all short positions, it is
the market maker’s self interest to assure not only that sufficient premiums are
being collected, but also that the option writers are profitable.
Two of the three possible single contract short positions can have no expected
1Economists usually define the profit function in terms of a maximization. That assumption
is relaxed until the end of the chapter.
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profitability as the expectation diverges and therefore does not exist. Expected
gains and losses for short selling a stock or call option cannot be defined. As it
happens, this is not a difficulty in equilibrium.
As will be shown later, the call price, given a large cash endowment, in equi-





z(n). Every variable on the right hand side
is well defined except φ and δ. Setting aside considerations of δ for a moment, the
question becomes “is there an optimal put premium given an obligation by the
market maker to write n put contracts without a volume limitation?”
The market participants will avoid writing put contracts if the price is set too
low, sticking the maker with the entire inventory. Likewise, market participants
could rush in to take up inventory if the price were too high. In an equilibrium there
is no pressure for prices to change. The concern is with equilibrium profitability.
The goal is to set a price such that the volume sold produces maximal prof-




φ(1 + iX)− nmax
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In this equation x ∈ {D,L}. As the goal is to get participants to voluntarily choose
optimal volume, it must first be determined what is an optimal volume.
The function max
(
0, k − pT
z(n)
)
has three possible existential states of nature.
They are
1. The firm is bankrupt
2. The firm has been merged out of existence
3. The firm is a going concern
In the bankrupt state, the writer pays k since pT = 0. This happens with
probability B. B is understood in a Bayesian sense as B|ι, where ι is information.
This is also true for the other existential states.









Without bankruptcy, it is not possible to calculate option premiums as the
integrals would hopelessly diverge in all existential states.
Mergers are often a bankruptcy substitute, as such, it is reasonable to believe
that post merger returns may have different parameters than for firms which are
a going concern. In the non-bankruptcy states the Cauchy distribution has two
parameters in each remaining state. These are based on the posterior estimates
from the existing data set.
If G is thought of as the probability of a firm continuing as a going concern and
M the probability of merger, then there are two ways to handle the relationship
between G, M, and B. They are:
1. G+M+B=1
2. Or by having both of the following conditions be true:
(a) G|not bankrupt +M |not bankrupt = 1
(b) (G|not bankrupt +M |not bankrupt)(1−B) +B = 1
The method used is the multinomial choice of G+M +B = 1.
The profit function in the merged state comes from a distribution without
known analytic properties. The method of histograms permits an approximate
solution for this problem.[13] Fundamentally, predicted values are based on the
probability that the final price, pT will be inside a particular partition. This
can only be an approximate solution and so refinement of a solution using first
principles would be a significant step forward.
Noting that in equation 5.8 that a loss would happen anywhere pT < kz(n),
implies that out of the money options, that is those greater than the strike price
should be exercised due to liquidity costs. One partition, should then cover the no
loss region of pT ≥ kz(n). The remaining partitions should be optimally chosen
to minimize information loss. The optimal number of partitions is assumed to be
S + 1, where S ∈ Z+.
The probability of being in a given slice, given a merger will happen in the
contract period, is unknown, but is estimated here using the multivariate normal
of dimension S+1. Each partition is mutually exclusive and therefore independent.
145
The beliefs regarding the probability of being in a particular in-the-money slice,










∼ N (µs, σ2s)M (5.10)
and for the out of the money slice:
Pr (z(n)pt ≥ k|Merged) ∼ N (µS+1, σ2S+1)M (5.11)
A multinomial distribution could have been used as well.























The second z(n) from equation 5.8 vanishes because z(n) scales the partitions so
that each partition is kz(n)
S
wide, but the midpoint is discounted by 1
z(n)
. Likewise,
as k scales the width of the histogram and appears as the paid out strike price, k
gets pulled out to the side.
In the going concern state of nature, the expected profit function is:




φ(1 + ix)− 0−
2n














For simplicity, it was assumed the contract was an all or nothing contract. It will
marginally overstate costs if this is not true for small values of n. The center of
location is µG and the parameter of spread is σG. Note however that the current
spot price is information and that µG and σG are notationally shortened from µG|pt
and µG|pt. It should also be noted that additional information beyond the strike
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price could be included such as accountancy data or dividend payments.
Because the distribution is truncated at zero due to the existence of bankruptcy,





Prior to evaluating the parametric form for the going concern, it may be valu-
able to consider using the distribution free form, as in equation 5.12, for the going
































































the problem simplifies to the more visually tractable:
E(∆ΠPS (n)|n; pt; k) =
n
z(n)
φ(1 + iX)− nΛ(k) (5.16)
Since pt and k are exogenous, this permits a solution for φ given an optimal
value for n.






− φ(1 + iX)λn
z(n)
− Λ(k) ≡ 0 (5.17)
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With a little manipulation, the equation can be brought into product-log form










where W (x) solves:
x = W (x) exp(W (x)) (5.19)
Unfortunately, φ has yet to be solved for. Still, it illustrates the important
inverse relationship between optimal volume and λ. Since volume, and not φ can
be observed in the market, φ, is solved for as:
φ =
Λ(k)z(n∗)
(1 + iX)(1− n∗λ)
(5.20)
For completeness, second order conditions support a maximum when:
nλ < 2 (5.21)
The profit function to write a short put, by substitution, is:









the expectation for which is:




Although this is an approximation, it has a nice form. Writers receive a per-
centage mark-up over costs. In this model, φ, is a function of n∗ and not n. The
alternative would be for φ to vary directly with n. There is an important con-
ceptual difference that goes to the core of banking. If φ is a constant, then all
mark-ups and mark-downs are taken by the market maker. The market maker’s
role is to absorb the volume. It represents motion along the supply curve. It is a
liquidity cost and not a size effect. It represent timing and the ability to maintain
stable supply and demand curves.
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On the other hand, φ(n) represents a shift of the curve. It represents a move-
ment along a different supply curve. This is different from a simple repricing of
the underlying security, from pt to p
′
t. This would imply the existence of a market
participant with pricing power. Of course, in equilibrium this should not occur
in the world of many competing actors, but could be imagined in a world where
a principal market maker failed and another actor was willing to underwrite the
missing contracts. It could also be the case where a market maker wanted to exit
a line of business and sell its book of business to another actor.




φ(n)(1 + iX)− nmax
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Taking expectations and setting the first derivative to zero generates a differ-








where c ∈ <++.
The expected profit function is:
E(sup ∆ΠPS (n)) = c(1 + iX) (5.26)
The writer is recapturing all costs and collecting a flat fee, independent of n, λ,
and k. For that to be the case, the market maker has to transfer capital and
liquidity profits to remove the risk from its books.
5.9.2.1 Parametric Form for Going Concern
The parametric form of the going concern profit function shown in equation 5.27
is far less tame. Indeed, a simple visual inspection would cause anyone to doubt
that the first and second derivative would go anywhere simple or useful. Far more
important, the pattern of n
z(n)
a− nb, is hopelessly broken here. Although it is the
parametric form of the close, distribution-free approximation and at its core the
same pattern must hold, it isn’t obvious how that would be arrived at.
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The simple pattern where z(n) and k scale the cost function is obscured by
the nature of the integration. The first and second derivative are contained in
an appendix. The fundamental lessons are the same, except that there isn’t an
observed analytic solution for the second derivative test.
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+ µ2 + σ2
)}
(5.27)
The primary issue that makes the problem difficult is that it is rational to
exercise out-of-the-money option contracts when, adjusted for the cost of liquidity,
they are pragmatically in the money. A person holding an option for 10,000 shares
of ABCorp with a strike at 50 when the current price is 49.75 would not exercise
under the Black-Scholes model, but must exercise here if the shares are still desired
if the market order to buy the shares in the open market would drive it over $50,
which it surely would. Unfortunately, liquidity costs are marked up and down
using an exponential cost function. This is what leads to the difficult functional
form.
5.9.2.2 Conclusion
The writer of a contract is the insurer. If the insurer fails, the market maker
assumes the liabilities. It is in the self-interest of the market maker for the writer
to be profitable and have adequate assets to meet obligations. The price observed
in this derivation is the minimum reserve price that the writer should receive.
Market maker fees must be on top of that minimum reserve. A profit maximizing
writer, as will be shown later, is a risk minimizing writer. This also minimizes the
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risk to the market maker. Should a risk loving writer appear, the market maker
must exclude bids below the minimum reserve as it increases the risk to the writer
and to the market maker.
5.10 Buying Put Contracts
It seems the most likely way to attack this problem is through the indifference
curve. In equilibrium, the marginal actor should be indifferent among the choices












− k) + (m̄− nψ(n))iX) Pr(ω)dω Pr(pT )dpT ≡∫
ω∈Ω
U(ω + m̄iX) Pr(ω)dω
(5.28)
where ω is other uncertain wealth not allocated to this asset with a domain of
possible values Ω.
Further it is probable that attacking the problem up to the strike price and
from the strike price to infinity may hold promise. Numerical solutions do seem
possible, but are outside the data available for this research.
The other possibility is to use regret utility functions. An interesting observa-
tion on regret utility is that long option contracts are never the supremum of a set
of actions for any given state of nature in n-space. This implies that under regret
utility long contracts always have negative utility in profit space over volume. This
is rather interesting in that such a contract makes the amount of regret absolutely
certain since the contract guarantees a worst possible state of nature.
Regret utility factors in the cost of false positives, that is the performing action
a when the optimal action, known only after the fact, is action a′. The existence
of long options imply the absence of a dominant strategy in all states of nature.
That is to say, no contract can stochastically dominate another. Under regret
utility, the stock market lacks a regret-free solution. At most, all strategies will
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bring about equal marginal regret. Indeed, the “do nothing” strategy is also never
the supremum strategy. Even what is traditionally called the risk free strategy is
regret filled.
5.10.1 Brief Discussion
A brief discussion is in order as this mechanism for pricing puts is slightly different
from what would be expected in a mean-variance framework. Note, for example,
there are no dividends in the formula for a put contract. This does not mean
dividend payments do not impact the price of puts.
A simple example would be a firm paying liquidating dividends over a period
of years. An option on the current price would almost certainly be guaranteed to
be in the money far enough into the future. This would differ from a firm paying
dividends from profits or no dividend at all.
How should one incorporate such a dividend? It should be in the likelihood
function, subject to any prior information about dividend payments on prices. It
should appear in Pr(pT |δ) and not as a correcting factor outside the expected cost
function. It is inherently true that dividends are uncertain. A Board of Directors,
as in any legislature, is subject to time inconsistency. That is, the games are
subgame imperfect. This forces inductive reasoning to properly estimate the role
of either announced or historical dividends on future prices.
If prices were not conditioned on information that included dividends, then
the effect of dividends is disbursed into the general uncertainty of future prices.
In essence, ignoring dividends increases uncertainty, but that does not inherently
mean the gain in information is worth the computational costs. It simply means
the effects of dividends become hidden in the uncertainty about price changes.
Another missing element is the relation between the current spot price and
the strike price. This missing information is captured in µG, µM , σG, σM as they
are really µX |pt and σX |pt. So the strike price vanishes into the posterior via the
likelihood function as well.
It is reasonably certain, but not perfectly certain, that a stock currently priced
at $50 per share with a put option with a strike price at $100 per share with one
year to run in the contract will expire in the money in the absence of information
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that would cause one to believe that the current price is far from the equilibrium
price.
One other slight difference from mean-variance finance is that calls are priced
actuarially while puts acquire their value through put-call parity. This is reversed
as calls have no expected value.
5.11 No Arbitrage Equilibrium
Noted in the literature is that a condition that must be met is the absence of arbi-
trage opportunities. This can be justified under a number of possible assumptions
or as a consequence of rationality concepts. However, one of the simplest is
de Finetti’s coherence principle. [76] de Finetti set about an axiomization of prob-
ability theory in 1937 built around the concept of gambling. Shortcomings in this
approach are noted in Shimony, Janes and Nau. [46, 68, 92] de Finetti’s Coherence
Principle can be stated as;
Assumption 5. A bookmaker’s betting odds are coherent if a client cannot place
a bet or a combination of bets such that no matter what outcome occurs, the
bookmaker will lose money.
An open question to this assumption, of course, is do rational actors have to
use coherent probabilities. Although this issue is covered by Ramsey and Savage,
it can simply be excluded here by the assumption that the market maker is a profit
maximizer and could simply choose not to engage in transactions that result in a
sure loss, when the alternative was a zero change in profits.[76, 86]
The practical implication, here, is that an infinite number of possible prices are
not possible. Depending upon perspective, the presence of a book maker assures
either the existence of a no arbitrage equilibrium or as an alternative construction,
perfect competition subject to liquidity costs.
The binding rule for the bookmaker is that the bookmaker will accept any and
all gambles as long as they are finite in number at the posted price.
The rule, when combined with the Coherence Principle create a set of binding
conditions on the bookmaker.
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If two different portfolios exist, denoted Ξ1 and Ξ2, with a common payoff
function of Π1 = Π2 = ΠΞ, and with posted market prices ξ1 and ξ2 respectively,
then if ξ1 6= ξ2 then it is possible to guarantee the bookmaker can lose money if
participants can freely buy or sell portfolios. The proof is simple. Assume, without
loss of generality, that ξ1 > ξ2 and that a participant can purchase or sell n > 0
portfolios at the different prices. The participants sells n portfolios of Ξ1 at ξ1
and purchases n portfolios of Ξ2 at ξ2. At inception of the position the market
participant receives n(ξ1 − ξ2) from the market maker, up to the total capital of
the market maker. At the payoff time the participant receives nΠΞ and pays nΠΞ
for a net profit of n(ξ1− ξ2). The market maker is guaranteed a loss of n(ξ1− ξ2).
This violates the assumption of the market maker being a profit maximizer as the
market maker could have set the prices equal and received a higher payoff, though
that payoff would also have been zero. With liquidity costs, equal prices would
have guaranteed a positive profit to the bookmaker.
As a side note, from the combination of the above rule with the Coherence
Principle it is possible to derive as theorems the Kolmogorov axioms of probability.
5.12 Call Options Under Various Initial Endow-
ments
As different possible actors could approach the market maker with different reserva-
tion prices, different possible no arbitrage equilibrium prices exist. It is important
to not read an equilibrium price as the equilibrium price but rather as the equi-
librium price conditional upon a state of nature. Each possible state of nature is
dependent upon the subjective conditions of the actors approaching the market
maker to enter into positions.
5.12.1 Large Cash Endowment
In this state of nature, it is assumed that m̄  0 and that after the position is
entered into sufficient cash exists to maintain the position without borrowing. The
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profit function, should no action be taken to enter into a position, is:
Πm̄0 = iDm̄ (5.29)
The profit functions in table 5.1 actually represent a change in profit from the
do nothing choice. As such, they are prefixed with a ∆ to make that clear. The
profit functions of this state of nature are in table 5.1. Some elements of these
Type of Position Formula for Profit Function
Long Call ∆ΠCL(n) = nmax(0,
pT
z(n)
− k)− nz(n)ψ(1 + iD)
Long Put ∆ΠPL(n) = nmax(0, k − z(n)pT )− nz(n)φ(1 + iD)
Long Equity Position ∆ΠSL(n) =
n
z(n)
pT − nz(n)pt(1 + iD) + nδ
Short Call ∆ΠCS (n) =
n
z(n)
ψ(1 + iD)− nmax(0, z(n)pT − k)
Short Put ∆ΠPS (n) =
n
z(n)
φ(1 + iD)− nmax(0, k − pTz(n))
Short Equity Position ∆ΠSS(n) =
n
z(n)
pt(1− iL)− nz(n)pT − nδ
Table 5.1. Profit Functions Given Sufficiently Large Cash Endowments
profit functions should be made explicit.
The profit is the net profit at the terminal date of the contract. These are
not present values, but nominal future profits. For the long position, although no
cost earns interest, the cash used would otherwise have been on deposit and so










Also of note is the interest adjustment to the short equity position, which is 1− iL.
There are multiple ways in which a broker-dealer can manage both option and
short equity positions. Some firms charge a special borrowing fee which is really
a mark-up of the bid-ask spread, some charge interest on the value of the initial
position and some charge interest on the continuous balance. For purposes of this
game interest is paid on the initial balance. In the United States interest is not
paid on the cash received for the short sale. It is held as collateral and used by
the broker-dealer until repaid giving the dealer an additional reward in the form
of an interest free loan.
A long European style call option without liquidity costs is valued at
max (0, pT − k). This ignores an important element of profitability, that is realiza-
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tion. The cash to cash cycle is exactly that, a cash to cash cycle. The contract
delivers n shares of some firm which can be sold at the bid price of pT
z(n)
. The owner
of the contract does have to deliver k to exercise the contract.
To see the difference it is best to do so in a world without transaction costs,
interest or dividends. A shareholder endowed with 100 shares of ABCorp at time
zero who continued to hold the same security at time one and with the same 100
shares made no profit. They started with 100 shares and ended with 100 shares.
Even if the price went from $10 to $20 no realization happened, the property
position is the same, that is the property owner holds 100 shares. If at time three
the price were $3 per share no loss would happen unless the shareholder sold and
then it would be based on the initial price and not the interim non-realized prices.
One other important difference between the game and the real world is the
absence of taxes. There are no income, property or inheritance taxes. Taxes could
alter the equilibrium prices, particularly with differential tax rates.
There is also a difference from the normal construction of a profit function
in economics. Normally a profit function could be constructed as price, given a
quantity, times that quantity minus the costs to produce that quantity. This isn’t
quite the construction here. The short call price is bid price which is a composite
function of some unknown function and a liquidity adjustment written as ψ
z(n)
.
Likewise the cost function contain loss mitigation revenues. The writer of a short
put must pay the strike price, but recovers from a total loss by selling the received
shares in the open market. As a consequence ψ
z(n)
is subject to the law of demand,
but ψ may not be, provided it increases slower than z(n) decreases. Costs may
be convex in volume, but the cost function is multiplicative with revenues in some
places and subtractive in others.
Without this construction, discussing the three parties to transactions, the
writer, the buyer and the market maker is very difficult. Still, it results in a less
than traditional construction from what would be seen in industrial production
economics.
5.12.1.1 Derivatives of Potential Arbitrage Positions
The derivatives for the arbitrage position call = put+ equity are shown below. In
the special case where the final price, pT is less than the strike price, k, it is not
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necessary to separately close the long position while simultaneously purchasing a
short position as implied by the separate equations. The joint position becomes:
∆ΠP+SL (n) = nk − nz(n)φ(1 + iD)− nz(n)pt(1 + iD) + nδ (5.31)
The put owner delivers the shares, already purchased at time zero, and delivers
them for k as per the contract..
The table of derivatives for the change in profit functions of the two positions
with respect to pT is as follows:
Type Price Derivative of Call Derivative of Put Plus Equity
Long
pT < k 0 0







pT < k 0 0
pT = k undefined undefined
pT > k −nz(n) −nz(n)
Table 5.2. Derivatives
Relatively simple math will show that as the only differences between the cases
are the interest rate, the derivatives will be the same for all possible outcomes and
all states of nature, given either a long or short position. As such, for brevity, the
derivatives with respect to pT are not shown for the other endowed states.
It follows that if the change in profitability of calls equals the change in prof-
itability of puts and equity positions then the no arbitrage requirement is met.
The method to determine the equilibrium price is to determine if it is invariant
over changes in pT . If it is not, then the differences in the anti-derivatives may not
be zero.
5.12.1.2 Equilibrium Pricing In Long Positions
For each position one should note that there are three cases. As liquidity costs exist,
it could matter if the interval of the bid and the ask prices cover the strike price.
As mentioned earlier, an option to buy 10,000 shares of stock at $10 per share.
Now imagine the current prices is $10.50 per share to sell 100 shares. Exercising
enough contracts to close out 100 shares would cost $1,000 and generate revenue
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of $1050.00. Now imagine that selling 10,000 shares would result in a net price of
$9.50 per share. The exercising party would pay $100,000 but only receive $95,000




The change in the profit functions of the call versus put plus equity position
must equal, as such:
pT
z(n)
− k − z(n)ψ(1 + iD) = −z(n)φ(1 + iD) +
pT
z(n)
− z(n)pt(1 + iD) + δ (5.32)
This reduces down to:




To extract a little more intuition out of the equilibrium, consider the case of
the at the money call price. In that circumstance the strike price is also the same
as the stock price so k = pt. In that case the formula becomes:
ψ = φ+ pt





For a long position the interpretation is that the price of a call option is equal
to the price of a put option plus the carrying cost of buying the initial shares,
marked down to present value and adjusted for liquidity costs minus the present
value of dividends missed by holding the call position, again adjusted for liquidity
costs.
Two other features are important here. First, the formula is independent of
any value of pT and so no uncertainty is present. Second, although δ does not bear
the usual notation for an estimator as would be the case if it were represented as δ̂;
this is done for convenience as dividends, like liquidity costs, appear everywhere.
CASE II:k ≥ pT
The equation for this case is:
−z(n)ψ(1 + iD) = k − z(n)φ(1 + iD)− z(n)pt(1 + iD) + δ (5.35)
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This reduces down to:




CASE III:kz(n) > pT > k
This case has two subcases, one in which the contracts are exercised as an all
or nothing execution and those that permit partial execution of the total position.
CASE IIIa: All or Nothing Execution
If the contract required all or nothing execution then the contract would not
be executed. This is the above example of having a nominally quoted price greater
than k, but when marked down for volume results in a net price below the strike.
For a simple formal proof, let pT = kz(n) − ξz(n), ξ > 0, then it follows that the
profit function for a call option is −z(n)ψ(1 + iD) due to the fact that the value
of the contract would be max(0,−ξ) = 0.
This leads to a somewhat surprising result in academic models that ignore
liquidity, that is that the put option should be exercised even though the contract
is out of the money.
Again, subject to the overall restriction, let pT = kz(n) − ξz(n), ξ > 0. It
follows that the value of the equivalent position is:
k − kz(n)− ξz(n)
z(n)
− z(n)pt(1 + iD) + δ, (5.37)
as this is greater than the non-exercised profit by an amount ξ, the option must
be exercised for maximal profitability.
The equilibrium is the same as for the low price equilibrium, which is:




CASE IIIB: Partial Execution
In the case where some, but not all contracts could be executed profitably, it is
assumed there exists a quantity n′ such that 0 < n′ < n and that the execution of
n′ contracts is profit maximizing. Although the existence of a profit maximizing
quantity has yet to be shown, it is assumed that it exists here.
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− z(n)ψ(1 + iD)
]









− nz(n)ψ(1 + iD) (5.40)






− z(n)pt(1 + iD) + δ − z(n)φ(1 + iD)
]
+ (n− n′)[k − z(n)φ(1 + iD)− z(n)pt(1 + iD) + δ] (5.41)
In equilibrium, this reduces to:
−nz(n)ψ(1 + iD) = nk − nz(n)pt(1 + iD) + nδ − nz(n)φ(1 + iD) (5.42)
Which is:




For all long positions, where the endowment of cash is positive and sufficient
to cover the cost of the positions, the equilibrium condition is:




For subsequent cases, calculations of Case III are omitted as it is simply a
variation of coefficients from the above case due to different interest rates.
5.12.1.3 Equilibrium In Short Positions
Although the profit equations for long and short option positions are the additive
inverse of each other, this is not true for the long and short equity position. This
difference results in a bid-ask spread even without liquidity costs, such as where
λ = 0. The difference between the gross amount of a call price the market would
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be willing to pay, ψL, is greater than the insurer requires, ψS. This violates the law
of one price. It could be interpreted, however, that in equilibrium, the spread is
sufficient to support commissions to an insurance agent to link the parties together.
Proper understanding of this difference is that if this condition is the equi-
librium condition, then neither long nor short participants can form an arbitrage
position against the market maker if the market maker keeps the spread between
the prices.
CASE I:z(n)pT ≥ k
There are slight mathematical differences created by going from long to short,
but it is the short case which is critical from a policy making perspective. It is the
option writer that needs sufficient reserves to support the system. As the buyer
has no method to inspect the writers, indeed, in the American over the counter
market exercise by long holders is exercised by random assignment, it is dependent
upon the market makers to set adequate reserve and collateral requirements.










− z(n)pT − δ (5.45)
This resolves to:
ψ = φ+ pt
1− iL
1 + iD
− k + δ
1 + iD
z(n) (5.46)
CASE II&III For economy of space, the calculations are omitted for the other
cases as they also resolve to equation 5.46.
5.12.2 No Endowment
In this state of nature, it is assumed that m̄ = 0. Further it is assumed that the
participants have sufficient access to credit as to be able to make purchases at an
interest cost of iL. The profit function, should no action be taken to enter into a
position, is:
Πm̄=0 = 0 (5.47)
The profit functions of this state of nature are in table 5.3.
There are slight differences in this state of nature from the large endowment
state. In order to enter into a long position the participant has to borrow funds
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Type of Position Formula for Profit Function
Long Call ∆ΠCL(n) = nmax(0,
pT
z(n)
− k)− nz(n)ψ(1 + iL)
Long Put ∆ΠPL(n) = nmax(0, k − z(n)pT )− nz(n)φ(1 + iL)
Long Equity Position ∆ΠSL(n) =
n
z(n)
pT − nz(n)pt(1 + iL) + nδ 1+iL1+iD
Short Call ∆ΠCS (n) =
n
z(n)
ψ(1 + iD)− nmax(0, z(n)pT − k)
Short Put ∆ΠPS (n) =
n
z(n)
φ(1 + iD)− nmax(0, k − pTz(n))
Short Equity Position ∆ΠSS(n) =
n
z(n)
pt(1− iL)− nz(n)pT − nδ 1+iL1+iD
Table 5.3. Profit Functions Given Sufficiently Large Cash Endowments
and so costs are marked up by the interest rate. This is opposite the short side
where any money received goes to a deposit account. There is also a difference in
both equity positions.
In both equity positions δ is a future value. In a long equity position the receipt
of dividends would pay down the debt from the purchase and so must be discounted
back to present value so it can earn the commercial loan rate of interest. In the
short equity position passed dividends are no longer paid from an endowment of
cash. As such, passed dividends must be paid from borrowings at the commercial
loan rate. As δ is defined with reference to the deposit rate, it must first be
discounted back to the present value to be costed out at the commercial loan rate.
Basic algebra confirms that the results will be of the same form, but with
different coefficients. For the long position, all cases result in the equilibrium
formula:






For the short position, all cases result in the formula:
ψ = φ+ pt
1− iL
1 + iD
− k(1 + iD) + δ(1 + iL)
(1 + iD)2
z(n) (5.49)
5.12.3 Large Endowment of Debt
In this state of nature, it is assumed that m̄  0. It is assumed that the partici-
pants have sufficient access to credit facilities as to be able to make purchases at
an interest cost of iL. It is further assumed that no cash revenue is sufficient to
entirely pay down the debt to a positive cash position. The profit function, should
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no action be taken to enter into a position, is:
Πm̄0 = −iLm̄ (5.50)
The profit functions of this state of nature are in table 5.4.
Type of Position Formula for Profit Function
Long Call ∆ΠCL(n) = nmax(0,
pT
z(n)
− k)− nz(n)ψ(1 + iL)
Long Put ∆ΠPL(n) = nmax(0, k − z(n)pT )− nz(n)φ(1 + iL)
Long Equity Position ∆ΠSL(n) =
n
z(n)
pT − nz(n)pt(1 + iL) + nδ 1+iL1+iD
Short Call ∆ΠCS (n) =
n
z(n)
ψ(1 + iL)− nmax(0, z(n)pT − k)
Short Put ∆ΠPS (n) =
n
z(n)
φ(1 + iL)− nmax(0, k − pTz(n))
Short Equity Position ∆ΠSS(n) =
n
z(n)
pt(1− iL)− nz(n)pT − nδ 1+iL1+iD
Table 5.4. Profit Functions Given Sufficiently Large Cash Endowments
This state of nature is distinguished by all transactions either paying down
debt or increasing debt. As such, the deposit rate only appears in the discounting
of dividends. The equilibrium equation for the long position in this state is:






The equation for the short position is:








This state of nature is important as it describes the state of nature for the
hedge fund industry.
5.12.4 Small Endowment of Cash
In the case where the participant begins with a small endowment of cash, but wishes
to make purchases that require the acquisition of debt for profit maximization, it
is best to think in terms of the marginal transaction.
This transaction is a single transaction and so is at a single price. The value
of the position has to be sufficient to make it worth going into debt to accomplish
the purchase. This permits two ways to think about the problem. One would be
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to blend the profit function between the deposit and the loan rates. The other
would be to concern oneself only with the marginal transaction.
The blended method, while a correct profit function, doesn’t represent the last
dollar spent. The marginal long position is the same as the wholly indebted state,
while the short position is like the large endowment of cash state.
At the margin, this is no different than the no endowment state, that is m̄ = 0.
As such, the equilibrium conditions are the same as for that state.
5.12.5 Small Endowment of Debt
In this case, the participant begins with a small endowment of debt. Long pur-
chases result in greater debt, but short positions more than pay off the debt. In
that case, the participant is actually deciding that the overall position is no longer
valuable enough to warrant carrying debt to maintain it.
As in the small endowment of cash state, at the margin, the result is the same
as the no endowment state, that is m̄ = 0.
5.13 Dominant Pricing
The equilibrium prices for the various endowments for call options are shown in
table 5.5.
Endowment Short Formula Long Formula
m̄ 0 ψ = φ+ pt 1−iL1+iD −
k+δ
1+iD
z(n) ψ = φ+ pt − k+δz(n)(1+iD)
m̄ ≈ 0 ψ = φ+ pt 1−iL1+iD −
k(1+iD)+δ(1+iL)
(1+iD)2
z(n) ψ = φ+ pt − kz(n)(1+iL) −
δ
z(n)(1+iD)





ψ = φ+ pt − kz(n)(1+iL) −
δ
z(n)(1+iD)
Table 5.5. Endowment Specific Equilibrium Pricing for Call Options
5.13.1 Put Contracts
The formula for φ is simpler and less diverse than the call option. As those who
have an endowment of debt have a higher discount rate, then they are willing to
accept a lower price. As such, the lowest price wins the contract on the short
side. The simple interpretation is that those who are willing to accept significant
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amounts of debt on their balance sheets are willing to accept smaller premiums to
pay for risks.
For those endowed with cash to write a contract at the higher price either
implies that those participants endowed with debt have reached their equilibrium
balance sheet and/or credit restrictions prevent further underwriting.
This implies that hedge funds and financial institutions should dominate the
market for writing put contracts.
The long put is priced by symmetry as z(n)φ. As the price in the normal state
is low, all types of endowments should be willing to buy long put contracts.
5.13.2 Long Call Contracts
For those willing to carry debt to buy long call contracts, the reservation price is
greater than the reservation price for those unwilling to carry debt. This, of course,
makes sense. Someone carrying debt would find insurance to be of greater value.
A leveraged loss is magnified by the proportion the balance sheet is leveraged.
5.13.3 Short Call Contracts
The reservation price for φ for those not heavily indebted is greater than for those
who are heavily indebted. Since coherence would require participants willing to
enter into either side of the position, either call or put plus a loan, the presence
of heavily indebted parties willing to underwrite contracts should preclude the
other two sets of endowment pricing from becoming operative. This is due to the
unwillingness to compete with indebted parties to underwrite puts.
If the case exists where heavily indebted parties are no longer willing to under-
write call or put contracts, then those near zero would offer lower prices than those
heavily endowed with cash. Only in the case where parties are unwilling to incur
increased debt in order to underwrite contracts, as those near zero are required to
do when shorting stocks and shorting dividends, will those heavily endowed with
cash be able to get their reservation price. Of course the market maker, as an
indebted party, would lose money on each transferred risk. So either this state
does not exist, or it appears in the run state. Cash rich investors appear when
there is blood in the street or when the government bails out the system.
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5.14 Speculators
Allowing risk loving actors into the game is not disruptive on the long side as a risk
loving actor would be willing to pay a higher premium than a risk averse person
for the right to purchase a gamble. It is disruptive on the short side of the market.
Risk loving individuals will pay a premium for each gamble, in effect guar-
anteeing that their wealth will go to zero given enough time. This implies that
risk loving individuals, given enough time, will default on option contracts at high
rates.
In markets with nationally insured banks a market maker would love to accept
the higher than normal option prices from risk loving buyers and sell options at
unusually large discounts to risk loving sellers. Until the market craters the makers
will make unusually wide profits. The collapse of the writers would result in the
collapse of the market makers, but this no longer is the case under too big to fail
doctrines. In that case, the shareholders of the market makers keep the unusually
wide profits, but get recapitalized to do it again from risk averse tax payers.
Two remedies to this are to require minimum regulatory option premiums with
prudential regulations similar in form to that found in the insurance and reinsur-
ance industry. The alternative is to have a no bailout provision in constitutional
law. The challenge of the no bailout provision is that it could be an incredibly
costly solution.
5.15 Expected Profit as a Negative Bayesian Risk
Function
The expected profit of the short put has a representation as a negative Bayesian
risk function. Focusing on the expected profit of the short put can also be thought
of as part of a decision rule.
A decision rule that states, subject to n, the market maker will buy or sell
contracts or the underlying instruments at a stated price implies the market maker
is indifferent among the choices.
Such a decision implies a rule exists whereupon the market maker maintains a
free substitution among actions, a, a′.
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This warrants another look at the profit function. Note that an equivalent
proof could be constructed using the Envelope Theorem.





φ(n)(1 + iX)− nmax
(




The market maker must accept no less than this minimum amount, although in
most circumstances, the market maker received more revenue. This is the minimum
net revenue function for the market maker and the revenue function for a writer.
Redefining the change in profit function as the loss function for a decision rule
and noting the dependence on the parameters it is:
L(θ, δ, n) = −∆ΠPS (n,θ) (5.54)
Defining f(pT |θ) as the predictive distribution for a given set of parameters,
the risk function from definition 11 becomes nothing more than the negative of the
expected profit function as the risk is:
R(θ, δ, n) =
∫ ∞
0
L(θ, δ, n)f(pT |θ)dpT (5.55)
Noting that the option prices were priced with reference for chosen values of
the parameter set, it must be noted that the true values of the parameter set are
unknown. Instead, market makers price contracts based on their beliefs about the
true values. So, while it is necessary for the underwriter to price with regard to n,
they must do so based on their beliefs which are random variables.
If π(θ) is the posterior density function then the Bayes risk associated with the
decision strategy is:





[L(θ, δ, n)f(pT |θ)dpT ]π(θ)dθ (5.56)
Note that the random variate, θ no longer exists as a variable as it has been
marginalized out. Notice also that utility of choosing which specific action to
choose is gone as well. Further, the final price no longer influences decisions. Only
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three variables remain, the decision rule, the posterior density and n. For a given
data set, π has a fixed functional form. It can be treated as an invariant function
at any arbitrarily chosen time, t.
So, given time t, the Bayes risk transforms into:
r(δ, n). (5.57)
A decision rule where the decision maker always chooses the value of n∗ that
maximizes profitability also always minimizes Bayes risk. A couple of observations
also appear to be in order regarding the admissibility of n∗. First, the posterior
should be unimodal in the individual parameters, although that isn’t strictly nec-
essary. Further, if a profit function exists then it provides a positive expected
profit. This is just a requirement of rationality, otherwise the market maker would
withdraw and no activity would happen. From the formula above, however, note














So n∗ is a positive real number and a Bayes estimator. If there are multiple
values that maximize profit then they have equivalent risk functions and as the
risk is minimized they are all admissible. It is improbable that the estimate of n∗
will be multimodal, given whatever data there is, and as such is likely a unique
Bayes estimator.
5.16 Conclusion
Leveraged institutions will, in most circumstances, set the price. Although this
model would allow for an array of prices, it should be leveraged firms that are the
price setters.
This model is rather simple. Integrate over the area at risk, find the expecta-
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tion, subtract expected value from the strike price. Discount that value to present
value, account for dividends, and set the price of calls as an equilibrium with
puts. None of that is actually very difficult as concepts. The implementation is
challenging, but the concepts are simple.
Pricing American style options requires the knowledge of as yet unknown math-
ematics. There isn’t a continuous time model for paths that look like the models
presented here. That should not be a problem as there is a very simple discrete
solution.
The American style option allows exercise any time within the contract period.
For a one year contract, the only requirement is estimating the probability of early
exercise for each day in the contract time period. For a one year option contract,
given there are around 255 trading days, this would be the same as calculating 255
options, each one day longer than the last and adjusting for the likelihood of early
exercise.
Asian style options require greater statistical theory than may be present. Asian
style options are based on the sample mean of prices over the period. As the
underlying has no mean, and as the sample mean is a Cauchy distributed random
variable, significant work will need to be performed. By not fixing the strike price,
but setting it at the average price a significant challenge is posed in attempting to
price them.
A further challenge comes in pricing interest rate options, commodities and
more exotic items such as weather derivatives. Not touched were the prices for
futures and forwards contracts. A lot of work needs to be performed to complete
this set of option contracts.
CHAPTER
SIX




Empirical testing of the proposed model requires some boundary conditions on
the sampling period and commentary on both the data an any prior distributions.
Only the estimation of one-year at-the-money equity put contracts were considered
as the alternative would have required substantial additional estimation. Because
of the inability to access certain information due to its non-public nature, the test
is necessarily restricted.
In particular, liquidity information regarding option contracts is proprietary
information of the market makers and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion. Attempts to acquire such data were rebuffed. Further, actual trading data
on option prices is not available. As such, only a test of future values given the
implicit liquidity costs and theoretical option prices can be constructed.
As the model only requires the estimation of expected values over bounded
regions a substantial amount of estimation normally required in Bayesian method-
ologies can be avoided. Some important limitations were introduced for compu-
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tational simplicity. In particular, many tools in standard use in the field, such
as logistic regression, were avoided due to the computational cost this creates
for Bayesian updating. This implies that better models could be created for any
significant component of the model; but, as computational time and memory allo-
cation were important , choices were made in favor of computational efficiency over
mathematical efficiency. Indeed the author chose to follow the advice of Frederick
Mosteller regarding computational efficiency.
Until recently mathematical statisticians have spent a great deal of
effort developing “efficient statistics” and “most powerful tests.” This
concentration of effort has often led to neglect of questions of economy.
Indeed some may have confused the meaning of technical statistical
terms “efficient” and “efficiency” with the layman’s concept of their
meaning. No matter how much energetic activity is put into analysis
and computation, it seems reasonable to inquire whether the output of
information is comparable in value to the input measured in dollars,
man-hours or otherwise.[66]
Necessarily then this implies that the test of the model should be noisier than
a more efficient and better model. Although the model is admissible when com-
pared to an equivalent Frequentist model, the model may not be admissible when
compared to a superior Bayesian or Frequentist model. Further, as is necessary in
any Bayesian model, choices regarding prior distributions and their hyperparame-
ters were arbitrary. That said, they are an honest attempt to model the views of
the author. It is necessary to model bankruptcy risk, merger risk and the density
function for returns given the various possible states of the world that could be
present in the future.
If a proof that the sample mean was a sufficient statistic for the expectation of
any Lebesgue-integrable, bounded, but unknown distribution then a distribution-
free solution naturally follows. The author was unable to find such a proof and
did not spend any time trying to create such a proof. Nonetheless, if it does or
can exist, then a wide range of possible alternatives exists.
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6.2 Bankruptcy Estimation
Bankruptcy represents the simplest of the estimation problems present in the
model. Because of how bankruptcy is defined, a party is either bankrupt or they
are not. This makes the likelihood function the binomial distribution. Because the
data set is so large this provides two alternative ways to model the prior and the
likelihood.
First, the normal approximation to the binomial could be used and a normal
or uniform prior could be used. As the only concern is the expectation, either
tool would result in the same solution with the difference only being one of com-
putational complexity. Second, the beta distribution could be used as the prior
distribution resulting in a beta distribution as the posterior distribution. As the
maximum a posteriori estimator of the expectation would be the same either way,
the beta posterior was used due to some simplifications available regarding model
selection.
The data used was the Compustat data set of quarterly and annual financial
data, the CRSP data set for security prices and the final disposition of a security,
and Gross Domestic Product data for the United States as produced by the Bureau
of Economic Analysis. As bankruptcy data goes back to the beginning of the CRSP
data in 1925, Compustat data does not become available until January 1962. As
such a prior was created based on CRSP data alone, unconditioned on either
accounting or Gross Domestic Product data.
6.2.1 Bankruptcy Data from 1925-1961
For most of the period, the CRSP data set primarily included only the largest
firms in the United States. As such, these firms were also the least likely to go
bankrupt and so a prior distribution based only upon this data would tend to skew
the prior probability downward. This forces one of two possible choices.
The first choice is to discard the data as non-representative of the data. The
challenge with this choice is that it requires discarding the data from the Great
Depression and World War II. Although these are not representative events in
American history, ignoring them requires ignoring periods of tremendous financial
and social stress. The second choice is to include the data, but to reduce its weight
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in some manner that can easily be objectionable. There is no way to weight the
value of this data objectively as there is no alternative reference set to norm it
against.
Nonetheless, some general principles were used to alter the weight of the prior
distribution, though the subjective nature of the decisions involved in dosing is
unavoidable. A goal of minimizing the impact of objections, while preserving
information was used.
Alternatives to weighting including creating a mixture distribution of the beta
distribution and the uniform distribution, or mixing the beta distribution with
data from the bond markets as to bankruptcy rates for the period. The later
choice has to be excluded for empirical reasons. As mentioned before, bond data
does not seem responsive to actual realizations of default rates and so there is no
evidence that bond data will be adequate to gather short run bankruptcy data.[97]
The former choice results in an objectionable choice of weights.
There is a non-trivial problem that could be created by ignoring the data from
the Depression and using some alternative, weakly informative prior such as the
triangular distribution, the Haldane distribution or the uniform distribution. That
problem is that some combinations of accounting data should result in a prior
sample with absolutely no observations of bankruptcy. Although this post 1961
group of firms represents real data, from the viewpoint of pre-1962 data, especially
the Great Depression, it seems implausible that the resulting prior distributions
would be credible to anyone.
Consider them in order of the implied number of observations, remembering
that extreme combinations of observations are relatively rare and that accounting
data is only quarterly data at best. Under the Haldane prior any observation of
no bankruptcies in a subgroup during the period prior to the sample period but
after 1961 would result in an expectation of a zero percent chance of bankruptcy.
This implies that there are firms where it is impossible for bankruptcy to happen,
even during periods of extreme financial stress. Because some combinations of
accounting data are rare, it may not be surprising to find zero bankruptcies in one
hundred observations. That does not mean that the true bankruptcy rate is zero,
merely that none were observed.
For the uniform prior, with one hundred observations, the implicit bankruptcy
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rate for the rarely observed group would be 0.99%. For the triangular prior the
expectation would be 0.97%. The role of the prior would be very strong and would
determine the implicit rate of bankruptcy.
For subgroups with few observations, the impact of the prior upon the posterior
distribution is unavoidable. For the author, the choice came down to discarding
data from periods of extreme stress and choosing a reasonable but weak informative
prior distribution.
The author chose a rather simple method, similar in substance to a maximum
entropy method. Two rules were used. The first rule is that the expectation of
the observed bankruptcies would be preserved in close approximation. The second
rule is that the variance would be maximized, while maintaining a proper density,





number of observed bankruptcies
number of survivals
, α ≡ 1 (6.1)
The maximum entropy method, unconditioned on prior information would be
the uniform distribution. Values of α, β < 1 guarantee negative entropy values.
However the method of maximum entropy is built around constraints that are
verifiable in data. This differs from the method of maximum entropy primarily
by enforcing the use of integers instead of the gamma function. Factorial based
solutions are not difficult in SAS, the gamma function generalizes factorials and is
computationally expensive. The resulting prior distribution has less entropy than
the true maximum entropy value. The second reason the difference matters less
is that this element of the prior distribution is only weighted ten percent, to be
discussed below.
There were 10,827,796 observed firm-days in the period. Each day a recorded
firm existed in the data set is counted as one firm-day. There were 34,310 observed
firm days where bankruptcy is observed within one year of the observation date.
Rounded to the nearest integer, this implies a beta distribution where α = 1 and
β = 315.
This gives a density function for the largest firms of:
Pr(bankruptcy) = 315(1− p)314 (6.2)
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The author chose to give this prior data a weight of ten percent and a uniform
distribution the weight of ninety percent. Although there is some arbitrariness in
the choice, it was selected by keeping the properties of other data in the future
sample in mind. In particular, the sample size would grow to about ten times
the original sample size in the data. Although the average weighting should be
less, there is another property of the sample that needed attended to, that of
size. As time has passed since the passage of the Securities Acts during the Great
Depression and due to technological changes in trading and accounting costs, the
relative size of the firm traded in the capital markets has fell pretty dramatically.
As smaller firms have greater exposure to regional crisis they should be at
greater risk of failure, how much greater is unclear. Further, partitioning on ac-
counting and economic data should result in important differences in rates. Using
these rules results in a beta prior distribution of:
Pr(bankruptcy) = 32(1− p)31 (6.3)
Graphically, the density function for the probability density of the prior distri-
bution of bankruptcy, unconditioned upon accounting data is peaked at zero and
falls off quickly to the asymptote.
Figure 6.1. Probability Density Function for the Prior Probability of Bankruptcy.
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In the form of an expectation, this results in an expected bankruptcy rate of
approximately 3.03%. For the above example of one hundred observations of no
bankruptcies the expected rate would be 0.76%. While this is substantially lower
than the prior expectation used, it is about twice the historical rate observed during
the period. It also has the virtue of granting at least some weight out into the
low twenty percent region. If the accounting data is in fact a valuable predictor of
bankruptcy rates, then some large rates should be expected.
Further, if the prior distribution is inappropriate, then this could be an impor-
tant factor in the falsification of the proposed model.
6.2.2 Bankruptcy Data from January 1962-June 1990
Beginning in 1962 both Gross Domestic Product(GDP) data and accounting data
were incorporated into the estimation of bankruptcy rates. As with the study by
Sun and Shenoy, Pearson-Tukey groups were constructed. Unlike the Sun and
Shenoy research missing data were not reconstructed using an alternate layer of
data that was correlated with the underlying data. Rather, the models with the
largest posterior density were used where the data was available and then combined
using model averaging. If information sufficient for one model but not the other
existed then only one model was used. If the accounting information for the models
with greatest posterior density was missing then estimation was done without
accounting data. If no accounting data was available, then only GDP was used
to estimate the rate of bankruptcy. The models were constructed using Pearson-
Tukey groupings of change in quarterly GDP and pairings of dissimilar accounting
ratios.
This methodology has a number of weaknesses. First, industry groups were
ignored. While this was done for computational simplicity, it is quite probable that
larger industry groupings may have been an important variable. Second, the model
choice was frozen on June 30, 1990 to minimize computation. This prohibits drift
in the model when drift may be called for. Third, it presumes a unique equilibrium
for all industries and that this equilibrium is the same; implying the true model
does not change with changing technologies and social circumstances. Fourth, it
ignores security prices. While this avoids the “cart before the horse,” problem it
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ignores an important form of data.
Because of both inflation and the increase in firm diversity with time, raw
accounting data is difficult to compare over time. Accounting ratios normalize the
data with respect to inflation, but not with respect to the increasing diversity.
Restructuring accounting ratios into quantile data reduces the magnitude of the
diversity effect. By grouping the quantiles of the ratios into Pearson-Tukey groups
the tails and the body are accounted for.
Because accounting data is strongly correlated by design, there is little inde-
pendent information in various combinations of data. The variables used carry
correlations, measured as Pearson product moment correlation coefficients, of be-
tween 0.60 and 0.96. By partitioning the data into mutually exclusive sets the
problem of orthogonality is resolved.
Four groups of accounting ratios were used with a rule that no model would use
a pairing within the same class of accounting ratios. The list of classes and ratios
are in table 6.1. Since there is no reason to believe any combinations of ratios are
any better than any other, a uniform prior is set over each of the seventy-eight
combinations. Generally speaking Bayesian methods should exhaust the model
space and as such, sets with one ratio each would normally be considered.
Class of Ratios Ratio
Profit Net Margin
Margins Gross Margin
Return Return on Equity
Ratios Return on Assets
Return on Net Assets
Debt Debt to Equity
Ratios Debt Ratio




Turnover Earning Power Ratio
Ratios Asset Turnover
Receivable Conversion
Table 6.1. List of Ratio Classes with Members of the Classes
This was not done as the implications for firms reporting just enough data
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to only calculate a single ratio have doubtful accounting data anyway. It is also
possible to remove GDP as an element of the data, however this was not done for
theoretical reasons.
Although it would be unsurprising to see accounting data vary with GDP data,
the accounting data has been contemporaneously ranked. As such, the effect of a
low ratio in one period may very well be considered a high ratio in another. This
would be lost with accounting ranks. GDP is captured to reflect uncertainty and
errors of actors outside the firm and as such is a latent variable.
Bayesian model averaging was used among the highest probability models, se-
lecting the smallest number of models to cover the densest 99% region of the model
space. Bayesian model averaging works by weighting a parameter of interest, in
this case the probability of bankruptcy, by the probability that the model is the
true model, normalized to one.
For example, if the first model predicts a 5% chance of bankruptcy and the
second model predicts a 10% chance of bankruptcy, the probability of bankruptcy
would be weighted by the probability either model is the true model. If there were
a 60% chance the first model was correct then the expectation of the two models
is:
.05× .6 + .10× .4 = .07 (6.4)
Since the true model is unknown, information is captured from both models
through a blended posterior density function. As this dissertation is only concerned
with expectations, this somewhat more robust view is lost.
For observations where the accounting ratios are missing for both models, then
only GDP is used as a factor.
The model containing the current ratio and the accounts receivable conversion
period had a posterior probability of 53.163% This was marginally better than
the model containing the net profit margin and the return on assets, which had
a posterior probability of 46.829%. The probability that one of the two models
is a fair representation of the true model, given the model restrictions and the
data, is 99.992%. As such, the probability that any one of the remaining seventy-
six models is a fair representation of the true model is only one-one hundred and
twenty-fifth of one percent. As this is outside the credible set, they are excluded
from the model construction.
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The resulting partitions and their associated parameter estimates, where α and
β are the prior parameters, k is the number of bankruptcies observed and n is the
total number of observations are presented in Table 6.2. Fundamentally, this
model deals with two things, the ability to fund current operations and the speed
with which delayed payments are received. Interestingly, one must look at the
empirical data to make good predictions. For example, a firm with a poor ability
to finance its current operations from its own assets, with slow repayment by its








Change in GDP α β k n Expected
Probability of
Bankruptcy
Low Low Strong Downward Shock 1 32 0 540 0.17%
Low Low Midrange 1 32 4919 100699 4.88%
Low Low Strong Upward Shock 1 32 459 6042 7.57%
Low Medium Strong Downward Shock 1 32 450 6480 6.92%
Low Medium Midrange 1 32 44130 456465 9.67%
Low Medium Strong Upward Shock 1 32 3272 40840 8.01%
Low High Strong Downward Shock 1 32 0 90 0.81%
Low High Midrange 1 32 4908 34568 14.19%
Low High Strong Upward Shock 1 32 331 2691 12.19%
Medium Low Strong Downward Shock 1 32 450 11165 4.03%
Medium Low Midrange 1 32 34859 890758 3.91%
Medium Low Strong Upward Shock 1 32 2912 54570 5.33%
Medium Medium Strong Downward Shock 1 32 6030 124957 4.83%
Medium Medium Midrange 1 32 319793 9234218 3.46%
Medium Medium Strong Upward Shock 1 32 22514 486126 4.63%
Medium High Strong Downward Shock 1 32 810 3960 20.31%
Medium High Midrange 1 32 29325 366148 8.01%
Medium High Strong Upward Shock 1 32 1546 20652 7.48%
High Low Strong Downward Shock 1 32 0 900 0.11%
High Low Midrange 1 32 2093 65369 3.20%
High Low Strong Upward Shock 1 32 181 5392 3.35%
High Medium Strong Downward Shock 1 32 450 9396 4.78%
High Medium Midrange 1 32 21836 1005458 2.17%
High Medium Strong Upward Shock 1 32 2369 67300 3.52%
High High Strong Downward Shock 1 32 0 90 0.81%
High High Midrange 1 32 1555 64726 2.40%
High High Strong Upward Shock 1 32 90 2183 4.11%
Table 6.2. Bankruptcy Prior for Current Ratio and Rec. Conversion Period
This somewhat counter-intuitive result isn’t surprising if one assumes the man-
agement of such firms are proactive in managing their assets. While such a firm
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should be struggling just to meet payroll, the management would rationally seek a
line of credit to smooth out current operations and this very line of credit permits
a firm to make only minimal payments from their own operations. It isn’t safe
to stereotype combinations of data without looking at why that data likely ex-
ists. The ability to get others to finance current operations allows management to
extend longer credit to customers and to turn over cash and its equivalents quickly.
The alternative model uses two highly correlated measures, the net profit mar-
gin and the return on assets. Certain combinations of data are impossible in this
pairing. It is impossible for a firm with the highest operating losses to also have the
highest returns on assets. Because of this internal correlation, it is the differences
between the measures that are informative. The sole difference is various forms
of leverage. A firm can have a low net margin but an extremely high return on
assets if the firm is highly leveraged. The model implicitly measures profitability
as a function of leverage.
The prior distribution for the alternative model can be found in Table 6.3.
Finally, the prior for the distribution for the case where no accounting data exists






Change in GDP α β k n Expected
Probability of
Bankruptcy
Low Low Sharp Decline 1 32 990 4505 21.84%
Low Low Midrange 1 32 98013 637046 15.38%
Low Low Sharp Increase 1 32 12101 77972 15.51%
Low Medium Sharp Decline 1 32 270 900 29.05%
Low Medium Midrange 1 32 16578 166359 9.96%
Low Medium Sharp Increase 1 32 270 3916 6.86%
Medium Low Sharp Decline 1 32 720 3240 22.03%
Medium Low Midrange 1 32 18509 160367 11.54%
Medium Low Sharp Increase 1 32 457 4594 9.90%
Medium Medium Sharp Decline 1 32 6210 140662 4.41%
Medium Medium Midrange 1 32 346706 11002330 3.15%
Medium Medium Sharp Increase 1 32 20487 561672 3.65%
Medium High Sharp Decline 1 32 270 11160 2.42%
Medium High Midrange 1 32 18702 900047 2.08%
Medium High Sharp Increase 1 32 1458 54068 2.70%
High Low Midrange 1 32 272 1273 20.90%
High Medium Sharp Decline 1 32 180 5940 3.03%
High Medium Midrange 1 32 11604 660855 1.76%
High Medium Sharp Increase 1 32 725 45895 1.58%
High High Sharp Decline 1 32 180 4230 4.25%
High High Midrange 1 32 10068 451823 2.23%
High High Sharp Increase 1 32 910 24899 3.65%
Table 6.3. Bankruptcy Prior for Net Margin and ROA
Change in GDP α β k n Expected
Probability of
Bankruptcy
Sharp Decline 1 32 1286 18813 6.83%
Midrange 1 32 110171 8596956 1.28%
Sharp Increase 1 32 4276 357635 1.20%
Table 6.4. Bankruptcy Prior When Missing Accounting Data
6.3 Merger Estimation
Sample based objections to merger estimation that were applicable to Bankruptcy
estimation are equally applicable to merger estimation. As with bankruptcy esti-
mation, logit/probit style models were not used. Rather, a similar mechanism as
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was used for bankruptcy estimation was used for merger rate estimation. This was
due to the computational expense created by high frequency Bayesian updating of
probit or logit models. Any generalized linear model is computationally expensive
in SAS when Bayesian methods are used. They almost always involve Markov
Chain Monte Carlo methods and create a non-analytic posterior. As such, there
is no convenient way to program the past posterior distributions into becoming
future prior distributions. This is a significant limitation. It is hard to argue
that a better model could not be formed. There is no dispute here of that claim.
The question here is the noise sufficiently large as to make the estimation method
unreliable.
6.3.1 Merger Data Prior to 1962
Prior to 1962 there were 78,110 observed firm-days within 365 days of the merger
date. The complementary set had 10,749,686 firm-days of observations. Using the
same rule as in the bankruptcy model, holding α constant to one and rounding β
to the nearest integer to allow the use of factorials instead of the gamma function
to permit computational ease, the resulting posterior distribution should be:
Pr(merger) = 139(1− p)138 (6.5)
However, as with the bankruptcy data, the firms in this period are the large
compared to the sample which includes non-exchange traded securities. As such,
it was weighted 10% with 90% going to a uniform distribution resulting in a prior
for the post-1961 period of
Pr(merger) = 16(1− p)15 (6.6)
This results in an expected merger rate of 6.25%. As it turns out, this very sub-
stantially overstates the risk of merger in most circumstances. This overstatement
is somewhat ameliorated by the shape of the beta distribution which favors smaller
probabilities over larger probabilities. Nonetheless, it tends toward overstatement.
Because of the shape of the prior, the likelihood and the prior do very substantially
overlap, but the expectation given the 1962-1990 sample is overstated. The effect
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is generally small due to sample size in the 1962-1990 period.
6.3.2 Merger Data 1962-June 30, 1990
Mergers were either calculated conditioned only on pre-1962 counts or conditioned
on prior information and accounting data. If the full set of accounting data was
present then it was used with pre-1962 count data as represented in Eq. 6.6. If
there was missing accounting information then only the count based prior was used
from Eq. 6.6.
6.3.2.1 Merger Risk January 1, 1962-June 30, 1990 With Missing Ac-
counting Data
The count of firm-days happening within 365 days of a merger were 396,243 where
accounting data was missing. The complementary set had 9,598,954 firm-days.
The posterior expected probability of a merger, given the prior and the existence
of missing accounting data, was 3.964%. Given that the unit of accuracy is one
tenth of one basis point the maximum likelihood estimator of the mean and the
posterior expectation are indistinguishable.
6.3.2.2 Financials Versus Non-Financials
SIC codes are an industry classification system designed by the Bureau of the
Census to make coding and classification simple. The CRSP data set capture SIC
code data as daily data. As firms are free to change their classification at any time,
CRSP updates it on a daily basis.
As the literature specifies that financials and non-financials should expect a
reversed impact of leverage, the data is partitioned using SIC codes into financial
and non-financial firms.
6.3.2.3 Other Factors
Three other variables were used to estimate merger risk. The factors are firm size,
asset efficiency and leverage.
The book value of common equity was used as a proxy for firm size. There are
other possible candidates for the estimation of firm size including gross assets, total
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revenue, total net income, total pre-tax income and market capitalization. Except
for market capitalization which takes share price into account, the remaining meth-
ods are accounting based methods. As such, they are subject to any distortions
created by the rules of accounting. Market capitalization can be distorted by bull
and bear markets and so shares the problems of accounting based measures in
that systematic distortions can occur. The accounting value of common equity
does have one advantage, in the end, it is the segment of the balance sheet that
directly impacts shareholders in the long run. The book value of equity changes
slowly and so tends to rank firms in about the same location from year to year
relative to the other firms. The other measures are far less stable.
Return on assets was used as a measure of asset efficiency. As with all account-
ing measures distortions will happen, however, it is a proxy for the quality of firm
management. A firm that fails to utilize all of its assets will have inferior returns
as measured by the ratio. The measure also ignores the direct effect of leverage,
though it is impacted by diminishing returns from scale. Return on net assets or
return on common equity directly capture leverage effects in the measure.
Finally, the debt-to-equity ratio captures leverage directly for most types of
leverage. Again, the measure is far from perfect. Firms will move assets and
liabilities off their balance sheet for a variety of legitimate and illegitimate reasons.
Each of these measures were divided into Pearson-Tukey groups.
The prior distribution of the probability of merger given accounting data is:
Group DE ROA TEQ Alpha Beta k n Expected
Probability of
Merger
Financial -1 -1 -1 1 15 501 10159 4.93%
Financial -1 -1 0 1 15 0 4691 0.02%
Financial -1 -1 1 1 15 0 0 6.25%
Financial -1 0 -1 1 15 416 17663 2.36%
Financial -1 0 0 1 15 954 24505 3.89%
Financial -1 0 1 1 15 0 0 6.25%
Financial -1 1 -1 1 15 0 2113 0.05%
Financial -1 1 0 1 15 361 8621 4.19%
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Group DE ROA TEQ Alpha Beta k n Expected
Probability of
Merger
Financial -1 1 1 1 15 0 0 6.25%
Financial 0 -1 -1 1 15 0 10590 0.01%
Financial 0 -1 0 1 15 1126 49744 2.26%
Financial 0 -1 1 1 15 0 1652 0.06%
Financial 0 0 -1 1 15 92 15118 0.61%
Financial 0 0 0 1 15 18150 701014 2.59%
Financial 0 0 1 1 15 4021 137886 2.92%
Financial 0 1 -1 1 15 0 2878 0.03%
Financial 0 1 0 1 15 1463 69985 2.09%
Financial 0 1 1 1 15 91 2653 3.45%
Financial 1 -1 -1 1 15 0 7242 0.01%
Financial 1 -1 0 1 15 340 27600 1.23%
Financial 1 -1 1 1 15 0 3768 0.03%
Financial 1 0 -1 1 15 277 8746 3.17%
Financial 1 0 0 1 15 23915 967363 2.47%
Financial 1 0 1 1 15 5765 285635 2.02%
Financial 1 1 -1 1 15 91 781 11.54%
Financial 1 1 0 1 15 93 1647 5.65%
Financial 1 1 1 1 15 0 0 6.25%
Non-
Financial
-1 -1 -1 1 15 5457 162033 3.37%
Non-
Financial
-1 -1 0 1 15 276 83548 0.33%
Non-
Financial
-1 -1 1 1 15 0 458 0.21%
Non-
Financial
-1 0 -1 1 15 10916 278967 3.91%
Non-
Financial
-1 0 0 1 15 10299 619024 1.66%
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-1 0 1 1 15 0 16330 0.01%
Non-
Financial
-1 1 -1 1 15 1943 72718 2.67%
Non-
Financial
-1 1 0 1 15 5739 331738 1.73%
Non-
Financial
-1 1 1 1 15 0 6888 0.01%
Non-
Financial
0 -1 -1 1 15 3732 187174 1.99%
Non-
Financial
0 -1 0 1 15 20279 975423 2.08%
Non-
Financial
0 -1 1 1 15 563 25897 2.18%
Non-
Financial
0 0 -1 1 15 4328 380492 1.14%
Non-
Financial
0 0 0 1 15 350565 12645401 2.77%
Non-
Financial
0 0 1 1 15 33135 1925713 1.72%
Non-
Financial
0 1 -1 1 15 1426 102961 1.39%
Non-
Financial
0 1 0 1 15 33133 1636463 2.02%
Non-
Financial
0 1 1 1 15 2170 141263 1.54%
Non-
Financial
1 -1 -1 1 15 1368 63585 2.15%
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1 -1 0 1 15 1810 74778 2.42%
Non-
Financial
1 -1 1 1 15 0 0 6.25%
Non-
Financial
1 0 -1 1 15 1951 72803 2.68%
Non-
Financial
1 0 0 1 15 15202 415382 3.66%
Non-
Financial
1 0 1 1 15 661 14361 4.60%
Non-
Financial
1 1 -1 1 15 0 10242 0.01%
Non-
Financial
1 1 0 1 15 410 21803 1.88%
Non-
Financial
1 1 1 1 15 0 823 0.12%
Table 6.5: Prior Probability of Merger Risk
6.4 Prior Distribution of Rewards of Investing
Given A Merger Will Happen
Given a merger will happen, a mixture distribution should be present. This mixture
should be different depending upon whether it was a merger for cash or for equity.
Mergers with a mix of cash and equity were treated as stock-for-stock mergers.
The logic being that the cash could be used to buy equity or could be treated as
a dividend.
As the distribution includes a skewed stable distribution without variance, the
author has two choices. The first is to describe the density function in terms of
series. This would be a computational nightmare in SAS, particularly given that
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the parameter values would have to vary.
The second solution takes advantage of the nature of the put contract. Its
expectation from zero to the strike price is approximated by the sample mean over
the same period. However, lacking an appropriate theorem, this useful observation
isn’t useful in Bayesian methodologies. Bayesian methodologies use estimates of
parameters and the likelihood function is unknown. Nonetheless, a solution does
present itself through discrete approximations of the integral.
By cutting the range into a histogram of small enough partitions, it is possible to
estimate the densities over the range of potential loss. Two potential mechanisms
exist to estimate the loss given both a merger happened and a loss happened. The
solutions are either to use a Dirichlet prior with a multinomial likelihood with
each histogram block being one partition of the multinomial distribution, or a
Normal-Wishart approximation.
The data used was CRSP data from December 31, 1925- June 30, 1990. A
choice then exists on the prior for this set of data. Use of a uniform distribution
does not make a lot of sense as it is clear that large losses should be rare and
that losses following announcement of the merger should also be rare. Further, the
Landau distribution would favor positive returns. As mergers should result from
purchases of undervalued assets returns should at least be slightly positive and the
variability is clearly unknown.
The Cauchy distribution where µ = 1.05 and σ = 1 multiplied by 2/3rds to
reduce the weight of losses and truncated at zero was used to create the prior nor-
mal mean of each partition. The standard deviation, to allow for simple updating
despite truncation, was taken as centered on µ/3.3 to place enough distance from
boundary conditions to minimize the distortion created in Bayesian updating.
One hundred rectangular partitions were created in the reward space from zero
to one. Although a polygon would slightly improve the estimate the partitions are
quite small and the effect is believed to be well below the unit of precision required.
The Multivariate Normal-Wishart distribution is a compound distribution of
the multivariate normal distribution and the Wishart distribution, which is a gen-
eralization of the Gamma distribution. The joint distribution is a four parameter
distribution.
Within the framework of the rules of probability, the joint prior probability of
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the mean and the precision µ and where Λ = Σ−1 is:
Pr(µ,Λ−1) = Pr(µ|Λ−1) Pr(Λ) (6.7)
The distribution of possible values of the mean, given a precision matrix, is
treated as the normal distribution, while the Wishart distribution is the distribu-
tion of possible precision matrices, the inverse of the covariance matrix. The two
remaining parameters can be thought of as a weight for the relative number of ob-
servations that the prior is treated as representing and the number of dimensions
minus one. The prior was given a weight equivalent to one observation while the
number of dimensions is 100 so the degrees of freedom are 99.
The prior for the probability an observation will be in a particular partition

























and a covariance of
σij = 0,∀i 6= j (6.10)
The covariance has no distribution as it is conditioned to be zero by construc-
tion.
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The observed frequencies were:
Return Prior Mean Count of Observations Posterior Mean
0.005 0.20% 708 0.14%
0.015 0.20% 348 0.07%
0.025 0.20% 488 0.10%
0.035 0.21% 189 0.04%
0.045 0.21% 507 0.10%
0.055 0.21% 810 0.16%
0.065 0.21% 743 0.15%
0.075 0.22% 545 0.11%
0.085 0.22% 681 0.13%
0.095 0.22% 352 0.07%
0.105 0.22% 402 0.08%
0.115 0.22% 397 0.08%
0.125 0.23% 399 0.08%
0.135 0.23% 209 0.04%
0.145 0.23% 427 0.08%
0.155 0.23% 531 0.11%
0.165 0.24% 426 0.08%
0.175 0.24% 354 0.07%
0.185 0.24% 395 0.08%
0.195 0.24% 351 0.07%
0.205 0.25% 399 0.08%
0.215 0.25% 325 0.06%
0.225 0.25% 386 0.08%
0.235 0.25% 312 0.06%
0.245 0.25% 502 0.10%
0.255 0.26% 448 0.09%
0.265 0.26% 350 0.07%
0.275 0.26% 427 0.08%
0.285 0.26% 516 0.10%
0.295 0.27% 503 0.10%
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Return Prior Mean Count of Observations Posterior Mean
0.305 0.27% 359 0.07%
0.315 0.27% 365 0.07%
0.325 0.28% 369 0.07%
0.335 0.28% 553 0.11%
0.345 0.28% 501 0.10%
0.355 0.28% 421 0.08%
0.365 0.29% 491 0.10%
0.375 0.29% 602 0.12%
0.385 0.29% 484 0.10%
0.395 0.29% 676 0.13%
0.405 0.30% 462 0.09%
0.415 0.30% 513 0.10%
0.425 0.30% 600 0.12%
0.435 0.30% 544 0.11%
0.445 0.31% 573 0.11%
0.455 0.31% 506 0.10%
0.465 0.31% 560 0.11%
0.475 0.32% 485 0.10%
0.485 0.32% 542 0.11%
0.495 0.32% 1107 0.22%
0.505 0.32% 504 0.10%
0.515 0.33% 576 0.11%
0.525 0.33% 547 0.11%
0.535 0.33% 722 0.14%
0.545 0.33% 685 0.14%
0.555 0.34% 652 0.13%
0.565 0.34% 547 0.11%
0.575 0.34% 721 0.14%
0.585 0.35% 656 0.13%
0.595 0.35% 691 0.14%
0.605 0.35% 770 0.15%
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Return Prior Mean Count of Observations Posterior Mean
0.615 0.35% 840 0.17%
0.625 0.36% 875 0.17%
0.635 0.36% 928 0.18%
0.645 0.36% 962 0.19%
0.655 0.36% 892 0.18%
0.665 0.37% 1172 0.23%
0.675 0.37% 914 0.18%
0.685 0.37% 1012 0.20%
0.695 0.37% 1079 0.21%
0.705 0.38% 1062 0.21%
0.715 0.38% 1297 0.26%
0.725 0.38% 1191 0.24%
0.735 0.38% 1160 0.23%
0.745 0.38% 1435 0.28%
0.755 0.39% 1355 0.27%
0.765 0.39% 1270 0.25%
0.775 0.39% 1385 0.27%
0.785 0.39% 1535 0.30%
0.795 0.39% 1676 0.33%
0.805 0.40% 1455 0.29%
0.815 0.40% 1562 0.31%
0.825 0.40% 1842 0.36%
0.835 0.40% 1950 0.39%
0.845 0.40% 1673 0.33%
0.855 0.40% 1836 0.36%
0.865 0.41% 1800 0.36%
0.875 0.41% 1798 0.36%
0.885 0.41% 1986 0.39%
0.895 0.41% 1913 0.38%
0.905 0.41% 1992 0.39%
0.915 0.41% 2157 0.43%
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Return Prior Mean Count of Observations Posterior Mean
0.925 0.41% 2312 0.46%
0.935 0.41% 2688 0.53%
0.945 0.42% 2595 0.51%
0.955 0.42% 2650 0.52%
0.965 0.42% 2778 0.55%
0.975 0.42% 3053 0.60%
0.985 0.42% 3473 0.69%
0.995 0.42% 6129 1.21%
Table 6.6: Table of Frequencies of Returns Given a
Merger
Generally, the prior overestimated the volume of loss, however as the number
of observations in each category is quite large, and the prior had the effect of only
being one observation in each category, the posterior and the maximum likelihood
estimate are identical out to the accuracy level desired. The difference between a
uniform prior and the Cauchy prior ended up being of the order of 10−7 or less.












where si is the sample standard deviation for the partition and x̄i is the sample
mean for the partition.
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Visually the posterior means of the merger data, with its Cauchy prior means
from zero to one graphically appear as:
Figure 6.2. Prior Distribution of Returns Given a Merger
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However if the prior were extended to out-of-the-money puts to include puts
at three hundred percent above the current price, then quite a different image
appears.
Figure 6.3. Prior Distribution for Mergers from 0 to 4
Its this image that makes the fact that it is a mixture distribution quite clear.
6.5 Prior Distribution of Rewards from Decem-
ber 31, 1925-June 30, 1990 for Going Con-
cerns
Because it is so clear from 1926 forward that the mode is one, the likelihood
function is conditioned on µ = 1. This leaves open only the question of the value
of σ. A search algorithm was created to place fine screen over the densest region.
The mode was found to 1
10
th of one basis point of σ. The 99% credible interval
is (0.24590,0.24627) The maximum a posteriori estimator is tied. The region of
highest density is (0.24602,0.24614).
Unfortunately, the standard method of updating the process over a parameter
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Figure 6.4. Prior Distribution of σ for Going Concerns
space was not computationally feasible using daily Bayesian updating. Daily up-
dating requires treating each day from July 1, 1990 to December 31, 2007 and treat
it as a sample. Bayes theorem is then applied daily. The uncertainty would be
marginalized out on a predictive distribution and an expected loss would form. To
accomplish this goal, quite a number of computational methods were tried. Ulti-
mately the same method as used for the unknown merger distribution was used as
it was computationally feasible without needing to substantially reduce the sample
size.
6.6 Testing the Properties of the Bankruptcy Es-
timators
6.6.1 Problem Background
The bankruptcy estimators provide a predicted rate of bankruptcy for each date
in the sample period. As bankruptcy in definition 2 implies a binary state. If qit
is redefined as k × (1− {0 or 1}) where one is one bankruptcy and zero is a going
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concern, then a simple binomial model appears.
Creating a binary variable xit which refers to the state of firm i on day t, then
the expectation of xit from the data available at time t − 1 can be denoted as
Et−1(x
i





for many values of i and j allowing joint updating. Further, the gap between
reality and the expectation can be denoted by git where:
git = x
i
t − Et−1(xit) (6.12)
The next Bayesian question is to determine the likelihood function for git. Not-
ing the concern here is for the forward value of the expectation against individ-
ual observations, it quickly becomes obvious that the solution can be reduced
to the difference between a sample mean and a prior expectation. Given finite
variance, the sampling distribution of the means and the expectations will be nor-
mal. Noting that the difference of two normals is a normal distribution itself,
it is possible to posit a likelihood for the difference as being generated from a
normal distribution.[113] A slightly more tenuous assumption was made that the
bankruptcy models’ properties were constant over time, yielding:
git ∼ N (δ, ω),∀i, t. (6.13)
Although any possible prior that either represents real knowledge, beliefs of
supporters of the proposed model, or the beliefs of adversaries could be used,
there is a computational advantage to express those beliefs using a conjugate prior
distribution.
One of the possible conjugate prior distributions for the normal mean and vari-
ance is the normal-inverse chi-squared distribution mixture distribution. As will
be shown, it is a more than reasonable representation of prior beliefs and so the
computational efficiencies outweigh any attempt to set a numerical and arbitrary
prior onto the model forcing some other mechanism such as acceptance-rejection
testing to determine the constant of integration and the marginal posterior testing
of hypothesis. The formulas here are provided by Lee.[55] For a more complete ex-
position on the analysis of conjugate prior distributions for the normal distribution,
see Murphy.[67]
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The question of the prior distribution would have the potential to be con-
tentious, except that the data set is so large that it will swamp the prior to the
required degree of accuracy. Nonetheless, an appropriate prior is called for. Al-
though the model expectation is a biased expectation, there isn’t a method to
determine if that bias is greater than or less than zero. The other question is how
much weight should the prior distribution have on the posterior distribution.
While it is reasonable to use prior variance estimates from the pre-1990 sample
data, another mechanism was chosen. Treating the prior as carrying only one
observation’s strength and choosing a conjugate prior, the question becomes what
is the most extreme possible value for the variance, prior to seeing any prior data
or sample data. The answer is one. The largest possible variance on a Bernoulli
trial based on a prediction would be one, ignoring Bessel’s correction to prevent
the value from exploding.
The use of the largest possible variance weakens any centering effects placing a
center of zero, which is a very reasonable center. It also increases the proposed risk
of the model triggering an increase in the probability of falsification to the extent
the variance is of concern; though, due to the size of the data set, the impact is
quite small.
The model requires two prior parameters and two hyperparameters. A hy-
perparameter is a parameter that does not appear in the likelihood function, but
which does impact the calculation of the posterior.
The prior parameter estimates, for a normal-inverse chi-squared prior distribu-
tion, are:
δ0 = 0, ω0 = 1. (6.14)
As the prior reflects very little actual knowledge, it is reasonable to give it a
sample size of one. This implies one degree of freedom for the prior estimator of
the mean and zero degrees of freedom for the prior estimate of the variance.
The hyperparameters are:
n0 = 1, ν0 = 0 (6.15)
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6.6.2 Uninformative Alternatives
Given a reasonable center of location for the difference estimator, this is the most
unreasonable possible choice of parameters that also bears some semblance of real-
ism. The two other conceptually leading choices would be a reference prior where,
Pr(δ, ω) ∝ ω−1, (6.16)
or a flat prior, which would technically be a proper prior due to boundary condi-
tions, of
δ = 0, ω = lim
k→∞
k, n = 0. (6.17)
Although the reference prior maximizes the value of the evidence and can, in a
sense, be thought of as being the view of someone with no strong prior beliefs, it
permits prior beliefs that somewhat favor the proposed model. Because the values
are bounded, due to the binary nature, the reference prior would favor realistic
to smaller than realistic variances. Due to the low probability of bankruptcy and
the truncation, the reference prior could be viewed as favorable to the proposed
model. As a consequence, the reference prior was not chosen.
The latter choice was excluded as it does ignore real information. It is also
an improper prior, or at least the limiting form of proper prior distributions, were
boundary conditions not present. Improper prior distributions are avoided due to
dimensionality reasons.[95]
6.6.3 Posterior Tests
To simplify notation and computation, m will be used to denote the number of
bankruptcies observed in the sample; n will be used to denote the number of firms
surviving as going concerns; and as many firms share the same expectation Em
will denote shared expectations for a particular part of a model.
If xit = 1 when a firm will be bankrupt within one year and x
i
t = 0 when firm
survives for at least one year, for a given day and shared expectation, then the






























This further simplifies to:
s2 =
mn
(m+ n)(m+ n− 1)
(6.22)
The posterior then needs to answer two distinct questions. The first question
is whether or not the estimator will trigger systematic losses to the market maker
due to being a systematic underestimate. The second question is whether or not
the estimator is too risky to use. The first is a question of the posterior distribution
of the mean, the second of the posterior distribution of the variance.
There are nearly 100,000 combinations of days and model subsets. That is a
non-trivial reporting issue, unless a simpler solution exists, which it does. It will be
shown that each separate test can be combined in a disciplined manner, permitting
a joint test even though the projected expectation changes with information.
As it is easier to define the MAP estimates of the parameters than to reproduce
the proof, the posterior parameters and hyperparameters are:
n1 = n0 +m+ n (6.23)
ν1 = ν0 +m+ n (6.24)
δ1 =




The posterior sum of the squares, denoted S1 for the posterior, S for the sample,
and S0 = ν0σ
2
0, is
S1 = S0 + S + (n
−1
0 + (m+ n)
−1)−1(δ0 − ḡ)2 (6.26)
The posterior MAP estimate of the variance is:
ω21 = S1/ν1 (6.27)
Substituting for the chosen prior values:
n1 = 1 +m+ n (6.28)





































t)− 1)2 + n]
(m+ n)(m+ n+ 1)
(6.33)
The posterior distribution, from Lee, is:[55]
Pr(δ, ω|x) = ω−(ν1+1)/2−1 exp
[
−n1δ









Murphy provides a simple derivation.[67] The marginal distribution of the mean
is Student’s t-distribution, so that:
Pr(δ|ḡ) ∝ tν1(δ|δ1, ω21/n1) (6.36)
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Because ν1 is so large, it is possible to substitute z-scores for raw values. The
final z-score is simply the weighted average z-score of the entire body of tests.
This reduces a large scale, multi-parameter problem down to one parameter. This
permits the option writer to evaluate the model with the simple hypothesis:
Hypothesis (1a). z ≤ 0
Hypothesis (1b). z > 0
While the market maker’s only concern is that there is no systematic loss, the
buyer of the option has the concern that the mark up is not too large. However,
as the risk premiums are unknown, this can only be stated as requiring the model
difference to be inside the interval (-c,0), where c is a constant.
The second set of hypothesis is whether or not the variance is small enough.
Small enough, of course, depends upon the degree of leverage. A firm leverage 1:1
can take larger losses without concern than a firm leveraged 25:1.
A one percent standard deviation would be large for highly leveraged firms, so
the writer would find the model too risky is the posterior variance were greater
than one basis point, or 1/10,0000.
Hypothesis (2a). ω2 ≤ .0001
Hypothesis (2b). ω2 > .0001
The formula for the distribution of possible posterior variances is from Lee, but
see Murphy for a complete proof.[55, 67] The marginal distribution of the variance
is:
Pr(ω2|x) = S1χ−2(ν1) (6.37)
Because the degrees of freedom are so large, it is better to work with the
precision rather than the variance for computational purposes. For test purposes,
the test is based on the precision, the multiplicative inverse of variance, rather
than the variance itself.
Pr(S1/ω
2|x) ∼ χ2(ν1) (6.38)
There is a question of how much risk could be absorbed by the writer. The
cut-off point chosen for the hypothesis was purely arbitrary. A better solution
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would be to make it less than some value chosen on a firm by firm basis, using the
cost function and leverage of the firm as the mechanism to set a value.
6.6.3.1 Results of Posterior Tests for Bankruptcy Estimator
The maximum a posteriori estimator for the mean difference between the model
and the actual observed outcomes was -0.007997. The maximum a posteriori esti-
mator for the variance of the differences was 0.000125271. There were 34,366,629
observations and 34,366,628 degrees of freedom for the test of the precision. The
sum of the squares was 4,305.14.
Given the very large sample size, the z-score for the hypothesis test is -4181.25.
The posterior probability of the writer not taking a loss is sufficiently close to unity
that it cannot be calculated. The probability is sufficient to accept hypothesis 1a,
that the model is adequate from the writer’s perspective. It will require research
into risk premiums to determine the adequacy from the view of the buyer.
The 99.99% Bayesian credible interval for the average difference between the
model and reality is (-.008004,-.007989).
Likewise, given the very large sample size, the χ2 test is also conclusive and
rejects hypothesis 2a. Given a required standard deviation of 0.01 or less, the
model is rejected. As this was chosen arbitrarily as a cut-off, the 99.99% credible
interval is provided as well.
As the χ2 distribution goes to the normal distribution as the sample size goes
to infinity, the normal approximation was used. The z-score was -1062.03 on the
precision. Using precision reverses the sign of the hypothesis and soundly rejects
2a.
The 99.99% highest density region credible interval for ω is (0.0112065,0.0112176)
with a maximum a posteriori estimate of 0.011212. The standard deviation is ap-
proximately 12% larger than the hypothesized level. Whether or not this is a good
or bad level depends upon the alternatives and the capital necessary.
6.6.3.2 Results of Posterior Tests for the Merger Estimator
The maximum a posteriori estimator for the mean difference between the model
and the actual observed outcomes was 0.018530. The maximum a posteriori es-
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timator for the variance of the differences was .002706. There were 42,337,719
observations and 42,337,719 degrees of freedom for the test of the precision. The
sum of the squares was 2,202,565.09.
Given the very large sample size, the z-score for the hypothesis test is 2,318.65.
The posterior probability of the writer taking a loss is sufficiently close to unity
that it cannot be calculated. The probability is sufficient to reject hypothesis 1a,
that the model is adequate from the writer’s perspective.
The 99.99% Bayesian credible interval for the average difference between the
model and reality is (0.01839,0.01867).
The 99.99% highest density region credible interval for ω is (0.0507,0.0533)
with a maximum a posteriori estimate of 0.052. The standard deviation is very
large and implies the need for research into this field. The z-score was 325.83 on
the precision.
There were more observations in the merger set than in the bankruptcy set
due to the use of different databases, along with effect of more rules to reject an
observation as suspect in the bankruptcy case due to the differing nature of the
data. This had the effect of removing more observations from the bankruptcy data
than the merger data.
6.6.3.3 Results of Posterior Tests for Expected Loss Given a Merger
The maximum a posteriori estimator for the mean difference between the model
and the actual observed outcomes was .008341105 . The maximum a posteriori
estimator for the variance of the differences was .030224. There were 180,681
observations and 180,681 degrees of freedom for the test of the precision. The sum
of the squares was 5,460.67.
The number of observations was relatively small due to the absence of offer
data. Offer prices were reconstructed by taking the first trade after merger and
dividing it by the last trade before the merger, with the proviso that a trade
occurred within the last week of existence and the first week post merger. As
many firms being merged out of existence have limited trading, many trades were
excluded by the inability to estimate the terms of exchange. The presence of a
deal term database or more liberal terms for estimation would have substantially
increased the number of observations.
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The z-score for the hypothesis test is 20.3944. The posterior probability of the
writer taking a loss is sufficiently close to unity that it can be treated as zero. The
probability is sufficient to reject hypothesis 1a, that the model is adequate from
the writer’s perspective. Even with a time drift for σ, the model is inadequate.
The 99.99% Bayesian credible interval for the average difference between the
model and reality is (0.007288,0.009395).
Given the high natural variability in the data, a second scale parameter based
hypothesis was not used. Rather, the distribution of the scale is provided instead.
The 99.99% highest density region credible interval for ω is (.026978,.03347).
6.6.3.4 Results of Posterior Tests of Expected Loss Given Survival
The maximum a posteriori estimator for the mean difference between the model
and the actual observed outcomes was .015058. The maximum a posteriori esti-
mator for the variance of the differences was 0.0459931. There were 20,421,083
observations and 20,421,083 degrees of freedom for the test of the precision. To
be included as an observation, a security had to trade between 352 days and 365
days from the date of the original trade. The sum of the squares was 939,236.13.
The z-score for the hypothesis test is 317.301. The posterior probability of the
writer not taking a loss is sufficiently close to unity that it cannot be calculated.
The probability is sufficient to reject hypothesis 1a, that the model is adequate
from the writer’s perspective. Ignoring the posterior tests for a moment, a four
percent drift in σ would be enough to trigger the model error alone. If the drift is
accounted for, this likely an excellent mechanism to estimate option loss premiums.
The 99.99% Bayesian credible interval for the average difference between the
model and reality is (0.01487,.01524). As with returns given a merger, a second
hypothesis test was not performed. As above, the credible interval was provided.
The 99.99% highest density region credible interval for ω is (0.04599,0.046) with a
maximum a posteriori estimate of .0459931.
6.7 Conclusion
Except for the bankruptcy estimator, results were disappointing. In the case of
merger analysis, there is too little theory present to form a good model. A merger
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Figure 6.5. Average Daily Loss, Given a Loss Did Occur Versus Daily Prediction of
Loss Given a Flat (Neutral) Prior
is a state and there are many paths to the state. Like having a fever, there are
many paths to the body creating the physiological process known as fever. Current
explanations revolve around the principal-agent problem, but there are certainly
other sources of merger risk. In the case of merged returns, a theoretical case
needs to be made, in a strong form, for the form of the distribution. As to the
return for going returns, existing methods should work given an increase in resource
availability.
If the hypothesis were changed so that the standard deviation was less than
or equal to the standard deviation used in the Fama-French Three Factor Model,
or their broader four or five factor model, then the best model has a 2.01 percent
standard deviation. Using the broader measure, the bankruptcy and merger risk
estimator are better, although they are in a different subject field. Actual costing
of risk should be performed to determine the subjective quality of the various







This work is a start towards option pricing. Not touched were American or Asian
style option contracts. Untouched was work on commodities and various other
contracts on underlying assets. Significant empirical work needs performed on
estimating merger risks. A better understanding of the determinants of bankruptcy
risk are needed. There is no work here on dividend estimation. Returns on equity
investments were not conditioned on interest rates. The risk premium wasn’t
estimated.
This work is incomplete. On the other hand, general principles have been
presented that will allow competing models to tested. The author lacked access
to trade data for option contracts. It should be determined if the mark-up/mark-
down on option contracts converges to liquidity costs of the underlying so that
actors are indifferent between direct ownership and the purchase of derivatives.
Fundamentally, this is a model of capital. As such it touches macroeconomic
models. These models have been separated since mean-variance finance came to the
fore. Logically, the value of physical capital must equal the the financial capital, in
equilibrium. The principles of financial capital and physical capital cannot diverge.




It is time to move forward. In terms of broad principles, certain things should
be present in models that have not been present in the past. The market maker,
if one exists, should operate under some form of a coherence principle. Liquidity
costs assure coherence and Pareto optimality. Dividends need to exist in models
since they exist in reality. Bankruptcy needs to be in the model for option pricing.
The likelihood function should be driven by the model and not convenience.
On the other hand, there isn’t a unique axiomization of Bayesian decision
theory. The axioms chosen should fit the needs of the problem. Axioms have
consequences. It is quite possible a more complete solution could be arrived at
using a different construction.
Under de Finetti, prices and probabilities are strictly interchangeable. Prob-
abilities and not just preferences are revealed by prices in this system. As such,
separations of probabilities and preferences are a problem. Conversely, Savage’s
or Ramsey’s method separates out pure probabilities from preferences, but this is
not a free ride either as it requires knowledge of internal states.[68]
Additional research needs performed on the distribution under mergers and on
the impact of boundary conditions on the likelihood function. Research also needs
performed on some version of continuous time methods.
A way forward may be through cost functions. If an expectation is turned
around, so that it isn’t a tool but rather a solution to a cost function problem,
them it may be possible to restructure anticipation in terms of cost functions.
If the expected value were thought of as being the solution to the anticipated
value, then it should be possible to have a variety of solutions that include the
median or the mode as a solution.
Continuous time finance uses expectations for a variety of things, but depends
upon it for differentiation. If the mode or the median are sufficiently smooth
as they move through time, then the differentiation no longer depends upon an
expectation. A general anticipation operator should then choose appropriately
among the mean, median or mode as the appropriate anticipated solution.
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7.2 Quarternions
Another opportunity to improve predictions may be using Quarternions. Pioneer-
ing work regarding the use of the complex plane to model planar Brownian motion,
which projects onto the real numbers as the Cauchy distribution began with work
by Krzysztof Burdzy.[19] It may be possible to extend this work through the use
of quarternions. Returns can be thought of as:
Rt = Rt(pt, pT ) (7.1)
Returns, as described here, are the function of two types of data, fast data and
slow data.
Liquidity costs are the fast data. Accounting and macroeconomic data are
slowly changing data. If liquidity costs are a function of a variable λ and accounting
data is represented as ι, then returns could be described as:
Rt = Rt(pt(λt, ιt), pT (λT , ιT )) (7.2)
It is common in mathematics and statistics to model the Cauchy distribution as
a projection from planar Brownian motion in the complex plane. Adding two
dimensions to each price results in a four dimensional error. The natural model for
this is probably the quarternion. Quarternions arise as the quotient of two vectors.
As a ratio function of two dimensional errors, quarternions may provide superior
computational options.
7.3 Observations from the Data
7.3.1 µ = 0%
The most striking component of the data is that the center of location for going
concerns is very clearly 0% plus dividends across the entire data set. The interpre-
tation is that risks are paid for through the dividend process. Prices adjust when
dividends are inadequate. This, of course, raises the question of what the predic-
tive dividend for a security is. Indeed, it also implies prices fail to fully impound
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information, but dividend policy joint with prices may. This is an open question.
There are two mechanisms to think about the dividend. The first is to note that
a present value, a future value and an annuity payment are equivalents. As such,
the absence of a current cash payment by a firm reinvesting its profits could be
thought of in terms of a current cash payment. The second method is to calculate
the dividend given information. In that scenario there is never a zero dividend
level.
Which works better is an empirical question.
Still, there are consequences to this construction. The first is that the marginal
actor demands payment in cash for risks and that these funds are no longer avail-
able to management. Both bankruptcy risk and inflation risk are compensated
through dividend payments. While the marginal actor receives payment in cash,
the average actor receives cash plus growth. The average actor is paid the median
return, which is 2%. The median return is the growth rate of capital and is a result
of the fact that the median and the mode are different.
The median return differs from the modal return due to the existence of
bankruptcy law. The limitation of liability truncates the distribution. As the
mean of the log return will be the median raw return, the growth rate is entirely
due to the limitation of liability.
The implication is that strong bankruptcy protection triggers higher economic
growth because adequate funds must be set aside as reserves. It is these reserves
that are the source of growth.
If the shape parameter is not fixed, then things that drive the shape parameter
drive the national growth rate.
7.3.2 σ May Be Increasing
The value of σ at the beginning of the period is not the value at the end. Because
of operational limitations to estimate movement of the posterior a wide mesh was
placed over returns as a function of time and the maximum a posteriori estimator
was plotted. The finest mesh that appeared to be operationally possible was 100
basis points. While quite crude, provide a picture of a time drift in σ because it
was only measured over the sample period it isn’t possible to determine when the
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drift began, or how consistent it is.
Figure 7.1. Drift of Sigma by Date
The difficulty of this graphic is that if it were a linear process, that is:
Pr(x|µ; β1; β0; τ) =
β1(τ − t0) + β0
(β1(τ − t0) + β0)2 + (x− µ)2
, (7.3)
then risk is drifting for some unknown reason. This is actually quite a bit of drift
over the interval. There is no reason to believe risk is a function of time, so some
investigation needs performed. Unfortunately, the sample period also corresponds
to the period known as the Great Moderation. Inadequate information exists for
the reason for drift, given the information base. It may simply be an artifact of the




In the world of blackboard economics, the limiting distribution of returns for going
returns is the Cauchy distribution. Nonetheless, mean-variance finance models
are the normative models of economics. They are taught at all levels, they are
on doctoral comprehensive exams, they are used in industry, and they underlie
regulatory models explicitly or implicitly. This paper requires the abandonment
of mean-variance finance.
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles use mean-variance methods. Text-
books carry the CAPM and have students calculate the cost of capital based on
the model. Real firms evaluate management and projects on what is an improper
algorithm. Regulatory models that use a normal distribution rather than a Cauchy
distribution to calculate required capital for financial intermediaries will tend to
undercapitalize those institutions. Hedge funds using Itô calculus based methods
are using methods uncorrelated with the true model.
The profession has discussed this issue for fifty years. It is time to put it to
bed.
7.4.1 Moving Forward
Knowing the distributions going forward permits a new range of policy mecha-
nisms. For example, as utility maximization, when combined with Bayesian anal-
ysis is admissible, it should be possible to construct Deming style processes for
pension fund management. Fund managers should be able to state, ex ante, the
predictive distribution of their policies once a better understanding of the vari-
ables involved are studied in greater depth. Trustees should be able to state their
assumptions and the costs associated with differing outcomes. Any improvement
in the management of financial capital improves the well being of labor, as labor
competes with physical capital.
Historically, there have been significant improvements in the utilization of labor.
This permits significant improvements in the utilization of capital. It is hoped this
will result in improvements in the real wage.
The challenge with moving forward is that there is so much to do. Mutual funds
should stop reporting average returns. Accounting ratios, as ratio data, need an
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analysis of the true underlying distribution performed. Old articles need dusted off
and checked for the mathematical principles used. New methods of integration and
differentiation need to be created in stochastic calculus. Undergraduate education
needs at least a minor tweaking. Dealing with uncertainty needs to be moved into
an undergraduate forum.
It is important to remember that a very short time ago, sequencing DNA was
a strictly doctoral level skill. Now it is an undergraduate level skill. It does not
follow that dealing with uncertainty is a doctoral level skill. Bayesian decision
theory is very accessible.
The list goes on. The way forward is to look at past ideas and to vet them
once again for the model construction, the statistical tests used and the intuition.
Regulatory structures have had the efficient market hypothesis built into their very
construction using ideas that are no longer supportable.
Finally, Bayes factors and posterior testing allow a contraction of the model
space. Economics is wonderful at generating models with statistical significance,
but not so good at picking and choosing among the crowd.
Fortunately, individuals will pick a problem, solve it and move on. Self interest
guarantees the large problems will be solved in relatively short order. There are
many dissertations to publish in the next decade. This is just a first work in a chain
of works passing through Eugene Fama and Benoit Mandelbrot and backwards to
Augustin Cauchy and even further back to Maria Agnesi and Fermat.
7.5 Implications for Other Fields of Economics
Any deferral of consumption for the purpose of improving well being in the future
will trigger a Cauchy distribution being somewhere in the mixture of distributions.
The study of marriage, religion, child rearing and so forth in all the social sciences
will likely be impacted in significant ways. There is no average marital experience.




This work is a start. It provides a frustrating sense of incompleteness. Seven
chapters are too short. Had dividends been tackled there would have been at least
two further chapters. Had the impact of interest rates been attempted then a book
on the yield curve would need to be constructed and then a volume on prices given
the curve. Bankruptcy and merger risk could have each held their own chapter.
Liquidity costs and counter-party failure risks could have covered at least two
additional estimators and three or four additional chapters as well. A chapter or
two on moral hazard and adverse selection when informational asymmetries are
included should be present. A chapter on time inconsistency for boards of directors
and for legislative inputs should be required. What is the government risk built
into a contract? Finally, an appendix or two on Bose-Einstein statistics, planar
Brownian motion and quarternions may end up being helpful.




GIVEN A MERGER WILL HAPPEN
To understand a possible derivation for the distribution of returns given that a
merger will happen, it is helpful first to derive the distribution of returns, given
that the firm will be a going concern over the entire period. To arrive at the
Cauchy distribution, it is necessary to set the underlying conditions.
A.1 Preliminaries
In economic discussions, the sample would be made up of pairs of prices, such that
any given price is in the set:
{pt : 0 < pt <∞}, (A.1)
and returns would be derived from a pair of prices, the buying and selling price,
such that
(pτ , pT ) ∈ <2 (A.2)
In statistics and mathematics, it is more common to place this ordered pair in
the complex plane rather than in <2. The differences are subtle and there is no
loss of generality created here in using <2.
216
There are advantages in using the complex plane when the Cauchy distribution
is present. They do not matter in this derivation. In particular, the complex plane
isn’t a total ordering, and all analytic functions are infinitely differentiable. Any
point can be thought of as (0, 0) without the need of a transformation.
This derivation of the Cauchy distribution and the distribution of returns, given
a merger will happen, will not be stated in price and return space. Because of this,
there will be some loss in specificity. The gain is in notational simplicity and
generality.
It is a small matter to add the minor complications created by bounded real
prices, but it is not a small matter of presentation. Further, this removes time
from the equations and simply allows the subjects in question to be an ordered
pair of numbers centered for computational convenience around zero.
The first goal is to construct a derivation of the Cauchy distribution that can
be used with the added information that a merger will happen.
In order to facilitate this, it is important to note the sample space is simply:
Ω ⊆ {(x, y) : (x, y) ∈ <2 and x 6= 0} (A.3)
This does not show how these two variables relate to each other. So an event
space, based on a functional relationship between the variables is necessary. The






→ S,∀(x, y) ∈ Ω
}
(A.4)
What is missing is a function to map F onto the closed interval [0, 1]. Extending
the assumption of normality, so ubiquitous in economics, to x and y it is convenient






















This use of the standard normal distribution is not without a slight loss in
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generality. By forcing the variances to be equal the errors will be circular rather
than elliptical. This computational convenience does mean that the result will be
the standard Cauchy and the standard merger distribution, rather than a more
general one that allowed the variance to systematically change over time.
Further, it is assumed that the variables are independent. This is very reason-
able and creates a joint marginal distribution of:










The next step is to relate this marginal distribution to the relationship between
x and y. The importance of S is that removes the importance of the level of x
or y in the same manner that returns remove the importance of levels of prices.
This relationship, can, of course be inverted. For any line S, the value of y can be
known if x is known using the simple equation of a line,
y = Sx (A.8)
The challenge then is to find the statistical distribution of the lines implied by
the set F . Since it is the entire line that is of interest an not a point-wise solution,
it is logical to convert lines into angles and segments rather than pairings of points
through the transformation:
x = r cos θ and y = r sin θ (A.9)
Noting that each individual line is of measure zero, the cdf of the lines will be
taken in a neighborhood around S. Since a change in S implies a change in slope,
then as the distance from the origin goes to infinity, the small shift will be quite a
large distance between two points taken at the same radius on each line.
Transforming the density function to polar coordinates, the improper integral







The extra r in the equation comes from the need to scale the disturbance in S as
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r becomes large. The extra 2 comes from the fact that there is an identical area
above and below the x-axis.
If the cumulative density function of S over a small neighborhood is considered,
then this is equivalent to:
FS(S)dS = Pr[s ∈ [S, S + dS]] (A.11)





it obviously follows that,
θ = tan−1(S) (A.13)
The proper cumulative density function, noting the above relationship, for S
is:














2 rdr = 1, (A.15)
so,




















Except for the party initiating the merger and, at some point, the management of
the acquired firm, no one in the general public knows the terms and conditions of
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the merger or acquisition prior to announcement.
In order to acquire a large enough percentage, if not all outstanding shares,
the acquiring party must increase the price to disgorge the shares from existing
owners. The buyer has to pay legal fees, fees for due diligence and to move along
the supply curve enough to acquire the desired percentage of shares. So if (0,0)
is the equilibrium point, in the absence of a merger, it must be the case that the
new equilibrium will be at (0,k). Again if the appraisal errors are normal about
the center of location k, this leads to a new distribution.
y = Sx is not redefined by the merger; it still passes through (0,0); the appraisal
errors no longer are centered there. This gives an interesting boundary condition
for value investing. Because the owners of a firm acquired by another firm can
be forced into a perfect state of illiquidity, the acquiring firm may not need to go
all the way to the equilibrium point. A value investor should consider a margin
of safety to avoid complete illiquidity or a loss in realized value due to a forced
acquisition.
As it is the future price that is affected, the distribution that will shift along






















Solving as before by integrating over the density function using the neighbor-








































SOFTWARE USED IN THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
RESEARCH
B.1 Chapter 5–Comparing Competing Models
/*options mprint symbolgen mlogic;*/
/*options obs=100000;*/
/*gathers all price data, in raw form, and calculates maximum and minimum
values of dates*/
proc sql;
create view gather as
select permno,date,prc,cfacpr,4*(year(date)-1929)+qtr(date)
as quarter,min(date) as dmin, max(date) as dmax
from crsp.dsf





/*restricts data to common shares only and assigns final status code*/
data common_only/view=common_only;
set crsp.dseall(keep=permno dlstcd shrcd dlamt nwperm
where=(^missing(dlstcd)));
by permno;
if substr(left(shrcd),2,1)=’3’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),2,1)=’4’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),2,1)=’5’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),2,1)=’8’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),1,1)=’2’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),1,1)=’4’ then delete;






if dlstcd=100 then operational=1;
else if dlstcd in(200,231,232,241,244,301,331,343) then merge=1;
else if dlstcd in(233,235,271,333,334,361) then cash_buyout=1;
else if dlstcd in(502,510,513,514,516,517,519,520,573,575,580,581,
582,583,584) then private=1;
else if dlstcd in(574) then bankrupt=1;
else if dlstcd in(234,242,243,251,252,261,262,300,332,341,342,400,450
,460,470,500) then do;
if dlstcd in(234,500) then do;
if nwperm>0 then merge=1;
else if nwperm=0 and dlamt>0 then cash_buyout=1;
else private=1;
end;
else if dlstcd in (242,243,251,341,342) then do;




else if dlstcd in (252,261,262,450) then do;
if nwperm>0 then merge=1;
else if dlamt>0 then cash_buyout=1;
else delete;
end;
else if dlstcd in(300) then do;
if nwperm>0 then merge=1;
else delete;
end;
else if dlstcd in (332) then do;
if nwperm>0 then merge=1;
else private=1;
end;
else if dlstcd in (400,460,470) then do;





/*links price data with list of common data and final states*/
proc sql;
create view link1 as
select a.*,b.operational,b.merge,b.cash_buyout,b.private,b.bankrupt








if operational=0 then do;











/*creates a framework of permno-dates that include weekends and holidays*/
data frame1/view=frame1;









/*creates a calendar of dates*/
data frame3;
set frame2(where=(permno NE lpermno and dmax-dmin>730));
by permno;





/*splits the data into operational, merger





/*joins trading calendar with the full calendar*/
proc sql;
create view operational2 as
select a.*,b.prc,b.cfacpr,b.quarter
from frame3 as a
left join
operational1 as b
on a.permno=b.permno and a.date=b.date;
quit;
proc sort data=operational2 out=operational3;






by permno descending date;



















if permno=lpermno365 then do;
if ^missing(lprc365) then return=lprc365/prc*cfacpr/lcfacpr365;
else if ^missing(lprc364) then return=lprc364/prc*cfacpr/lcfacpr364;
else if ^missing(lprc363) then return=lprc363/prc*cfacpr/lcfacpr363;
else if ^missing(lprc362) then return=lprc362/prc*cfacpr/lcfacpr362;
else if ^missing(lprc361) then return=lprc361/prc*cfacpr/lcfacpr361;
else if ^missing(lprc360) then return=lprc360/prc*cfacpr/lcfacpr360;
else if ^missing(lprc359) then return=lprc359/prc*cfacpr/lcfacpr359;
else if ^missing(lprc358) then return=lprc358/prc*cfacpr/lcfacpr358;
else if ^missing(lprc357) then return=lprc357/prc*cfacpr/lcfacpr357;
else if ^missing(lprc356) then return=lprc356/prc*cfacpr/lcfacpr356;
else if ^missing(lprc355) then return=lprc355/prc*cfacpr/lcfacpr355;
else if ^missing(lprc354) then return=lprc354/prc*cfacpr/lcfacpr354;
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else if ^missing(lprc353) then return=lprc353/prc*cfacpr/lcfacpr353;





































This data was exported into Excel where very simple numerical integration was
performed.
B.2 Chapter 6-Bankruptcies From 1925-1961
options fullstimer;
/*This program sets prior distributions for transactions that
happened before the start of the compustat database*/
/*Since the compustat database begins on 1/1/62 the last
purchase can be on 12/31/61 with a final close of 12/31/62*/
proc summary data=crsp.dsf(where=((prc>0))) n max min;
by permno;
var date;
output out=work.dates n=number max=max_date min=min_date;
run;
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/*this excludes rarely traded securities*/
/*this also deletes securities first started after the
compustat start date*/
data work.dates;
set work.dates (where=(_FREQ_>510 and min_date<MDY(1,1,1962)));
by permno;
keep permno max_date min_date;
run;







merge sorted_dates(in=aa) crsp.dseall(keep=permno dlstcd shrcd
dlamt nwperm where=(^missing(dlstcd)) in=bb);
by permno;
if aa and bb then do;
if substr(left(shrcd),2,1)=’3’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),2,1)=’4’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),2,1)=’5’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),2,1)=’8’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),1,1)=’2’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),1,1)=’4’ then delete;


















set common_only(where=(dlstcd^=100 and max_date<mdy(1,1,1962)));
run;
data merger/view=merger;

























if dlstcd in(234,500) then do;
if nwperm>0 then merge=365;
else if nwperm=0 and dlamt>0 then cash_payout=365;
else private=365;
end;
if dlstcd in (242,243,251,341,342) then do;
if nwperm>0 then merge=365;
else cash=365;
end;
if dlstcd in (252,261,262,450) then do;
if nwperm>0 then merge=365;
else if dlamt>0 then cash=365;
else delete;
end;
if dlstcd in(300) then do;




if dlstcd in (332) then do;
if nwperm>0 then merge=365;
else private=365;
end;
if dlstcd in (400,460,470) then do;





set active merger cash private bankrupt mixed;
run;
proc summary data=combined sum;
var operational merge cash private bankrupt;
output out=state_summary sum(operational)=s_op


















label total="Total number of observations"
going="Total number of going concerns"
merge="Total number of mergers"
bankrupt="Total number of bankruptcies"
m_going="Posterior mean of going concerns"
v_going="Posterior variance of going concerns"
m_merge="Posterior mean of mergers"
v_merge="Posterior variance of mergers"
m_bankrupt="Posterior mean of bankruptcies"
v_bankrupt="Posterior variance of bankruptcies"
;









/*January 1, 1929 is first day of quarter 1*/



























































































































































































































































































































%do i=129 %to 333;



















/*convert to tukey groups*/
data final;
set final(where=(rank_ratio<1000) keep=quarter rank_ratio);
if rank_ratio>10 and rank_ratio<90 then rank_ratio=0;















/*options mprint symbolgen mlogic obs=1000000;*/
/*gather gvkey permno linkages*/
data link/view=link;




if missing(ulinkenddt) then ulinkenddt=mdy(12,31,2013);
if missing(ulinkdt) then delete;




proc summary data=crsp.dsf(where=(prc>0 and ^missing(prc)));
by permno;
var date;































if substr(left(shrcd),2,1)=’3’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),2,1)=’4’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),2,1)=’5’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),2,1)=’8’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),1,1)=’2’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),1,1)=’4’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),1,1)=’7’ then delete;
else do;
if dlstcd=100 then operational=1;
else if dlstcd in(200,231,232,241,244,301,331,343) then merge=1;
else if dlstcd in(233,235,271,333,334,361) then cash_buyout=1;
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else if dlstcd in(502,510,513,514,516,517,519,520,573,
575,580,581,582,583,584) then
private=1;




if dlstcd in(234,500) then do;
if nwperm>0 then merge=1;




else if dlstcd in (242,243,251,341,342) then do;
if nwperm>0 then merge=1;
else cash_buyout=1;
end;
else if dlstcd in (252,261,262,450) then do;
if nwperm>0 then merge=1;




else if dlstcd in(300) then do;
if nwperm>0 then merge=1;
else delete;
end;
else if dlstcd in (332) then do;




else if dlstcd in (400,460,470) then do;





if bankrupt=1 then operational=0;
else operational=1;



































set comp.fundq(keep=datadate gvkey IBQ CSHOQ SALEQ COGSQ
NIQ CEQQ ATQ PPENTQ INVTQ RECTQ APQ DLCQ DLTTQ OIADPQ ACTQ
LCTQ CHQ CHEQ
LTQ DLTTQ where=(^missing(date) and date>mdy(12,31,1961)
and date<mdy(7,1,1990))rename=(datadate=date));
by gvkey date;
if missing(NIQ) then NIQ=IBQ;















if (^missing(SALEQ) and ^missing(COGSQ)and
(SALEQ NE 0)) then gm=(SALEQ-COGSQ)/SALEQ;
else gm=.;
/*Net Margin*/
if (^missing(niq) and ^missing(SALEQ) and
(SALEQ NE 0)) then nm=niq/SALEQ;
else nm=.;
/*Return on Equity*/
if (^missing(NIQ) and ^missing(CEQQ) and
(CEQQ NE 0)) then roe=NIQ/CEQQ;
else roe=.;
/*Return on Assets*/
if (^missing(NIQ) and ^missing(ATQ) and
(ATQ NE 0)) then roa=NIQ/ATQ;
else roa=.;
/*return on net assets*/
if (^missing(NIQ) and ^missing(PPENTQ) and
^missing(INVTQ) and ^missing(RECTQ) and
^missing(APQ) and (PPENTQ+INVTQ+RECTQ-APQ NE 0)) then
rona=NIQ/(PPENTQ+INVTQ+RECTQ-APQ);
else rona=.;
/*Debt to Equity ratio*/
if (^missing(DLCQ) and ^missing(DLTTQ) and ^missing(CEQQ)
and (CEQQ NE 0)) then de=(DLCQ+DLTTQ)/CEQQ;
else de=.;
/*Earning power ratio*/
if (^missing(OIADPQ) and ^missing(ATQ)
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and (ATQ NE 0)) then ep=OIADPQ/ATQ;
else ep=.;
/*Current ratio*/
if (^missing(ACTQ) and ^missing(LCTQ) and
(LCTQ NE 0)) then cr=ACTQ/LCTQ;
else cr=.;
/*acid ratio*/
if (^missing(ACTQ) and ^missing(INVTQ) and
^missing(LCTQ) and (LCTQ NE 0)) then acid=(ACTQ-INVTQ)/LCTQ;
else acid=.;
/*Note that XPPQ is prepaid expense but is
null in the entire data set and so was not used.*/
/*cash ratio*/
if (^missing(cash) and ^missing(LCTQ)
and (LCTQ NE 0)) then cashratio=cash/LCTQ;
else cashratio=.;
/*asset turnover*/
if (^missing(SALEQ) and ^missing(ATQ) and
(ATQ NE 0)) then turnover=SALEQ/ATQ;
else turnover=.;
/*receivables conversion*/
if (^missing(RECTQ) and ^missing(SALEQ)
and (SALEQ NE 0)) then rec_conv=RECTQ/SALEQ;
else rec_conv=.;
/*debt ratio*/
if (^missing(LTQ) and ^missing(ATQ)
and (ATQ NE 0)) then debt_r=LTQ/ATQ;
else debt_r=.;
/*long term debt to equity*/
if (^missing(DLTTQ) and ^missing(CEQQ)















rona="Return on net assets"
turnover="Asset turnovers"
;
drop cshoq SALEQ COGSQ NIQ CEQQ ATQ PPENTQ INVTQ
RECTQ APQ DLCQ DLTTQ OIADPQ ACTQ LCTQ LTQ DLTTQ cash;
run;
/*sort by quarter to rank*/




proc rank data=ratios2 percent ties=mean out=ratios3;
by quarter;
var gm nm roe roa rona de debt_r ltd cr acid
cashratio ep turnover rec_conv;
ranks rgm rnm rroe rroa rrona rde rdebt_r
rltd rcr racid rcashratio rep rturnover rrec_conv;
run;
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%do i=1 %to 14;
if ^missing(r&&a&i) then do;
if r&&a&i>10 and r&&a&i<90 then &&a&i=0;




drop r&a1 r&a2 r&a3 r&a4 r&a5 r&a6 r&a7 r&a8










proc sort data=ratios5 out=ratios6;
by gvkey;
run;










if date>dmax then delete;
if date<dmin then delete;
if date>ulinkenddt then delete;
if date<ulinkdt then delete;
if dmax>mdy(6,30,1990) then dmax=mdy(6,30,1990);
if dmin<mdy(1,1,1961) then dmin=mdy(1,1,1960);
run;
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/*sort by permno quarter*/
proc sort data=gvkey4 out=gvkey5;
by permno quarter;
run;
/*split data to create date data*/
proc sort data=gvkey5(keep=permno dmin













/*create registry that items are sorted*/
proc sort data=gvkey_left2 presorted out=gvkey_left3;
by permno quarter;
run;
/*create quarter specific data*/
data gvkey_right1/view=gvkey_right1;
set gvkey5(keep=permno quarter gvkey ulinkdt ulinkenddt

















if bankrupt=1 then do;




/*create filter to remove items without accounting






%do i=1 %to 2;






%do i=3 %to 5;





%do i=6 %to 8;





%do i=9 %to 11;
%do j=12 %to 14;





















%do i=1 %to 2;
%do j=3 %to 14;
%let model=%eval(&model+1);
proc freq data=gvkey9(where=(^missing(&&a&i) and





do i=-1 to 1;
do j=-1 to 1;
do k=-1 to 1;













merge g(drop=i j k m) model&model(drop=percent);
by &&a&i &&a&j rank_ratio operational;























%do i=3 %to 5;
%do j=6 %to 14;
%let model=%eval(&model+1);
proc freq data=gvkey9(where=(^missing(&&a&i) and





do i=-1 to 1;
do j=-1 to 1;
do k=-1 to 1;












merge g(drop=i j k m) model&model(drop=percent);
by &&a&i &&a&j rank_ratio operational;























%do i=6 %to 8;
%do j=9 %to 14;
%let model=%eval(&model+1);
proc freq data=gvkey9(where=(^missing(&&a&i)






do i=-1 to 1;
do j=-1 to 1;
do k=-1 to 1;












merge g(drop=i j k m) model&model(drop=percent);
by &&a&i &&a&j rank_ratio operational;























%do i=9 %to 11;
%do j=12 %to 14;
%let model=%eval(&model+1);
proc freq data=gvkey9(where=(^missing(&&a&i) and





do i=-1 to 1;
do j=-1 to 1;
do k=-1 to 1;













merge g(drop=i j k m) model&model(drop=percent);
by &&a&i &&a&j rank_ratio operational;









































if n>0 then do;
likelihood=0;
do i=n to n+alpha+beta-1;
likelihood=likelihood-log(i);
end;
if n ne k then do;









do i=1 to alpha+beta-1;
likelihood=likelihood+log(i);
end;











if n>0 then do;
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likelihood=0;
do i=n to n+alpha+beta-1;
likelihood=likelihood-log(i);
end;
if n ne k then do;









do i=1 to alpha+beta-1;
likelihood=likelihood+log(i);
end;































drop _TYPE_ _FREQ_ likelihood;
run;
























B.3.3 Prior Probability of Bankruptcy
libname gdp ’/home/wvu/deharris/new/state2’;
/*options mprint symbolgen mlogic obs=1000000;*/
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/*gather gvkey permno linkages*/
data link/view=link;




if missing(ulinkenddt) then ulinkenddt=mdy(12,31,2013);
if missing(ulinkdt) then delete;




proc summary data=crsp.dsf(where=(prc>0 and ^missing(prc)));
by permno;
var date;























if substr(left(shrcd),2,1)=’3’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),2,1)=’4’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),2,1)=’5’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),2,1)=’8’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),1,1)=’2’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),1,1)=’4’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),1,1)=’7’ then delete;
else do;
if dlstcd=100 then operational=1;
else if dlstcd in(200,231,232,241,244,301,331,343) then merge=1;
else if dlstcd in(233,235,271,333,334,361) then cash_buyout=1;
else if dlstcd in(502,510,513,514,516,517,519,520,573,575,580,581,582,583,584)
then
private=1;
else if dlstcd in(574) then bankrupt=1;
else if dlstcd
in(234,242,243,251,252,261,262,300,332,341,342,400,450,460,470,500) then do;
if dlstcd in(234,500) then do;
if nwperm>0 then merge=1;
else if nwperm=0 and dlamt>0 then cash_buyout=1;
else private=1;
end;
else if dlstcd in (242,243,251,341,342) then do;




else if dlstcd in (252,261,262,450) then do;
if nwperm>0 then merge=1;




else if dlstcd in(300) then do;
if nwperm>0 then merge=1;
else delete;
end;
else if dlstcd in (332) then do;
if nwperm>0 then merge=1;
else private=1;
end;
else if dlstcd in (400,460,470) then do;





if bankrupt=1 then operational=0;
else operational=1;
























do date=dmin to dmax;
if dmax-date>365 then operational=1;












if missing(rank_ratio) then delete;
if missing(operational) then delete;
run;

















set comp.fundq(keep=datadate gvkey SALEQ ATQ RECTQ ACTQ
LCTQ NIQ IBQ where=(^missing(date) and date>mdy(12,31,1961) and
date<mdy(7,1,1990))rename=(datadate=date));
by gvkey date;











if (^missing(niq) and ^missing(SALEQ) and (SALEQ NE 0)) then nm=niq/SALEQ;
else nm=.;
/*Return on Assets*/
if (^missing(NIQ) and ^missing(ATQ) and (ATQ NE 0)) then roa=NIQ/ATQ;
else roa=.;
/*Current ratio*/
if (^missing(ACTQ) and ^missing(LCTQ) and (LCTQ NE 0)) then cr=ACTQ/LCTQ;
else cr=.;
/*receivables conversion*/
if (^missing(RECTQ) and ^missing(SALEQ)







drop ibq saleq NIQ ATQ RECTQ ACTQ LCTQ;
run;
/*sort by quarter to rank*/





proc rank data=ratios2 percent ties=mean out=ratios3;
by quarter;
var nm roa cr rec_conv;
ranks rnm rroa rcr rrec_conv;
run;









%do i=1 %to 4;
if ^missing(r&&a&i) then do;
if r&&a&i>10 and r&&a&i<90 then &&a&i=0;














proc sort data=ratios5 out=ratios6;
by gvkey;
run;










if date>dmax then delete;
if date<dmin then delete;
if date>ulinkenddt then delete;
if date<ulinkdt then delete;
if dmax>mdy(6,30,1990) then dmax=mdy(6,30,1990);
if dmin<mdy(1,1,1961) then dmin=mdy(1,1,1960);
run;
/*sort by permno quarter*/




/*split data to create date data*/
proc sort data=gvkey5(keep=permno dmin dmax












/*create registry that items are sorted*/
proc sort data=gvkey_left2 presorted out=gvkey_left3;
by permno quarter;
run;
/*create quarter specific data*/
data gvkey_right1/view=gvkey_right1;
set gvkey5(keep=permno quarter gvkey ulinkdt
ulinkenddt &a1 &a2 &a3 &a4 rank_ratio);
by permno quarter;
run;













if bankrupt=1 then do;









data both1 nmroa1 arrec1 none1;
set gvkey8;
by permno quarter;
if ^missing(&a1) and ^missing(&a2) and
^missing(&a3) and ^missing(&a4) then output both1;
else if ^missing(&a1) and ^missing(&a2)
then output nmroa1;















proc freq data=both1 noprint;
tables &a1*&a2*rank_ratio*operational/out=nm_model1;
run;
proc freq data=both1 noprint;
tables &a3*&a4*rank_ratio*operational/out=ar_model1;
run;




proc freq data=nmroa1 noprint;
tables &a1*&a2*rank_ratio*operational/out=nm_model2;
run;















from nm_model1 as a, nm_model2 as b





create table ar_model as
select a.&a3, a.&a4,a.rank_ratio, a.operational,
a.count+b.count as totals
from ar_model1 as a, ar_model2 as b




create table gdp_bankruptcy as
select a.rank_ratio, a.operational,
a.count, a.count+b.count as totals











B.4 Prior Probability of Merger




























label de="Debt to Equity"
roa="Return on Assets"
;




set ratios1(where=(^missing(roa) and ^missing(de) and
^missing(ceqq) and ^missing(date)));
run;
/*sort by quarter to rank*/




proc rank data=ratios2 percent ties=mean out=ratios3;
by quarter;
var roa ceqq de;
ranks rroa rceqq rde;
run;








%do i=1 %to 3;
if ^missing(r&&a&i) then do;
if r&&a&i>10 and r&&a&i<90 then &&a&i=0;









proc sort data=ratios4 out=ratios5;


























if gvkey NE lgvkey then do;












delete ratios2 ratios3 ratios5 ratios7;
modify ratios8;
rename k1=date k2=gvkey k3=roa k4=teq k5=de;
run;
proc sort data=ratios8 presorted out=ratios8a;
by gvkey date;
/*gather gvkey permno linkages*/
data link1;
set crspa.ccmxpf_lnkused(keep=ugvkey ulinkdt apermno




if missing(ulinkenddt) then ulinkenddt=mdy(12,31,2013);
if missing(ulinkdt) then delete;
else if missing(gvkey) then delete;
else if ulinkenddt<mdy(1,1,1962) then delete;
else if ulinkdt>mdy(6,30,1990) then delete;
else do;
if ulinkenddt>mdy(6,30,1990) then ulinkenddt=mdy(6,30,1990);
if ulinkdt<mdy(1,1,1962) then ulinkdt=mdy(1,1,1962);




drop ulinktype ulinkdt ulinkenddt;
run;
























if aa and bb;
run;

















if substr(left(shrcd),2,1)=’3’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),2,1)=’4’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),2,1)=’5’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),2,1)=’8’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),1,1)=’2’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),1,1)=’4’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),1,1)=’7’ then delete;
else do;
if dlstcd=100 then operational=1;
else if dlstcd in(200,231,232,241,244,301,331,343) then merge=1;
else if dlstcd in(233,235,271,333,334,361) then cash_buyout=1;
else if dlstcd in(502,510,513,514,516,517,519,520,573,575,580,
581,582,583,584) then
private=1;
else if dlstcd in(574) then bankrupt=1;
else if dlstcd
in(234,242,243,251,252,261,262,300,332,341,342,400,450,460,470,500) then do;
if dlstcd in(234,500) then do;
if nwperm>0 then merge=1;
else if nwperm=0 and dlamt>0 then cash_buyout=1;
else private=1;
end;
else if dlstcd in (242,243,251,341,342) then do;
if nwperm>0 then merge=1;
else cash_buyout=1;
end;
else if dlstcd in (252,261,262,450) then do;
if nwperm>0 then merge=1;





else if dlstcd in(300) then do;
if nwperm>0 then merge=1;
else delete;
end;
else if dlstcd in (332) then do;
if nwperm>0 then merge=1;
else private=1;
end;
else if dlstcd in (400,460,470) then do;





if merge=1 then operational=0;
else operational=1;





if aa and bb;
drop gvkey;
run;





set crsp.dsf(keep=hsiccd permno date rename=(hsiccd=sic));
by permno date;
if sic>1999 and sic<4000 then category=4;
else if sic>5999 and sic<6800 then category=8;
else if sic GE 6800 and sic<9000 then category=9;
else if sic GE 4000 and sic<5000 then category=5;
else if sic >999 and sic<1500 then category=2;
else if sic GE 5200 and sic<6000 then category=7;
else if sic GE 5000 and sic<5200 then category=6;
else if sic ge 1500 and sic<1800 then category=3;
else if sic GE 100 and sic LE 999 then category=1;




set sic1(where=(^missing(sic) and date>mdy(12,31,1961)
and date<mdy(7,1,1990)));
by permno date;















































if missing(sic) then do;
test=0;
%do i=1 %to 7;














set sic8(where=(^missing(sic))keep= permno date







proc summary data=crsp.dsf(where=(prc>0 and ^missing(prc)));
by permno;
var date;
output out=minimax1 min(date)=dmin max(date)=dmax;
run;
data minimax2/view=minimax2;












set minimax2 (where=(dmax>mdy(1,1,1962) and dmin<mdy(6,30,1990)));
by permno;
if dmin<mdy(1,1,1962) then dmin=mdy(1,1,1962);
if dmax>mdy(6,30,1990) then dmax=mdy(6,30,1990);





















merge frame4a(drop=operational in=aa) state_space1(in=bb);
by permno;





















if dmax-date>365 and operational=0 then operational=1;
run;
proc freq data=frame7(where=(missing(sic))) noprint;
tables operational/out=no_data1;
run;




















do i=1 to 2;
if i=1 then group="F";
else group="N";
do de=-1 to 1;
do roa=-1 to 1;
do teq=-1 to 1;








proc sort data=with_data2 out=with_data3 presorted;































B.5 Prior Probability for Returns Given a Merger
/*options mprint symbolgen mlogic;*/
/*options obs=1000000;*/
/*gathers all price data, in raw form, and calculates maximum and
minimum values of dates*/
proc sql;
create view gather as
select permno,date,prc,cfacpr,min(date) as dmin, max(date)
as dmax
from crsp.dsf




/*restricts data to common shares only and assigns final status
code*/
data common_only/view=common_only;
set crsp.dseall(keep=permno dlstcd shrcd dlamt nwperm
where=(^missing(dlstcd)));
by permno;
if substr(left(shrcd),2,1)=’3’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),2,1)=’4’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),2,1)=’5’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),2,1)=’8’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),1,1)=’2’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),1,1)=’4’ then delete;








if dlstcd=100 then operational=1;
else if dlstcd in(200,231,232,241,244,301,331,343)
then merge=1;
else if dlstcd in(233,235,271,333,334,361)
then cash_buyout=1;
else if dlstcd in(502,510,513,514,516,517,519,
520,573,575,580,581,582,583,584) then private=1;
else if dlstcd in(574) then bankrupt=1;
else if dlstcd in(234,242,243,251,252,261,262,
300,332,341,342,400,450,460,470,500) then do;
if dlstcd in(234,500) then do;
if nwperm>0 then merge=1;
else if nwperm=0 and dlamt>0 then cash_buyout=1;
else private=1;
end;
else if dlstcd in (242,243,251,341,342) then do;
if nwperm>0 then merge=1;
else cash_buyout=1;
end;
else if dlstcd in (252,261,262,450) then do;
if nwperm>0 then merge=1;
else if dlamt>0 then cash_buyout=1;
else delete;
end;
else if dlstcd in(300) then do;
if nwperm>0 then merge=1;
else delete;
end;
else if dlstcd in (332) then do;




else if dlstcd in (400,460,470) then do;






/*links price data with list of common data and final states*/
proc sql;
create view link1 as
select a.*,b.merge,b.cash_buyout,b.dlamt,b.nwperm








if cash_buyout=1 or merge=1 then do;



















keep permno old_permno low high;
run;









set merge4(where=(date le high and date ge low));
permno=old_permno;
























if ldate=dmax then test=1;

















if date>dmax then prc=prc*converstion_factor;
keep permno date prc;
run;










set frame1(keep=permno dmin dmax);
by permno;




















proc sort data=frame4 out=lead0;




by permno descending date;
%do n=365 %to 352 %by -1;
lprc&n=lag&n(prc);










/*Note that the closing transaction can only happen
on day 365, as such, returns are not normalized










if permno=lpermno365 then do;
if ^missing(lprc365) then return=lprc365/prc*cfacpr/lcfacpr365;
else if ^missing(lprc364) then return=lprc364/prc*cfacpr/lcfacpr364;
else if ^missing(lprc363) then return=lprc363/prc*cfacpr/lcfacpr363;
else if ^missing(lprc362) then return=lprc362/prc*cfacpr/lcfacpr362;
else if ^missing(lprc361) then return=lprc361/prc*cfacpr/lcfacpr361;
else if ^missing(lprc360) then return=lprc360/prc*cfacpr/lcfacpr360;
else if ^missing(lprc359) then return=lprc359/prc*cfacpr/lcfacpr359;
else if ^missing(lprc358) then return=lprc358/prc*cfacpr/lcfacpr358;
else if ^missing(lprc357) then return=lprc357/prc*cfacpr/lcfacpr357;
else if ^missing(lprc356) then return=lprc356/prc*cfacpr/lcfacpr356;
else if ^missing(lprc355) then return=lprc355/prc*cfacpr/lcfacpr355;
else if ^missing(lprc354) then return=lprc354/prc*cfacpr/lcfacpr354;
else if ^missing(lprc353) then return=lprc353/prc*cfacpr/lcfacpr353;





set lead3(keep=return date where=(^missing(return) and
date<mdy(7,1,1990))) cash_return;
do i=.01 to 1 by .01;
if return<i and return=>i-.01 then return_class=i-.005;
end;
















B.6 Prior Probability for σ for a Going Concern
/*options mprint symbolgen mlogic;*/
/*options obs=10000;*/
/*gathers all price data, in raw form, and calculates maximum and
minimum values of dates*/
proc sql;
create view gather as
select permno,date,prc,cfacpr,min(date) as dmin, max(date)
as dmax
from crsp.dsf





/*restricts data to common shares only and assigns final status
code*/
data common_only/view=common_only;
set crsp.dseall(keep=permno dlstcd shrcd dlamt nwperm
where=(^missing(dlstcd)));
by permno;
if substr(left(shrcd),2,1)=’3’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),2,1)=’4’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),2,1)=’5’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),2,1)=’8’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),1,1)=’2’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),1,1)=’4’ then delete;







if dlstcd=100 then operational=1;
else if dlstcd in(200,231,232,241,244,301,331,343) then merge=1;
else if dlstcd in(233,235,271,333,334,361) then cash_buyout=1;
else if dlstcd in(502,510,513,514,516,517,519,520,573,575,580,
581,582,583,584) then private=1;
else if dlstcd in(574) then bankrupt=1;
else if dlstcd in(234,242,243,251,252,261,262,300,332,341,342,
400,450,460,470,500) then do;
if dlstcd in(234,500) then do;
if nwperm>0 then merge=1;




else if dlstcd in (242,243,251,341,342) then do;
if nwperm>0 then merge=1;
else cash_buyout=1;
end;
else if dlstcd in (252,261,262,450) then do;
if nwperm>0 then merge=1;
else if dlamt>0 then cash_buyout=1;
else delete;
end;
else if dlstcd in(300) then do;
if nwperm>0 then merge=1;
else delete;
end;
else if dlstcd in (332) then do;
if nwperm>0 then merge=1;
else private=1;
end;
else if dlstcd in (400,460,470) then do;






/*links price data with list of common data and final states*/
proc sql;
create view link1 as
select a.*,b.operational,b.merge,b.cash_buyout,b.private,b.bankrupt









if operational=0 then do;












/*creates a framework of permno-dates that include
weekends and holidays*/
data frame1/view=frame1;










/*creates a calendar of dates*/
data frame3;
set frame2(where=(permno NE lpermno and dmax-dmin>730));
by permno;




/*splits the data into operational and merger. bankruptcy










create view operational2 as
select a.*,b.prc,b.cfacpr
from frame3 as a
left join
operational1 as b
on a.permno=b.permno and a.date=b.date;
quit;
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proc sort data=operational2 out=operational3;





by permno descending date;
%do n=365 %to 352 %by -1;
lprc&n=lag&n(prc);
lcfacpr&n=lag&n(cfacpr);










/*Note that the closing transaction can only happen on day 365,
as such, returns are not normalized






if permno=lpermno365 then do;
if ^missing(lprc365) then return=lprc365/prc*cfacpr/lcfacpr365;
else if ^missing(lprc364) then return=lprc364/prc*cfacpr/lcfacpr364;
else if ^missing(lprc363) then return=lprc363/prc*cfacpr/lcfacpr363;
else if ^missing(lprc362) then return=lprc362/prc*cfacpr/lcfacpr362;
else if ^missing(lprc361) then return=lprc361/prc*cfacpr/lcfacpr361;
else if ^missing(lprc360) then return=lprc360/prc*cfacpr/lcfacpr360;
else if ^missing(lprc359) then return=lprc359/prc*cfacpr/lcfacpr359;
else if ^missing(lprc358) then return=lprc358/prc*cfacpr/lcfacpr358;
else if ^missing(lprc357) then return=lprc357/prc*cfacpr/lcfacpr357;
else if ^missing(lprc356) then return=lprc356/prc*cfacpr/lcfacpr356;
else if ^missing(lprc355) then return=lprc355/prc*cfacpr/lcfacpr355;
else if ^missing(lprc354) then return=lprc354/prc*cfacpr/lcfacpr354;
else if ^missing(lprc353) then return=lprc353/prc*cfacpr/lcfacpr353;















do i=1 to nrow(values);










do i=lower to upper by level;
z=z+1;






do i=1 to nrow(l_likelihood);




do i=1 to nrow(index_value);
if test=0 then do;






else if test=1 then do;











do i=lower to upper by level;
z=z+1;






do i=1 to nrow(index_value);




do i=1 to nrow(index_value);
if test=0 then do;






else if test=1 then do;













do granularity=1 to 3;











do i=lower to upper by level;
zz=zz+1;





















































/*options mprint symbolgen mlogic obs=100000;*/
/*gathers all price data, in raw form, and calculates maximum and
minimum values of dates*/
proc sql;
create view gather1 as
select permno,min(date) as dmin, max(date) as dmax
from crsp.dsf


















if substr(left(shrcd),2,1)=’3’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),2,1)=’4’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),2,1)=’5’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),2,1)=’8’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),1,1)=’2’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),1,1)=’4’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),1,1)=’7’ then delete;
else do;
if dlstcd=100 then operational=1;
else if dlstcd in(200,231,232,241,244,301,331,343) then merge=1;
else if dlstcd in(233,235,271,333,334,361) then cash_buyout=1;
else if dlstcd in(502,510,513,514,516,517,519,520,573,575,580,581,
582,583,584) then
private=1;
else if dlstcd in(574) then bankrupt=1;
else if dlstcd
in(234,242,243,251,252,261,262,300,332,341,342,400,450,460,470,500) then do;
if dlstcd in(234,500) then do;
if nwperm>0 then merge=1;
else if nwperm=0 and dlamt>0 then cash_buyout=1;
else private=1;
end;
else if dlstcd in (242,243,251,341,342) then do;
if nwperm>0 then merge=1;
else cash_buyout=1;
end;
else if dlstcd in (252,261,262,450) then do;
if nwperm>0 then merge=1;





else if dlstcd in(300) then do;
if nwperm>0 then merge=1;
else delete;
end;
else if dlstcd in (332) then do;
if nwperm>0 then merge=1;
else private=1;
end;
else if dlstcd in (400,460,470) then do;





if bankrupt=1 then operational=0;
else operational=1;





if aa and bb;
run;
/*gather gvkey permno linkages*/
data link/view=link;
set crspa.ccmxpf_lnkused(keep=ugvkey ulinkdt apermno ulinkenddt




if missing(ulinkenddt) then ulinkenddt=mdy(12,31,2013);
if missing(ulinkdt) then delete;
else if missing(gvkey) then delete;




create view gather4 as
select a.*,b.gvkey,b.ulinkdt,b.ulinkenddt







set gather4(where=(^missing(dmin) and ^missing(dmax)));
by permno;
run;





do date=dmin to dmax;





































set comp.fundq(keep=datadate gvkey SALEQ ATQ RECTQ ACTQ
LCTQ NIQ IBQ where=(^missing(date))rename=
(datadate=date));
by gvkey date;































drop ibq saleq NIQ ATQ RECTQ ACTQ LCTQ date;
run;
/*sort by quarter to rank*/




proc rank data=ratios2 percent ties=mean out=ratios3;
by quarter;
var nm roa cr rec_conv;















%do i=1 %to 4;
if ^missing(r&&a&i) then do;
if r&&a&i>10 and r&&a&i<90 then &&a&i=0;


















create view accounting_data4 as
select a.*, b.nm,b.roa,b.cr,b.rec_conv
from accounting_data3 as a
left join
ratios5 as b







if operational=0 then do;







create view total_set3 as
select a.*, b.rank_ratio




set total_set3(keep=permno date nm roa cr rec_conv rank_ratio
operational);
328
if ^missing(nm) and ^missing(roa) and ^missing(cr) and
^missing(rec_conv) then category=1;
else if ^missing(nm) and ^missing(roa)
then category=2;












proc freq data=total_set5(where=((date>mdy(12,31,1961) and







proc freq data=total_set5(where=((date>mdy(6,30,1990) and
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do date=mdy(6,30,1990) to mdy(12,31,2007);
do nm=-1 to 1;
do roa=-1 to 1;
do rank_ratio=-1 to 1;











proc sort data=modela3 out=modela5 presorted;
by date nm roa rank_ratio operational;
run;
proc sort data=modela4 out=modela6;




by date nm roa rank_ratio operational;
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if missing(count) then count=0;



















by date nm roa rank_ratio;










by date nm roa rank_ratio;
retain alpha1-alpha27 beta1-beta27 0;
%do i=-1 %to 1;
%do j=-1 %to 1;
%do k=-1 %to 1;
%let count=%eval(&count+1);
%if %eval(&i)=-1 & %eval(&j)=-1 & %eval(&k)=-1 %then %do;
























by date nm roa rank_ratio;
run;
proc freq data=total_set5(where=((date>mdy(12,31,1961)








proc freq data=total_set5(where=((date>mdy(6,30,1990) and





do date=mdy(6,30,1990) to mdy(12,31,2007);
do cr=-1 to 1;
do rec_conv=-1 to 1;
do rank_ratio=-1 to 1;











proc sort data=modelb3 out=modelb5 presorted;
by date cr rec_conv rank_ratio operational;
run;
proc sort data=modelb4 out=modelb6;




by date cr rec_conv rank_ratio operational;
if missing(count) then count=0;




















by date cr rec_conv rank_ratio;










by date cr rec_conv rank_ratio;
retain alpha1-alpha27 beta1-beta27 0;
%do i=-1 %to 1;
%do j=-1 %to 1;
%do k=-1 %to 1;
%let count=%eval(&count+1);
%if %eval(&i)=-1 & %eval(&j)=-1 & %eval(&k)=-1 %then %do;























by date cr rec_conv rank_ratio;
run;









title"verification that there are no missing dates";
run;





do date=mdy(6,30,1990) to mdy(12,31,2007);
do rank_ratio=-1 to 1;
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proc sort data=modelc3 out=modelc5 presorted;
by date rank_ratio operational;
run;
proc sort data=modelc4 out=modelc6;




by date rank_ratio operational;
if missing(count) then count=0;































retain alpha1-alpha3 beta1-beta3 0;
%do k=-1 %to 1;
%let count=%eval(&count+1);
%if %eval(&k)=-1 %then %do;
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from sample1a as a, modela11 as b, modelb11 as c
where a.date=b.date and a.date=c.date and





title"posterior expected bankruptcy rate";
run;
proc freq data=total_set5(where=(mdy(6,30,1990)





by date nm roa cr rec_conv operational;
















by date nm roa cr rec_conv;
run;
proc means data=sample1g n nmiss;





by date nm roa cr rec_conv;
if missing(bankrupt) then bankrupt=0;
if missing(going_concern) then going_concern=0;
run;
proc sql;
create view sample1i as
select a.*,b.bankrupt,b.going_concern
from sample1b as a, sample1h as b
where a.date=b.date and a.nm=b.nm and




set sample1i(drop=nm roa cr rec_conv);
run;
proc freq data=total_set5(where=((date>mdy(6,30,1990)




create view sample2b as
select a.date,a.nm,a.roa,b.expectation
from sample2a as a, modela11 as b





title"posterior expected bankruptcy rate2";
run;
proc freq data=total_set5(where=(mdy(6,30,1990)






by date nm roa operational;















by date nm roa;
run;
proc means data=sample2g n nmiss;
title"count of missing bankruptcies and




by date nm roa;
if missing(bankrupt) then bankrupt=0;




create view sample2i as
select a.*,b.bankrupt,b.going_concern
from sample2b as a, sample2h as b











create view sample3b as
select a.date,a.cr,a.rec_conv,b.expectation
from sample3a as a, modelb11 as b














by date cr rec_conv operational;















by date cr rec_conv;
run;
proc means data=sample3g n nmiss;






by date cr rec_conv;
if missing(bankrupt) then bankrupt=0;
if missing(going_concern) then going_concern=0;
run;
proc sql;
create view sample3i as
select a.*,b.bankrupt,b.going_concern
from sample3b as a, sample3h as b











create view sample4b as
select a.date,b.expectation
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from sample4a as a, modelc11 as b




title"posterior expected bankruptcy rate4";
run;
proc freq data=total_set5(where=(mdy(6,30,1990)
























proc means data=sample4g n nmiss;






if missing(bankrupt) then bankrupt=0;
if missing(going_concern) then going_concern=0;
run;
proc sql;
create view sample4i as
select a.*,b.bankrupt,b.going_concern
from sample4b as a, sample4h as b
where a.date=b.date;
run;













retain number omega 1 df delta 0;
g_bar=bankrupt/(bankrupt+going_concern)-
expectation;



















create table joint_sample4 as
select a.*






B.8 Posterior Test for Bankruptcy
libname gdp ’/home/wvu/deharris/new/state3’;
libname bankrupt ’/home/wvu/deharris/new/state3’;
/*options mprint symbolgen mlogic obs=100000;*/
/*gathers all price data, in raw form, and calculates maximum and minimum values of dates*/
proc sql;
create view gather1 as
select permno,min(date) as dmin, max(date) as dmax
from crsp.dsf

















if substr(left(shrcd),2,1)=’3’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),2,1)=’4’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),2,1)=’5’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),2,1)=’8’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),1,1)=’2’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),1,1)=’4’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),1,1)=’7’ then delete;
else do;
if dlstcd=100 then operational=1;
else if dlstcd in(200,231,232,241,244,301,331,343) then merge=1;
else if dlstcd in(233,235,271,333,334,361) then cash_buyout=1;
else if dlstcd in(502,510,513,514,516,517,519,520,573,575,580,581,582,583,584) then
private=1;
else if dlstcd in(574) then bankrupt=1;
else if dlstcd
in(234,242,243,251,252,261,262,300,332,341,342,400,450,460,470,500) then do;
if dlstcd in(234,500) then do;
if nwperm>0 then merge=1;
else if nwperm=0 and dlamt>0 then cash_buyout=1;
else private=1;
end;
else if dlstcd in (242,243,251,341,342) then do;
if nwperm>0 then merge=1;
else cash_buyout=1;
end;
else if dlstcd in (252,261,262,450) then do;
if nwperm>0 then merge=1;
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else if dlstcd in(300) then do;
if nwperm>0 then merge=1;
else delete;
end;
else if dlstcd in (332) then do;
if nwperm>0 then merge=1;
else private=1;
end;
else if dlstcd in (400,460,470) then do;





if bankrupt=1 then operational=0;
else operational=1;





if aa and bb;
run;
/*gather gvkey permno linkages*/
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data link/view=link;
set crspa.ccmxpf_lnkused(keep=ugvkey ulinkdt apermno ulinkenddt
ulinktype where=(ulinktype in("LC","LU","LS")) rename=(ugvkey=gvkey apermno=permno));
by permno;
if missing(ulinkenddt) then ulinkenddt=mdy(12,31,2013);
if missing(ulinkdt) then delete;
else if missing(gvkey) then delete;




create view gather4 as
select a.*,b.gvkey,b.ulinkdt,b.ulinkenddt







set gather4(where=(^missing(dmin) and ^missing(dmax)));
by permno;
run;




do date=dmin to dmax;



































/*This is the end of the permno based gathering and combining of data*/
/*gather acct data*/
data acct_data/view=acct_data;
set comp.fundq(keep=datadate gvkey SALEQ ATQ RECTQ ACTQ
LCTQ NIQ IBQ where=(^missing(date))rename=(datadate=date));
by gvkey date;










if (^missing(niq) and ^missing(SALEQ) and (SALEQ NE 0)) then nm=niq/SALEQ;
else nm=.;
/*Return on Assets*/
if (^missing(NIQ) and ^missing(ATQ) and (ATQ NE 0)) then roa=NIQ/ATQ;
else roa=.;
/*Current ratio*/











drop ibq saleq NIQ ATQ RECTQ ACTQ LCTQ date;
run;
/*sort by quarter to rank*/




proc rank data=ratios2 percent ties=mean out=ratios3;
by quarter;
var nm roa cr rec_conv;















%do i=1 %to 4;
if ^missing(r&&a&i) then do;
if r&&a&i>10 and r&&a&i<90 then &&a&i=0;

















create view accounting_data4 as
select a.*, b.nm,b.roa,b.cr,b.rec_conv











if operational=0 then do;







create view total_set3 as
select a.*, b.rank_ratio
from total_set2 as a left join gdp.storage as b
on a.quarter=b.quarter;
quit;






















drop lpermno lnm lroa lcr lrec_conv;
run;
data total_set4/view=total_set4;
set total_set3c(keep=permno date nm roa cr rec_conv rank_ratio
operational);
if ^missing(nm) and ^missing(roa) and ^missing(cr) and ^missing(rec_conv) then category=1;
else if ^missing(nm) and ^missing(roa) then category=2;
else if ^missing(cr) and ^missing(rec_conv) then category=3;
else category=4;
run;




















do date=mdy(6,30,1990) to mdy(12,31,2007);
do nm=-1 to 1;
do roa=-1 to 1;
do rank_ratio=-1 to 1;












proc sort data=modela3 out=modela5 presorted;
by date nm roa rank_ratio operational;
run;
proc sort data=modela4 out=modela6;




by date nm roa rank_ratio operational;
if missing(count) then count=0;




















by date nm roa rank_ratio;









by date nm roa rank_ratio;
retain alpha1-alpha27 beta1-beta27 0;
%do i=-1 %to 1;
%do j=-1 %to 1;
%do k=-1 %to 1;
%let count=%eval(&count+1);
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%if %eval(&i)=-1 & %eval(&j)=-1 & %eval(&k)=-1 %then %do;




















set modela10(where=(bankrupt+going_concern>0) drop=alpha1-alpha27 beta1-beta27 percent);
by date nm roa rank_ratio;
run;
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do date=mdy(6,30,1990) to mdy(12,31,2007);
do cr=-1 to 1;
do rec_conv=-1 to 1;
do rank_ratio=-1 to 1;











proc sort data=modelb3 out=modelb5 presorted;
365
by date cr rec_conv rank_ratio operational;
run;
proc sort data=modelb4 out=modelb6;




by date cr rec_conv rank_ratio operational;
if missing(count) then count=0;




















by date cr rec_conv rank_ratio;









by date cr rec_conv rank_ratio;
retain alpha1-alpha27 beta1-beta27 0;
%do i=-1 %to 1;
%do j=-1 %to 1;
%do k=-1 %to 1;
%let count=%eval(&count+1);
%if %eval(&i)=-1 & %eval(&j)=-1 & %eval(&k)=-1 %then %do;





















set modelb10(where=(bankrupt+going_concern>0) drop=alpha1-alpha27 beta1-beta27 percent);
by date cr rec_conv rank_ratio;
run;









title"verification that there are no missing dates";
run;




do date=mdy(6,30,1990) to mdy(12,31,2007);
do rank_ratio=-1 to 1;









proc sort data=modelc3 out=modelc5 presorted;
by date rank_ratio operational;
run;
proc sort data=modelc4 out=modelc6;





by date rank_ratio operational;
if missing(count) then count=0;































retain alpha1-alpha3 beta1-beta3 0;
%do k=-1 %to 1;
%let count=%eval(&count+1);
%if %eval(&k)=-1 %then %do;



















set modelc10(where=(bankrupt+going_concern>0) drop=alpha1-alpha3 beta1-beta3 percent);
by date rank_ratio;
run;




create view sample1b as
select a.date,a.nm,a.roa,a.cr,a.rec_conv,sum(b.expectation*.53163,c.expectation*.46829) as expectation
from sample1a as a, modela11 as b, modelb11 as c




title"posterior expected bankruptcy rate";
run;





by date nm roa cr rec_conv operational;
















by date nm roa cr rec_conv;
run;
proc means data=sample1g n nmiss;




by date nm roa cr rec_conv;
if missing(bankrupt) then bankrupt=0;
if missing(going_concern) then going_concern=0;
run;
proc sql;
create view sample1i as
373
select a.*,b.bankrupt,b.going_concern
from sample1b as a, sample1h as b
where a.date=b.date and a.nm=b.nm and a.roa=b.roa and a.cr=b.cr and a.rec_conv=b.rec_conv;
run;
data sample1j/view=sample1j;
set sample1i(drop=nm roa cr rec_conv);
run;




create view sample2b as
select a.date,a.nm,a.roa,b.expectation
from sample2a as a, modela11 as b




title"posterior expected bankruptcy rate2";
run;






by date nm roa operational;















by date nm roa;
run;
proc means data=sample2g n nmiss;




by date nm roa;
if missing(bankrupt) then bankrupt=0;




create view sample2i as
select a.*,b.bankrupt,b.going_concern
from sample2b as a, sample2h as b









create view sample3b as
select a.date,a.cr,a.rec_conv,b.expectation
from sample3a as a, modelb11 as b




title"posterior expected bankruptcy rate3";
run;






by date cr rec_conv operational;















by date cr rec_conv;
run;
proc means data=sample3g n nmiss;




by date cr rec_conv;
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if missing(bankrupt) then bankrupt=0;
if missing(going_concern) then going_concern=0;
run;
proc sql;
create view sample3i as
select a.*,b.bankrupt,b.going_concern
from sample3b as a, sample3h as b









create view sample4b as
select a.date,b.expectation
from sample4a as a, modelc11 as b




title"posterior expected bankruptcy rate4";
run;
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proc means data=sample4g n nmiss;






if missing(bankrupt) then bankrupt=0;
if missing(going_concern) then going_concern=0;
run;
proc sql;
create view sample4i as
select a.*,b.bankrupt,b.going_concern
from sample4b as a, sample4h as b
where a.date=b.date;
run;





set sample1j sample2j sample3j sample4j;
run;
proc print data=joint_sample1(obs=10);




retain number omega 1 df delta 0;
g_bar=bankrupt/(bankrupt+going_concern)-expectation;














create table joint_sample4 as
select a.*





B.9 Posterior Test for Merger
/*options mprint symbolgen mlogic obs=100000;*/
/*gathers all price data, in raw form, and calculates maximum and minimum values of dates*/
proc sql;
create view gather1 as
select permno,min(date) as dmin, max(date) as dmax
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from crsp.dsf
















if substr(left(shrcd),2,1)=’3’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),2,1)=’4’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),2,1)=’5’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),2,1)=’8’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),1,1)=’2’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),1,1)=’4’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),1,1)=’7’ then delete;
else do;
if dlstcd=100 then operational=1;
else if dlstcd in(200,231,232,241,244,301,331,343) then merge=1;
else if dlstcd in(233,235,271,333,334,361) then cash_buyout=1;
else if dlstcd in(502,510,513,514,516,517,519,520,573,575,580,581,582,583,584) then
private=1;
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else if dlstcd in(574) then bankrupt=1;
else if dlstcd
in(234,242,243,251,252,261,262,300,332,341,342,400,450,460,470,500) then do;
if dlstcd in(234,500) then do;
if nwperm>0 then merge=1;
else if nwperm=0 and dlamt>0 then cash_buyout=1;
else private=1;
end;
else if dlstcd in (242,243,251,341,342) then do;
if nwperm>0 then merge=1;
else cash_buyout=1;
end;
else if dlstcd in (252,261,262,450) then do;
if nwperm>0 then merge=1;




else if dlstcd in(300) then do;
if nwperm>0 then merge=1;
else delete;
end;
else if dlstcd in (332) then do;
if nwperm>0 then merge=1;
else private=1;
end;
else if dlstcd in (400,460,470) then do;






if merge=1 then operational=0;
else operational=1;





if aa and bb;
run;
/*gather gvkey permno linkages*/
data link/view=link;
set crspa.ccmxpf_lnkused(keep=ugvkey ulinkdt apermno ulinkenddt
ulinktype where=(ulinktype in("LC","LU","LS")) rename=(ugvkey=gvkey apermno=permno));
by permno;
if missing(ulinkenddt) then ulinkenddt=mdy(12,31,2013);
if missing(ulinkdt) then delete;
else if missing(gvkey) then delete;




create view gather4 as
select a.*,b.gvkey,b.ulinkdt,b.ulinkenddt








set gather4(where=(^missing(dmin) and ^missing(dmax) and dmax>mdy(12,31,1961) and dmin<mdy(1,1,2008)));
by permno;
if dmin<mdy(1,1,1962) then dmin=mdy(1,1,1962);
if dmax>mdy(12,31,2007) then dmax=mdy(12,31,2007);













set no_accounting_data1(keep=permno date) accounting_data1(keep=permno date);
dummy=1;
run;
proc sort data=subset1 out=subset2;
by permno date;
run;













drop gvkey ulinkdt ulinkenddt dummy;
run;
















/*This is the end of the permno based gathering and combining of data*/
/*gather acct data*/
data acct_data/view=acct_data;
















if (^missing(NIQ) and ^missing(ATQ) and (ATQ NE 0)) then roa=NIQ/ATQ;
else roa=.;
/*Debt to equity*/





label de="Debt to Equity"
roa="Return on Assets"
;
keep gvkey date roa de ceqq quarter;
run;
data ratios1a/view=ratios1a;
set ratios1(where=(^missing(roa) and ^missing(de) and ^missing(ceqq) and ^missing(date)));
run;
/*sort by quarter to rank*/




proc rank data=ratios2 percent ties=mean out=ratios3;
by quarter;
var roa ceqq de;
ranks rroa rceqq rde;
run;









%do i=1 %to 3;
if ^missing(r&&a&i) then do;
if r&&a&i>10 and r&&a&i<90 then &&a&i=0;












create view accounting_data4 as
select a.*, b.de,b.roa,b.ceqq
from accounting_data3 as a
left join
ratios5 as b
on a.gvkey=b.gvkey and a.quarter=b.quarter;
quit;
data accounting_data5/view=accounting_data5;





if operational=0 then do;







set crsp.dsf(keep=hsiccd permno date rename=(hsiccd=sic) where=(^missing(sic) and date>mdy(12,31,1961) and date<mdy(1,1,2008)));
by permno date;




create view total_set3 as
select a.*, b.group
from total_set2 as a left join sic1 as b
on a.permno=b.permno and a.date=b.date





































if missing(group) then do;
test=0;
%do i=1 %to 7;
%if %eval(&i)=1 %then %do;























set total_set7(keep=permno date de roa ceqq group operational);




































do date=mdy(6,30,1990) to mdy(12,31,2007);
do de=-1 to 1;
do roa=-1 to 1;
do ceqq=-1 to 1;
do i=1 to 2;
if i=1 then group="F";
else group="N";












proc sort data=modela3 out=modela5 presorted;
394
by date de roa ceqq group operational;
run;
proc sort data=modela4 out=modela6;




by date de roa ceqq group operational;
if missing(count) then count=0;




















by date de roa ceqq group;









by date de roa ceqq group;
retain alpha1-alpha54 beta1-beta54 0;
%do i=-1 %to 1;
%do j=-1 %to 1;
%do k=-1 %to 1;
%do m=1 %to 2;
%let count=%eval(&count+1);
%if %eval(&i)=-1 & %eval(&j)=-1 & %eval(&k)=-1 & %eval(&m)=1 %then %do;
if de=%eval(&i) and roa=%eval(&j) and ceqq=%eval(&k) and group="F" then do;










else if de=%eval(&i) and roa=%eval(&j) and ceqq=%eval(&k) and group="F" then do;







else if de=%eval(&i) and roa=%eval(&j) and ceqq=%eval(&k) and group="N" then do;

















set modela10(where=(merged+going_concern>0) drop=alpha1-alpha54 beta1-beta54 percent);
by date de roa ceqq group;
run;











do date=mdy(6,30,1990) to mdy(12,31,2007);


















if missing(count) then count=0;





























retain alpha beta 0;












set modela11(keep=date merged going_concern expectation) modelb11(keep=date merged
going_concern expectation);
if missing(merged) then merged=0;
if missing(going_concern) then going_concern=0;
if missing(expectation) then delete;
run;
data solution/view=solution;
set combined_sample(where=(date>mdy(6,30,1990) and date<mdy(1,1,2008)));
retain count number omega 1 df delta 0;
count=count+1;
g_bar=merged/(merged+going_concern)-expectation;









create view final1 as






B.10 Posterior Test for Loss Given Merger
/*options mprint symbolgen mlogic;*/
/*
data filter1;













proc summary data=filter1(where=(prc>0 and ^missing(prc)));
by permno;
var date;
output out=date_bounds min(date)=dmin max(date)=dmax;
run;
/*restricts data to common shares only and assigns final status code*/
data common_only/view=common_only;
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set crsp.dseall(keep=permno dlstcd shrcd dlamt nwperm where=(^missing(dlstcd)));
by permno;
if substr(left(shrcd),2,1)=’3’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),2,1)=’4’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),2,1)=’5’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),2,1)=’8’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),1,1)=’2’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),1,1)=’4’ then delete;







if dlstcd=100 then operational=1;
else if dlstcd in(200,231,232,241,244,301,331,343) then merge=1;
else if dlstcd in(233,235,271,333,334,361) then cash_buyout=1;
else if dlstcd in(502,510,513,514,516,517,519,520,573,575,580,581,582,583,584) then private=1;
else if dlstcd in(574) then bankrupt=1;
else if dlstcd in(234,242,243,251,252,261,262,300,332,341,342,400,450,460,470,500) then do;
if dlstcd in(234,500) then do;
if nwperm>0 then merge=1;
else if nwperm=0 and dlamt>0 then cash_buyout=1;
else private=1;
end;
else if dlstcd in (242,243,251,341,342) then do;
if nwperm>0 then merge=1;
else cash_buyout=1;
end;
else if dlstcd in (252,261,262,450) then do;
if nwperm>0 then merge=1;




else if dlstcd in(300) then do;
if nwperm>0 then merge=1;
else delete;
end;
else if dlstcd in (332) then do;
if nwperm>0 then merge=1;
else private=1;
end;
else if dlstcd in (400,460,470) then do;







merge filter1(in=aa) d_end(keep=permno d_end) date_bounds(in=cc keep=permno dmin dmax) common_only(in=bb where=(cash_buyout=1 or merge=1));
by permno;
if aa and bb and cc;
run;
data filter3/view=filter3;
set filter2(where=(d_end-dmax<366 and d_end-date<366));
by permno;
if prc>0 then lower_distance=dmax-date;
run;
proc sql;
create view filter4 as
select a.*,min(a.lower_distance) as minimum_lower_distance
404















create view new_firm1 as
select a.permno, a.date, a.prc,a.cfacpr,b.permno as old_perm, b.d_end,b.dmax
from crsp.dsf as a right join filter6 as b
on a.permno=b.nwperm and a.date>b.d_end and a.date<b.d_end+365;
quit;
data new_firm2/view=new_firm2;





create view new_firm3 as
select a.*, min(a.upper_distance) as minimum_upper_distance






















create view combine_set2 as
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select a.*,b.lower_price,c.upper_price
from combine_set1 as a, extract_lower_price as b, extract_upper_price as c
where a.permno=b.permno and a.permno=c.permno;
quit;
data combine_set3/view=combine_set3;
set combine_set2(keep=date dlamt permno prc cash_buyout d_end
lower_price merge upper_price);
if cash_buyout = 1 and date>d_end then delete;






drop cash_buyout dlamt prc;
run;
























if aa and bb;
run;
data first_join&i/view=first_join&i;
merge storage&j(in=aa where=(prc>0)) lead&i(where=(prc&i>0));
by permno date;
































if return GE 1 then do;
loss0=1;
end;
%do i=1 %to 100;













retain cumulative_loss0-cumulative_loss100 total 0;
%let k=_Sum;






set loss_class3(keep=date cumulative_loss0-cumulative_loss100 total);
by date;






















merge expectation1(keep=date expectation) expectation2(keep=date loss);
by date;
if date<mdy(7,1,1990) then delete;



























B.11 Posterior Test for Loss Given Going Con-
cern


















/*restricts data to common shares only and assigns final status code*/
data common_only/view=common_only;
set crsp.dseall(keep=permno dlstcd shrcd dlamt nwperm where=(^missing(dlstcd)));
by permno;
if substr(left(shrcd),2,1)=’3’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),2,1)=’4’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),2,1)=’5’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),2,1)=’8’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),1,1)=’2’ then delete;
else if substr(left(shrcd),1,1)=’4’ then delete;








if dlstcd=100 then operational=1;
else if dlstcd in(200,231,232,241,244,301,331,343) then merge=1;
else if dlstcd in(233,235,271,333,334,361) then cash_buyout=1;
else if dlstcd in(502,510,513,514,516,517,519,520,573,575,580,581,582,583,584) then private=1;
else if dlstcd in(574) then bankrupt=1;
else if dlstcd in(234,242,243,251,252,261,262,300,332,341,342,400,450,460,470,500) then do;
if dlstcd in(234,500) then do;
if nwperm>0 then merge=1;
else if nwperm=0 and dlamt>0 then cash_buyout=1;
else private=1;
end;
else if dlstcd in (242,243,251,341,342) then do;
if nwperm>0 then merge=1;
else cash_buyout=1;
end;
else if dlstcd in (252,261,262,450) then do;
if nwperm>0 then merge=1;
else if dlamt>0 then cash_buyout=1;
else delete;
end;
else if dlstcd in(300) then do;
if nwperm>0 then merge=1;
else delete;
end;
else if dlstcd in (332) then do;
if nwperm>0 then merge=1;
else private=1;
end;
else if dlstcd in (400,460,470) then do;
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merge filter1(in=aa) d_end(keep=permno d_end) common_only(in=bb);
by permno;
if aa and bb;
run;
data filter3/view=filter3;
set filter2(where=(^missing(prc) and prc>0));
by permno;
if operational=0 and d_end-date<366 then delete;
else prc=prc/cfacpr;
keep date permno prc;
run;
























if aa and bb;
run;
data first_join&i/view=first_join&i;
merge storage&j(in=aa where=(prc>0)) lead&i(where=(prc&i>0));
by permno date;
































if return GE 1 then do;
loss0=1;
end;
%do i=1 %to 100;













retain cumulative_loss0-cumulative_loss100 total 0;
%let k=_Sum;






set loss_class3(keep=date cumulative_loss0-cumulative_loss100 total);
by date;
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merge expectation1(keep=date expectation) expectation2(keep=date loss);
by date;
if date<mdy(7,1,1990) then delete;
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